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Social indicators, the measures we use to guide social action, are
important because they define and focus attention on problems and
crcate demand for particular solutions. The combination of a new
ability to store and manipulate data and a commitment to deal with a
wider range of social issues has produced a new interest in deliberate
planning of social indicators. Thus far the writings are speculative
and efforts to institute a system of indicators have failed.
The purpose of the thesis is to help find ways to design
indicators successfully. The study considers "design" to include all
elements essential to the creation of an indicator and its involvement
in decision-mnaking. It includes methods of defining concepts.
collecting data, and constructin'g indices as well as types of
institutions to produce and use the indicator and ways it may get
political acceptance. The thesis examines these issues for two
indicators that have had long history and wide use and may be considered
relatively successful. The indicators are the U.S. unemployment rate,
the monthly percentage of the labor force that is unemployed, and the
standard budget, a list of goods and services requisite for a particular
standard of living. When priced, it is a measure of income adequacy.
The studies examine the intellectual and political origins of the
indicators, the ways their concepts and methods came to be developed,
and the ways they were used and not used.
These successful indicators share common characteristics. Both
were created for urgent social problems and received particular impetus
in crises like depressions and wars. The legislative rather than the
executive branch motivated substantive developments. The methods and
concepts emerged from a long period and involved both academics and
politicians. Both indicators were produced by statistical agencies,
insulated from politics, with the aid of outside committees which
formed interest groups and gave legitimacy to changes.
The unemployment indicator was more.successful in many ways than
the budgets, and the reasons derive largely from its qualities as a
simpler, more straightforward measure. As an essential part of the
implementation of a policy established by the Employment Act of 1946,
the unemployment rate became an institution. Interest groups and the
public came to understand it, analysts to use it and many to defend it
from attack from the press and encroachments on its objectivity. The
budgets, in spite of their wide use to set wage and welfare levcls,
never gained general acceptance as a measure of income adequacy and
never became part of established policy. Nonuse of the budget where
adequate income was an issue was as common as use, particularly in
policy discussion. As a complex, empirical measure of an imperfectly
defined norm, it was ambiguous, value-laden and controversial. It
was misunderstood and not useful to researchers. Today its existence
is in doubt, as a hostile Administration attempts to abolish it rather
than accept the income goals it defines, and few come to its defense.
The conclusions are that indicators are most likely to be success-
fully produced with Congressional initiative, taking advantage of
current issues. The process will take years, and the qualities of
the indicators and the ways they are used will interact. Institutions
to protect indicators from current politics, provide them with informed
Lnterest groups, and permit orderly change and public scrutiny are
essential. Finally; the indicator's concept and design must be clear
and, if not simple, then based cn theory so it may be explained,
trusted, and used.
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SOCIAL INDICATORS: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
CHAPTER I
SOCIAL INDICATORS IN THE FORMATION OF POLICY
Introduction
After retiring as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
Wilbur Cohen told a Congressional Committee that the Chief of
Statistics and Research (which he was also at one time) is in many
ways more influential than a Cabinet Secretary. He continued, "the
man who decides to collect or not collect statistics on Indian
education or medicare or medicaid or nutrition or hunger is the
person who is fundamentally determining the character of the issue
and the controversy later on." (1)
The dawning realization that statistics may define the problems
we face as a nation is motivating a widening effort to develop
social indicators as a conscious part of the policy-making process.
Although decision-makers have used social statistics for many years,
the choice and design of the data has not been their province.
Thus they have not applied the kinds of selection criteria to data
that they have applied to the other decisions they make. The result
is that policy-makers are often faced with problems whose basic
outlines are shaped and limited by the character of the data that
happens to be available and to carry with it some credibility.
Other problems are impossible to demonstrate or even define clearly
in the absence of quantitative information. Advocates of social
indicators agree that their choice and design should be more
deliberate and more directed toward issues of public policy.
But how to do this effectively remains a question.
The objective of the present thesis is to explore the implications
of the idea that social statistics themselves and their supporting
institutions are an integral part of the process through which
public action on social issues is conceived and taken. The
thesis will examine not only the hypothesis that an indicator's
existence and character is critical to the ways in which we perceive
and solve problems, but also that the nature of the institutions
and methods for producing and using the data has an important effect
on whether and how we do use the data. Of course, the nature of
the indicator itself can influence the character of the ins1titutions.
around it, just as the institutions may influence the indicator.
The ultimate purpose of this study is to further understanding
of how social data themselves may come into existence and how and
why they shape or fail to shape public decisions. The underlying
assumption is that data are at least potentially beneficial to the
process of social decision-making - that they may inform the
participants and give them common ground for rational discussion
and that they may provide us the means of formulating specific
goals and measuring our progress toward them. In any case, quan-
titative data is certain to be a part of an increasing proportion
of decisions on social questions in this modern era of computers and
"scientific" samples. Therefore, it is essential that we learn to
design and to use or to reject data so that it informs rather than
confuses discussion. We should try to make this new use of data
an opportunity rather than a problem.
The basic approach of the thesis to understanding the dynamics
of data in social decision-making has been to examine the birth,
growth and evolution of two indicators which have an important
current role. One is tha unemployment rate, the monthly percentage
of the U.S. labor force which is unemployed. It plays a major
role in decisions on national economic policy. The other is the
standard budget, a lesser known, but in many ways equally potent,
indicator of an "adequate" income level. It figures in decisions
abouL benefiLs andwages and is beginning to play a role in discussion
of guaranteed incomes.
The study aims to identify the forces that have created these
indicators and influenced their development, to define ways they
have been produced, used, and not used. The analysis seeks many
of the explanations in the nature of the indicators as well as in
the ways they have been developed and presented to the public.
An understanding of how data selection, design, uses and users
have interacted over a long period for actual indicators can help us
to plan the new indicators we want the institutions they will require.
Certainly, if we know nothing about how indicators have developed and
come to play a role in decision-making, (or failed to play one) we are
at a considerable disadvantage. After examining the two indicators,
comparing the successes and failures, and attempting explanations, I
will define some general guidelines to a strategy for developing
future indicators.
Definition of a Social Indicator
As a first step, let me make clear what the term indicator means
in the context of this thesis. It is any type of quantitative measure
which is either used or designed for use in guiding some action.
This should be differentiated from statistics, which are simply numbers,
buried perhaps in census tabulations, in which no one is interested and
which no one is likely to use. A statistic becomes an indicator when
someone uses it to back up a comment on the state of society, a sugges-
tion on a proposed action, or actually to formulate an action. An
indicator reflects directly or indirectly on a matter which is of concern
to society and which society may possibly affect. Thus the number of
stars in the sky is probably not an indicator whereas the number of
soot particles in the air possibly is one.
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The term "social" meant only to limit the indicator to matters
directly pertaining to the welfare of people in their social context.
Thus an indicator of mental illness would be a social indicator insofar
as society was either responsible for or affected by it. The so-called
"economic" indicators are sometimes used to study the economy, the
state of which is only indirectly and not always dependably related to
the welfare of individuals or groups. Sometimes economic indicators
are directly used to reflect the social conditions and, in that case,
we would consider them social indicators.
Many writers have suggested that social indicators should have
some specific characteristics to be deemed worthy of the title. Some
say they should be part of a regular time series, they should be
descriptive, help us make predictions, or provide warning signals
of impending problems. Others stress that social indicators must be
part of an interrelated set pertinent to the total social system, that
they must permit causal analysis of problems or that they must be
directly normative.
The present study will regard these proposals as hypotheses. One
can limit one's definition of a social indicator to data which meet
any of these criteria, but I prefer to limit it only to data which can
be or are used in decision-making. The quality of their use or the way
they are used is a subject for investigation here rather than a prior
decision. While the traits suggested for social indicators sound
attractive, some may be more useful for dealing with certain types of
problems than others. Some characteristics may not even be feasible
because of the nature of certain social issues. Moreover, they may
be constrained by the ways policies are made or can be made in our
system. For example, an early warning indicator is not of much value-
if decision-making procedures are not set up to respond to them.
It is possible that our brand of democracy will never set up procedures
for the rapid decisions that the design of many types of indicators
would presume.
This broad definition of social indicators represents an attempt
to avoid defining away important questions about the way an
indicator can and, perhaps, should be designed and used. Many
narrower definitions would preclude investigation of how design and
use may actually be related, stating only instead how they ought to be
related. One outcome of this thesis will hopefully be the exploration
of the concept of a social indicator and a more complete definition of
what it is, what is is not and what a range of possibilities may be.
Indicators Define Problems and their Solutions
The most important role of social indicators, as Wilbur Cohen
implied, is probably their way of defining many of the problems that
society confronts. The situations that we as a society preserve as
problems are not forced upon us by chance or some arbitrary fate.
Rather, our problem perceptions are relative to our social system and
values, and to our information. (2) Thus we perceive unemployment
as a problem today because first, our system has now made it possible
for workers to have permanent job attachments, secondly we have come
to place high value on regularity of employment, thirdly, we have a
model of how unemployment may be alleviated, and finally, we have precise,
frequent data on the level of unemployment.
The question of how problems come to be defined is important most
obviously because if we do not perceive a problem, we are not likely
to do anything about it. Moreover, the way the problem is defined
points us in the direction of certain types of actions. Thus if we
define as a problem that many Americans are illiterate, the obvious
answer is to provide literacy training. However, if we define the
problem as the fact that many cannot cope with the complexities of
modern life, literacy training is only one of the possible indicated
actions. If poverty is au individual's problem, we tend to provide
case work solutions; whereas if it is a social problem, we might try
to eliminate discriminatory practices.
A problem is defined by the discrepancy between an actual situation-
and a desired situation. Two elements are involved, our perception of
reality and our goal definitions. Indicators are important in both.
Thus if we say the problem is that the economy is not growing fact enough,
it means we have some way of measuring economic growth and some
criterion for what is fast enough. The usual measure for growth is GNP,
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and what rate is "fast enough" may depend on past rates or other
countries' rates. The target rate might also derive from models that
connect GNP growth to other target variables like unemployment rates,
or population growth. The target GNP growth might be set at a level
thought high enough to produce low enough unemployment or high enough
to accommodate an expanding population.
The definition of the problem turns out to be where many decisions
are made and many, often desirable, alternatives foregone. Problem
definition is not only essential to action, it may well actually
promote action, and indicators make the latter particularly likely.
Thus once you can define and preferably, measure a discrepancy between
what it is and what most agree should be, then it becomes a political
necessity do something. (3)
Quantitative description tends to be more communicable on a mass
scale and carry a certain aura of fact which purely conceptual
definitions do not. Thus problems for which we have quantitative
measures tend to receive most public recognition. Policy makers are
more likely to act on them than on many other issues because, when
measures exist, it is easier to demonstrate reasons for policies and
progress toward goals.
In a statement prepared as a preface to the recent White House
Staff Report on National Goals, Patrick Moynihan outlined many of the
issues in measuring social problems. He said "It is a good general
rule that governments only begin to do something about problems when
they learn to measure them. It is perhaps even more important to be
clear that people are only likely to take serious advantage of
opportunities when they learn to recognize them." He goes on to
describe how the development of national income accounts permitted for
the first time a discussion in comprehensible public terms about
implications of decisions for economic growth.
He said that goals"institutionalize the creation of each dis-
content. The setting of future goals, no matter how distant, drains
legitimacy from present conditions. Once (a goal) is established and
it is agreed upon that the future will have to be very different from
the present, it becomes absurd to be content with the present."(4)
Indicators, then, play an important role in policy-making by
providing descriptions of reality, suggesting ways of formulating,
goals, and, by implication, identifying problems. In defining
problems, they point to decisions for policy antd sometimes create
demand for policy. This is the fundamental potency of indicators.
It is the reason that individual indicators have frequently become
controversial and at the same time that they can open new vistas for
the policy-makers.
MIML
Policy-Making, Models, and Indicators
The potential and limitations of social indicators in the formula-
tion of public action on social problems depend on the models we use
to analyze society and the modesl we use to select and measure the
indicator. These must mesh with one another if the indicator is to
be useful. It is these models that underlie our policy formation,
problem definition and indicator selection. We cannot fully understand
the role that indicators have or fail to have without recognizing the
existence and nature of the models we operate with.
Let us first clarify some terms. A policy is broad, high-level
decision about goals and strategies. It involves issues in the
context of a large system, long-range objectives and basic values.
It should be differentiated from a program, which is the definition of
tactics to reach a specified goal. Although the two are on a
continuum in which the dividing line is imprecise, a program design
involves a more united system, in which many more elements are pre-
determined or presumed not manipulable (5) because the policy has
already been set. A policy for example, might be to end our
participation in Vietnam as quickly as possible, without trying to win.
A program would be the plan for how many people would be withdrawn,
when, and under what circumstances. At the program level, policies
may be subverted or created implicitly. In any case, it is
in the creation of policy that indicators have their greatest potential
impact, as they work together with explicit or implicit models.
The term "model" in this thesis is a broad one. It includes not
only precise mathematical descriptions like econometric models, but
also more imprecise, poorly articulated descriptions of how society
functions, how people behave, or how an organization operates. - The
model may be explained in words, numbers or diagrams. It may be
purely descriptive in the sense that it simply assigns names to
elements in a situation and perhaps links between variables whose
behavior seems to correlate. It may also be a causal model in which
the relationships between elements are explained and the forces
identified. Finally it could be a normative model, which described
how things ought to be done.
Policy and program planning requires at least an implicit causal
or normative model. A policy is designed to change some condition,
to "solve" a problem by alleviating the discrepancy between what is
and what should be. The normative model may define what should be,
the causal model how to change current situations to preferred ones.
Thus problem definition and problem solution are intricately bound up
with models.
An article by William Pounds of MIT's industrial Management School
describes the ways in which managers "find" problems (6) by using
various kinds of normative models. He provides a succinct outline of
the approaches, which are certainly common to social decision-makers
and policy analysts. The most common model is the historical one,
which says that current situations should resemble the past. For
example, April sales should always exceed March sales by 10%, or
absenteeism should remain constant. Planning models also play a role,
however, in which the problem is defined by a failure to achieve some
target performance level. This is the kind of "problem" Democratic
presidential candidate Edmund Muskie had when he won a primary with
only 35 percent of the vote instead of his predicted 45 percent.
Pounds outlines three other types of problem-identification
models. Other people's models force problems on managers when they
write in with complaints about products that do not meet their
standards, however derived. Thus developing countries tend to have
problems like unemployment or lack of economic mobility defined for them
by the countries which give them assistance. Extra-organizational
models provide problem definition for managers who feel their company
should be following a similar pattern to other companies. This nation
has a problem in health care because our mortality rates are higher than
many other countries. Finally, every so often a scientific model
comes into play. The engineer often identifies problems in, say an
electronic control system, with the aid of complex theoretical models
evolved by scientists. Although this kind of problem-finding is rare
in social policy, it was at work in the original definition of
strategies in the Poverty Program. Because of a social science.
theory on the relation of delinquency and opportunity to poverty,
plans were made to alleviate poverty indirectly, by dealing with
delinquency. (7) All of these models, of course, except perhaps the
scientific one, require further models of how to bring about change.
These simply are models of how to define what changc is necessary,
The indicator is important in this process because it provide,
the description of the reality and often of the goal. As such, it
may carry within it the normative model. If the description is on7
partial, it may become the reality in our minds as we use it in our
model, For example, when we use annual income to identify the.poor,
we tend to equate poverty with a particular low income. It happens
that a substantial portion of low-income families have major
possessions like homes and cars and can live quite comfortably, and a
number of others go into debt or savings in a low-income year and
continue to live comfortably. If we use the income line as the
unique poverty definition, we assume a model of poverty which says)
that income is the only factor that is necessary to identify the
problems which we call poverty. Use of an income line suggests to the
policy-maker the obvious "solution" to poverty - raising of incomes.
Thus the indicators influence policies through the models they imply.
Measurement Requires Models
Thus far, we have discussed the role of an indicator in models
for social change, but we should also recognize that the indicator
itself depends on measurement models and assumptions, which ultimately
determine what the indicator means. (8) That is, an indicator is the
product of a measurement process in which there is an objective or a
concept being measured, a model which describes by what phenomena
we may measure our objective, and a set of methods by which we make the
measurement. Sometimes we fail to specify the concept precisely,
perhaps the model for its measurement has flaws or the actual methods
may not capture the intended phenomenon. Any and all of these problems
may exist in an indicator and will influence the way it behaves, the
way it is regarded and the way it can be used. The appropriate way
of measuring something is not dictated by an absolute criterion.
A measurement is not the reality but only our notation for it, and its
appropriateness depends to varying degrees on the acceptance of valur
assumptions, and the purposes for which we want the indicator measure.
depend on some kind of theory, however primitive, and the final
indicators are at varying distances from the reality they intend to
describe. Thus at the simplest level, direct observation, we might
want to measure the number of chairs in a room. To do so we have
to make assumptions about our measurement instruments and assume that
our eyes will actually show us all the chairs. We have to make an
important assumption about the adequacy of our instrument when we look
through a telescope or send an agent into the field to observe for us.
We also have made an assumption that the relevant item to count is
chairs and that we have a generalized concept of a chair. This is
easy enough if all are of some conventional design, but we may have to
make some classification decisions for stools, benches and even desks,
all of which may serve the same purpose as chairs sometimes. The
decision clearly will depend on what use we want to make of the
information. A junk dealer might measure the whole room in pounds
of scrap metal,
These are the minimum kinds of assumptions and judgments involved
in any measure; their number increases as the measure is at an
increasingly greater distance from the underlying concept. Most
measures of social phenomena have the more tenuous relations to their
object. According to a typology by Kaplan there are three more
measurement types which lie on a continuum from fewer to greater
assumptions. (9) The first is indirect observation in which we only
infer the existence of the phenomenon through presumed connections,
usually causal, with something we do observe. What we observe may
in fact be very different from the phenomenon we are interested in, but
we believe it is its observable effect. Thus we infer the existence
of an electric current because we feel a shock, a change in temperature
because of the rise in a column of mercury, or the existence of
poverty because we see poor housing.
We can measure another kind of concept by reference to direct
observables in connection with constructs. We measure or define the
concept in question by calculation based on observables or some
assumed relations between the observables. We often cannot see
velocity, but we measure it by calculating from positions in space
and time. We do not observe discrimination but calculate it on the
basis of social and individual. behavior patterns. Clearly since there
may be differences among definitions of something so difficult to
observe as discrimination, our measurem2ent of it will depend tremendously
on our interpretations of human behavior and our understanding of
motivation.
Finally, we might try to measure what Kaplan calls a theoretical
concept - a concept not fully defined by reference to observables, even
with an intervening model. Kaplan cites as examples marginal utility
and the Protestant ethic, both of which can only be understood in the
context of economic and sociological theory, respectively. In other
words, their meaning depends on a total system of theory. In social
policy such theoretical concepts might be the cycle of poverty or
family disorganization.
The two indicators which are the subject of this thesis fall at
different ends of this continuum of implicit measurement models. The
unemployment rate is an indirect measure, whereas the standard budget
is closer to a theoretical measure. Though we cannot observe unemploy-
ment directly, we can inquire about it from those who experience it
directly. The implicit model says only that people will understand
and reply honestly to the questions and interviewers will record them.
The standard budget, however, represents a concept whose very existence
we only presume because of what we observe about how society operates.
As we shall see, it is measured by a number of elaborate inferences,
many of which start with indirect observation. The many measurement
assumptions of the budge.ts demanded far more theory than unemployment
measures. The indicator would prove to be adequate for many purposes
because the theory was insufficient.
Many strategies exist to measure things which are not completely
observable. (10) One can measure some other variable thought to vary
with the concept of concern either because of a causal connection or
simply past experience. One can also measure something which
represents part of the concept. For example, violent crime is some-
times used as an indicator of total crime in the United States.
In fact, it may not vary in the same direction or to the same degree.
Another approach is to use a composite figure to represent a complex
concept. Socioeconomic status, for example, is often measured as a
combination of income, education and occupational status. The use of
this technique depends on finding commensurable units for the different
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elements as well as devising a combinational rule. It requires an
assumption that these several dimensions collapsed into a single index
did not themselves interact in important ways and that these variations
were independent. The unemployment rate is only a partial measure of
the unemployment problem, but the standard budget is an attempt to
represent the whole concept of income adequacy as a single, composite
figure.
When one starts with a vague or imperfectly defined concept that
one needs for a model or perhaps simply to explore further, one can
apply the operational approach to measurement. Though we cannot
measure such a concept directly, we can define a set of operations which
in combination will provide both measurement and definition of the
concept. That is, after we perform the operations, we have the measure,
and whatever that measure represents is the concept. The best known
such operational measure is IQ. The concept has got something to do
with inLellectual competence or inLelligence, but the only way we can
define it is through the comparative performance of many people in
responding to questions on a particular test. We can assume the measure
really does represent a phenomenon since its levels predict individual
success in society's terms - grades and later earnings. The trouble
with designing indicators in this "operational" way is that without
a definite concept and a measurement model, we have no decision rules.
It is difficult to know if we are measuring any real concept. Once
we have the indicator, we tend to regard it as representing a
meaningful reality, though it may be only an arbitrary construct. (11)
The standard budget is such an operational measure, and, as such,
it has been susceptible to attack on logical and technical grounds.
Moreover, since no other measure of the social norm of income adequacy)
exists, there is no way to check the validity of this indicator as a
measure of its concept - no way, in fact to be sure what it measures
does. This problem was to provide the single greatest handicap for
the standard budget in practice. Experience with the budget strongly
suggests that successful indicators require not only clear concepts,
but well thought-out models for their measurement.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL INDICATOR CONCEPT
Origins
The idea that statistics are pertinent to political decision-making
is not new. The very term "statistics" is derived from the word state -
information on the state. As early as the 17th and 18th centuries the
Political Arithmcticians were interested in what they called the "Art
of Reasoning by Figures Upon Things Relating to Governient." A
requirement for a regular census was wiritten into the original U.S.
Constitution. For more than a hundred years, governments in the
United States and elsewhere have regularly conducted major data
collection efforts on such social problems as the cost of living or
industrial work patterns.
Today,quantitative information is likely to play an ever widening,
role in policy-making. IL is pat Licularly easy to comnunicate
through mass media. Modern computer technology, permitting storage
and manipulation of large quantities of data has already'meant that
social data is increasingly available and presented as evidence in many
discussions. Moreover, in the sixties for the first time, except
temporarily in the Depression, the United States has made commitments
to government action on a wide range of social problems. It has been
a period of rapid growth of social theory, and analysts and policy-
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makers have wanted to test and choose among the ideas. All this
activity increases the demand for and interest in social statistics.
Statistics on the quality of life have existed many years and
have been used fairly often as indicators. The first self-conscious
effort, however, to organize and interpret a collection of such data
to reflect social conditions dates back to 1929, when President Hoover
appointed a prestigious committee of social scientists to examine the
major social trends. The kind of retrospective and long-range analysis
that was the goal of the study was more suited to prosperous 1929
than to the press ing problems of the Depression. When the massive,
thoughtful report came out in 1932, (12) it was not surprising that
it made little impact. The study was not followed up, as attention
turned to the solution of immediate problems. The idea of outlining
and identifying a compendium of important social data was not revived
again until the mid-sixties.
The contribution of economic indicators to economic planning was
probably the most important single factor in the sudden popularity of
the concept of social indicators. The most spectacular success of
economic indicators, occurred just before the sudden burst of interest
in social indicators in 1966 and 1967. Using economic indicators in
econometric models, President Kennedy and his advisors decided in 1963
on a tax cut to prevent recession. By 1966 it was clear that not
only was recession staved off, but also the economy was working at
approximately the levels official economists predicted. It was a
coup for economic theorists, and it awakened imaginations about the
possibilities for social data and theory in planning. Many of the
proposals for social indicators have been modelled on economic
indicators. Indeed the very term "social indicator" was conceived of
as an analogy to economic indicators.
Let us look briefly at the story of economic indicators to see
where there may be parallels or lessons to be learned for a strategy
of development and use of social indicators. In the early part of
the twentieth century, economists and statisticians in the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), in cooperation with a wide range
of government operating agencies and statistical bureaus, built up an
enormous array of time series data on a range of business conditions.
The approach was very much an empirical one; the focus was on
quantity rather than selectivity. Most of the data was collected and
tabulated withuuL a specific purpose ur Lheory for its use. If the
data seemed generally relevant and not too difficult to collect, the
NBER would add it to its list of indicators. Their hope was that
patterns would emerge from examination of the data. (13)
The majority of the economic indicators and ways of using them
were developed before 1930. The theory of a continuous price index
was developed in this time, and economists constructed several such
indices. The indicators, which were eventually to number in the
hundreds, included figures on business output, input and general
activity. Gradually, the NBER evolved a way of attempting to forecast
upturns and downturns in the business cycle from the relation of
current movements in the data to the pattern of past movements.
They gradually defined certain indicators as "leading" and others as
"lagging" according to their customary position relative to the move-
ments of the other indicators. It was a historical model in
Pounds' sense. The designation was not based on a theory which might
explain why one indicator would be expected to lead or lag. Nor was
there a theory explaining the dynamic or the cause of business cycles
themselves. The use of economic indicators in the early period
simply presumed the existence of such cycles and the continued relation-
ship of certain variables to the cycle in the same way.
Economic indicators were useful for prediction so long as the
patterns and relationships did not change over time. They would not.
be useful for diagnosis since the model used was only a descriptive
one of past correlations. If past relations did not hold in the
future, a new model would be nececary. It was an effort to measure
economic activity without a model of what was significant activity to
measure, or a model of how that activity might grow or change.
While it was a more reliable way of predicting future conditions,than
an individual's subjective approach, it was not an aid to understanding
what to do about business cycles.
Businessmen and, to some extent, Federal agencies use these NBER
indicators in this naive, predictive way even today, but new elements
have radically changed the role of economic indicators since 1930.
Several important new indicators were developed, in particular,
measures of national income and product (GNP) and unemploymentto match
new conceptions of the economy. John Maynard Keynes' work, along with
the experience of a persistent depression focussed attention on a
theory of economic growth. The interest in business cycles, receded
in favor of a theory which explained the low-consumption, low-employment
equilibrium the economy seemed to have reached. The theory was to be
the basis for the econometric models of the national economy which were
developed in recent years, using many of the NBER indicators. These
models provided the foundation for the tax cut, and other successful
efforts to calibrate the economy. Not only did they permit diagnostic
analysis and indicate policy interventions, but they also provided
greater accuracy and precision in prediction than the empirical,
business-cycle approach.
Economic indicators were a key element in this development of
economic policy and control. Indeed, without them it would not have
been possible. Moreover, in the context of current models, the
changes in economic indicators can critically affect national policy.
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Social indicator enthusiasts see the same potential for social data -
it could become increasingly important and contribute to the develop-
ment of better prediction and more effective social policy.
The question is whether social indicators must pass through a
stage of largely empirical activity involving the amassing of data and
searching for patterns, or whether we can or should proceed directly
to the careful selection of data for use in models of social change.
The former is expensive and time-consuming, though it may be better
than no systematic data collection if we can find some simple,
repetitive patterns. We have no grand social theory equivalent to
Keynesian economics in any case around which to structure social data
collection, though perhaps more limited social theories can provide
sufficient guidelines. Many advocates of social indicators as
parallels to economic indicators do not appear to recognize how much
more useful they were in the context of theory.
Recent Literature
In the midsixties, a new concept began to emerge into public
view - the concept that a nation should follow a deliberate strategy of
developing social data as a guide to public action. The idea of
using social data for decision-making was not the new aspect. Rather,
the new element was thinking of the data as a whole, and planning it
more consciously in a broader framework than the special interests that
had prompted earlier data collection.
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Many different proposals would be made for the conceptual frame-
work for a system of indicators, design principles for indicators,
and specific new indicators themselves, but all are founded in a
fundamental faith in a traditional rational planning model. The
object of indicators is to improve decision-making. The assumption is
that more information on alternatives and their effects will inform
decisions better. The underlying, but usually unstated, idea is
that there is some kind of formal process through which information is
and can be an integral part of national policy making and that decisions
will be taken based on the inforTmation. Despite this fundamental
assumption, comparatively little can be found in the writings on
social indicators on ways of facilitating and promoting indicator use
and public understanding, or on the way indicators can be expected to
mesh with planning processes.
The concept appears to have originated with Bertram Gross, a
political scientist who was unquestionably influenced by the example of
economic indicators. He had played a critical role as a Congressional
staff member in the creation and passage of the Employment Act of 1946,
the act which provides the framework for national economic policy-
making, and later served on the staff of the Council of Economic
Advisors, the principle policy-making body of the act. Aware of the
success of economic indicators in promoting and rationalizing economic
policy, he was concerned about the way economic indicators drew
attention away from social concerns. He termed this "The New
Philistinism." (14) He was also interested in the potential of
indicators for developing theories and conceptions of the social
system.
The popularizer of the social indicator idea was Raymond Bauer,
a social psychologist ard professor at the Harvard Business School.
He prepared the volume Social Indicators in conjunction with a study
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the impact of
the space program on society. (15) He stressed the potential role
of indicators to help us detect and measure the effects, direct and
indirect, of the programs on society. The concepts were general
to any major national program. His emphasis was on the complexity
and interrelatedness of the various factors and on the importance of
assessing program affects in the light of our values and goals.
He clearly established the notion that indicators were for policy
purposes. Some later writers had different or more specific views on
how indicators would fit into decision-making but his basic insight has
continued to motivate most of the ensuing discussion:
"For many of the important topics on which social critics blithely
pass judgment, and on which policies are made, there are no yardsticks
by which to know if things are getting better or worse." (16)
These early efforts were still somewhat vague, groping for a precise
concept and strategy for indicators, but they awakened a tremendous
interest. Suggestions and proposals have been proliferating ever
since, (17) though the proposals are as varied as the disciplines from
which they come and the personalities of their proposers. Some
proposals draw directly on the concepts and methods in economic
indicators, others are very political in nature, focussing on the
strategic choice of indicator concepts and the impact they could have
on policy, and others are problem-oriented, growing out of well-defined
research areas. Some proposals involve grand system frameworks into
which to fit indicators, others focus on principles for designing
individual indicators. Some writers advocate the rapid amassing of
data and others want to go slowly to await the building of theory.
In short, there is as yet no clear pattern, no obvious solution to
how indicators should be designed. In fact, there is considerable
controversy.
To give an idea of the diversity aid nature of the proposals
we can look at some examples. One approach is the idea that
indicators should be designed within a "social accounting" framework,
modelled on economic accounts. (18) The indicators would be part of
a vast matrix. This idea necessitates a grand system model, and
tremendous effort in quantifying all the relevant elements,
classifying them and determining the strength of their relationship
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with other variables.
Economists at the National Planning Association, despite the
practical difficulties, are working on such a input-output table. (19)
The inputs are expenditures on government programs and the outputs are
goal indicators like life expectancy or number of violent crimes. The
advantage is that the array of alternatives can be seen at once. The
problem is that the numbers in the table represent much guesswork
because though we know very little about the relationship, say, of
educational investment to educational output, we know almost nothing
about the relation of educational investment to air pollution or
population growth. Our social system models are simply not
adequate to the task. Moreover, although the National Planning
Association uses monetary units in its table, it is unclear that these
are the relevant units for analysis of social issues. However, there is
little likelihood of finding any other commensurable units and without
them such a table is impossible. Certainly, the whole notion of
social accounts has been severely criticised (20), and it has not been
much pursued recently.
In another view, the important aspect of a social indicator is that
it be of direct normative interest. Another economist, Mancur Olson-
who headed up a Federal study on social reporting expressed this view
succintly. An indicator "should facilitate comprehensive and balanced
judgments about the condition of major aspects of a society. It is if
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all cases a direct measure of welfare and is subject to the interpre-
tation that, if it changes in the "right" direction while other things
remain equal, things have gotten better or people are 'better off'."
(21) He used GNP and National Income as the model. He seems to
have posited very difficult requirements, however, since all indicator
users will have to have the same normative model defining the "right"
direction and will have to agree that all other things are equal.
Even if enough agree on these models so the indicator can be applied,
"all other things" are seldom equal in practice, as we shall see.
Accordingly, the interpretation of an indicator's movements can seldom
be unambiguous.
The recent study of the President's Commission on Federal
Statistics had a section on social reporting which said that indicators
could be problem-oriented, descriptive or analytical. (22) The
implication was that these are three different kinds of indicators._
The evidence in the thesis will suggest these specific descriptions
and classifications are not very useful. It is unlikely we could
lay down firm principles for the design of such indicators. Moreover,
the system for using them is not monolithic and the supposedly
descriptive indicator will be used as a problem-oriented one if it
suits some purpose - and even sometimes if it does not.
Another approach is not to take a stand at all on many of these
issues, but to encourage the development of indicators independently
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of one another within the traditional groupings of policies or
research interests. Of course the types of indicators that would
emerge would be those which met needs of the specific area and its
models. This is a kind of "laissez faire" approach in which
indicator advocates collect in one place analyses. and proposals of
experts in many fields (23), but attempt to impose no structure. The
prospects for developing useful indicators are good if one builds on
a foundation of prior research and models. However, the goals of
research in different areas are different, and accordingly, the
indicators have varying degrees of policy relevance. The
compendia of studies suffer from a lack of communcation between the
analysts and a lack of commonality of purpose. The reader who
would like to have the use of more indicators in the future is left
in limbo after reading the varied approaches and has little idea of
where to go next.
The one element lacking in virtually all of these studies has
been a view of a process throuch which indicator's might be designed
and, eventually, used. (24) The reader might assume that the
indicators can and should be created more or less by the stroke of the
pen of some particularly wise individual. They could think that
once the indicator is made available it will automatically be used and
people will understand more about their problems and their solutions.
In fact, though most social indicator analysts have not addressed
these questions, the answers may well influence all the other things
they have said. If useful indicators cannot be designed by stroke
of a pen, perhaps our postulates for indicator design will be
beside the point. Moreover, if getting people to use indicators is
a problem, then perhaps we cannot be so free to decide what type of
design they should have or what type of model they must fit. Instead
the designs and models may have to mesh with those of people who are
setting policy.
Efforts to Institute a Social Report: Executive
Since 1966 there have been several efforts to institute a national
system of social reports or indicators. The fact that the efforts
existed testifies to the potential that many see in this area. The
fact that none of them so far has been implemented testifies to the
inadequacy of our understanding of how social data can come to be part
of a decision-making system. However, the reasons for failure so far
have not simply to do with an inability to choose the "right" indicators
and plan ways to collect and use them. The very political potential
of indicators has been a tremendous roadblock. Any strategy for the
implementation of a social reporting will have to take into account that
many people will regard indicators as politically dangerous and will
attempt to stop their production because of their power to define
problems and their solutions.
The first effort to establish a system of indicators began in
1966 when President Johnson in March of 1966 directed the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare to "develop the necessary social
statistics and indicators to supplement those prepared by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and Council of Economic Advisors. With these yard-
sticks, we can better measure the distance we have come and plan for
the way ahead." It was a grand sounding gesture, but somewhat hollow.
A Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mangur Olson, was given charge of the work,
and he pursued it with mostly borrowed staff and part-time help.
A panel of nationally known social scientists was appointed to
supervise the work. Some contributed considerably, but the panel did
not review the final report. The much heralded report, published
almost three years later, was a slim volume assessing the social
indicator needs in seven goal areas like income and health. (25)
It was a respectable work, given the amount of resources that went into
it, but it did not fulfill the promise of its mandate to lay the
foundations for a social reporting system. It was a speculative
document which apparently did not even represent the consensus of its
high level panel. The report was an internal product of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and carried with it no
way of enforcing recommendations for data needs and little academic
prestige. It did not make a stir in the news. After the report's
issuance, Olson's office was disbanded, and HEW work on a social
report discontinued as President Johnson left office.
In July of his first year in office, President Nixon decided to
follow up on the social report idea, but this time he proposed a White
House staff group. He set up a National Goals Research Staff with
the mandate to produce a social report in a year and the clear
implication that it was to b-e the first in a series of annual reports.
He made Professor Raymond Bauer staff consultant for the study, making
it clear that the production of social indicators was a major purpose.
This effort too, however, was ill-fated from the start, as
evidenced by the fact that political staffer Leonard Garment was
placed in official charge instead of Professor Bauer. He would be
more interested in the immediate political impact of the data than
Professor Bauer and certainly would want to avoid any data that would
create unwanted issues.
The political sensitivity of many types of data began to be
obvious, and no important support from Cabinet members or interest
groups materialized. The effort was little publicized and apparently
not taken very seriously outside of the Goals Research staff. The
final report (26), was a philosophical, semi-historical document
organized, like its predecessor, around subject matter areas. It
raised and discussed issues but contained almost no quantitative
information and recommended no goals. There was no mention of
another annual report, and again the staff was disbanded.
The only Administration followup to this abortive social report
in 1972 is a small project in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
One 0MB staff member and one or two statisticians on loan from other
agencies are planning a social statistics publication. If it is
published, under current plans, it would draw only on existing data
but would pull together and publish selected figures for some important
goal areas. (27) Within the Administration there is little interest
in the document, and its publication date keeps receding in the future.
White House staffers have been known to object vehemently to the
proposed inclusion of a number of kinds of data that could reflect
poorly on the Administration's policies. One effort to limit
controversy was an Administration decision to include no explanation
or interpretation with the data. Dry tabulations are certainly less
interesting to the news media than summaries and interpretations.
The prospects for this statistics publication, even with all these
limitations on it, are still bleak.
Efforts to Institute a Social Report: Congressional
Meanwhile, in Congress the pressure for social reporting is
gradually building. Shortly after President Johnson set up Mancur
Olson's group, Senator Walter Mondale introduced a bill into Congress
known as the "Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act." The
concept, was that social policy planning could be rationalized by
duplicating the organizational structure for economic policy-making.
The bill would set up a council of Social Advisors, nationally
prominent social scientists, to advise the President and make an annual
social report to Congress and the nation. Its counterpart in the
Congress to evaluate the recommendations would be a Joint Committee
on the Social Report. A recent addition to the bill would provide
also a Congressional goals and priorities staff to parallel the-0MB in
evaluating the total budget and proposing alternatives. (28) It would
do something in the nature of the Urban Coalition's "Counter budget"
recently published, (29) outlining a number of feasible major
alternatives for public spending.
A version of the bill has been reintroduced in each Congress and
extensive hearings held. Although the bill has not yet passed, it has
had many supporters in the Senate. In 1971 it was cosponsored by 24
Senators, including most of the candidates for the Democratic Presidential
nomination. The most ambitious and activist Senators seem to see the
legislation as an opportunity. The group as a whole is bipartisan,
but entirely from the liberal wings of the parties. There has been no
parallel interest in the House, where members tend to take a shorter
range view of policy decisions. Conservatives fear this bill, as
they did the Employment Act of 1946, on which it is modelled, because
they recognize that social scientists tend to be liberal and that this
kind of measure could give them power. Moreover, the fear of even
minimal central planning still exists. Conservative opponents labeled
the Full Employment Act in 1946 "totalitarian", "Nazi" and "Communist",
and would undoubtedly become as incensed if the Full Opportunity Act
begins to gain ground.
The Senate hearings were compilations of views from social
scientists who almost unanimously supported the bills, (30) and the
Executive Office which invariably opposed them. Both Nixon and
Johnson Administrations asserted that ongoing efforts and agencies
were already performing the functions planned by the legislation.
However, Johnson staff came back in later years to testify in favor
of the bill. Both Administrations saw the bill as a threat to their
control over social policy, which they preferred to plan through
operating departments or internal staff of the Executive Office.
Once the staff was out of power they would favor the bill again. They
presumably recognized the force of the arguments often repeated in
these hearings. A Council of Social Advisors, witnesses contended,
would answer more to professional standards than to the exigencies of
day-to-day politics. The publication of a social report would bring
issues into public view and create demand for the resolution of
problems. Clearly the President's Urban Affairs Council, made up of
mostly Cabinet members and meeting quietly without public reports,
would not perform any of these roles of a Social adviser's Council,
though Administration spokesman asserted unconvincingly that they would.
The hearings have helped build a constituency for the concept of
social reporting and provided a forum for exploration of the issues.
They have also served to keep up pressure on the Executive to maintain
some semblance of an effort, however emasculated, to produce an
official set of indicators. In recent years Congress has voted the
National Science Foundation more funds than it requested to sponsor
research on social indicators. Many private and independent groups
have been sponsoring major research on indicators, the Russell Sage
Foundation, (31) the Urban Institute, (32) and the University of Iowa,
among others. These private efforts may ultimately play an important




PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
At this moment in 1972, the probability seems high that social
indicators will play an increasing role in decision-making. We
can make of this prospect an opportunity for focussing attention on
problems and providing markers on the road to their solution.
Indicators may provide a way of rationalizing discussion and planning,
giving us common "facts" and concepts to use. Indicators can grow
haphazardly with little national attention to any deliberate process
of producing or using them. In that case, they may or may not
clarify discussion or focus attention where, as a nation, we would wish
it. If we feel it is worthwhile to make a conscious plan to hasten
and guide the development and use of social indicators, however, we
will need to understand far more than we apparently do at present
about the nature of the process through which an indicator can come
into being and into use.
The thoughtful and sometimes provocative work on the qualtities
indicators could or should have almost nowhere addresses this question
of process. Occasionally there is a mention of the kind of
institution that should produce indicators, but no apparent awareness
of or, at least, concern for the need for a longer term strategy which
would convert dry statistics into useful indicators. The actual
efforts to start a system of indicators also reflect this failure to
plan for both design and use of the data. The inability so far to
find a way to mesh a deliberately planned system of indicators with
the political realities is due to a lack of knowledge about what
happens at this interface of politics and data. We know relatively
little about the ways in which one may affect the other - influence
it or provide obstacles. (33) Perhaps the relationship is such that
a deliberate, total system of social indicators can never be implemented.
It seems likely, however, that if we understand more about the relation-
ship of decision-making and data, we can encourage the growth of
indicators.
Therefore, I have chosen to examine the birth and development of
the two indicators which have played a role in important public
actions on social problems over long periods. One indicator is the
monthly unemployment rate, published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and the other is the standard budget, an indicator of
living costs for a specified family type, based on the cost of a list
of goods and services that are presumably adequate in some sense.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics publish the latter annually for many
cities and regions. I selected the indicators because they were
similar in having a long history, which would presumably permit them
both to have evolved through several stages and been accepted.
Moreover, they both have had fairly wide use so their stories should
illustrate any interactions between design and use.
I selected the indicators also because of their differences
in the hope that we might see what the implications of some of these
differences were. Unemployment is a relatively simple concept, and
a fairly direct measure, while the standard budget is a more difficult
concept and more indirectly measured. Its measurement is more laden
with value judgments and it is more of a composite than unemployment.
The standard budget bears a greater resemblance to the more subjective
"quality of life" measures that are increasingly being suggested.
The unemployment figures are national aggregates applying to the
country as a whole, whereas the standard budget has a limited applica-
bility to particular subsets of the population. Finally, the
standard budget is a level, a completely normative indicator, while
the unemployment rate is simply a scale.
It may be that successful indicators can encompass these wide
differences, or it may be that some of these qualities of the indicators
may be obstacles to their effective use. The following case studies
will attempt to shed light on how these indicator characteristics
may be caused by or related to their use. It will be a study of the
total process through which the indicators were created, used and not
used.
"Indicator design" in the context of this thesis is a broad
term. I mean it to imply ar more than an academic exercise of
selecting and structuring data to deal with a problem. Past
experience gives no reason to suppose such a product stands much
chance of becoming an indicator that made a difference. My
assumption is - and hopefully the thesis will bear it out - that the
design of an indicator is a more elaborate process which must interact
with political realities. It is a product of institutions,
individuals, available methodologies and pressing public concerns,
as well as of the nature of the problem itself. Its existence may
help to create new institutions, or methodologies, and may reshape
public problem perceptions and plans for their solution. Therefore
indicator design will be viewed in this thesis as an interactive process
with its use, one that is continuously evolving.
Therefore I approached these case studies looking for evidence of
the interactive process, and ways of defining and explaining it.
In looking for ways to explain the use or nonuse of data, I have
sought explanations in the character of the data itself, as well as in
its environment, the political concerns, and qualities of the people
and institutions who produce it and are available to use it. I look
for the moments when the indicator became the object of controversy as
reflections of their potential significance in decision-making processes.
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At times the issues may revolve around the indicator's concept and
reveal how the definition of an indicator may focus discussion and
bring out underlying issues. Finally, the comparison and study
of these two indicators came to illustrate a subtle but significant
contrast, and much of the study came to focus on trying to explain
this difference, which may be a very important one for future indicators.
Although both indicators have had substantial history and use, one,
the unemployment rate, is firmly established as part of our policy-
making apparatus, above the exigencies of immediate political pressures.
It has a permanence and life of its own which inspires confidence in
users so that it is taken for granted and accepted by most parties to
discussion. In short it has become an institution. The budget, on
the other hand, has never established so firm a position, has never
been fully accepted, and today is in danger of deliberate extinction
by a hostile Administration. Hopefully the comparison of these
studies will shed some light on how and why this institutionalization
occurred for one, but not for the other.indicator, and suggest where
such institutionalization may be desirable and possible for indicators
in the future.
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PART II
THE UNEPLOYMENT RATE: STUDY OF A SUCCESSFUL
INDICATOR
PREFACE
Unemployment Figures: Interpretations and Controversy
In the winter of 1971 the U.S. unemployment rate was hovering
around 6%, an unusually high level for a period of economic expansion
and rapid inflation. Not surprisingly, Nixon's policy officials and
staff tried to find encouraging signs in the monthly fluctuations in
the rate. Unfortunately, their public interpretations were seemingly
at odds with those of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) technicians
who released the data at monthly press conferences and other government
economists and statisticians. In January, Secretary of Labor Hodgson
saw the 6% rate as "close to cresting" and in February he called the
same rate "encouraging" while Assistant BLS Commissioner Harold Goldstein
was cautioning against jumping to conclusions, and pointing out the
long-term trends in unemployment growth.(1)
Elsewhere in the Administration also, the optimists publicly
clashed with the technicians. White House Press Secretary, Ziegler,
said the December 6% rate was "not unexpected" and blamed the rate on a
recently concluded General Motors strike, asserting there was nothing
wrong with Administration economic planning. A spokesman from the
President's Council of Economic Advisors, however, termed the rate
"undesirably high" and said it reaffirmed the need for a stronger thrust
to accelerate the economy. The Chairman himself, Paul McCracken, agreed
with Senator Proxmire at a Joint Economic Committee hearing that the rate
was "unacceptable, if not just plain intolerable." When Secretary
Hodgson found the February unemployment decline of .2% of "great
significance," and Goldstein declared it "marginally significant," (2)
the Administration reacted and, in doing so, plunged unemployment figures
into deeper controversy than ever. They decided to cancel the press
briefings that had been held for many years on the release of the data.
Congress and the press reacted bitterly. House Speaker Carl
Albert accused the Administration of muzzling "impartial career officials"
and said the end of the briefing clearly demonstrated the Administration's
"lack of faith in its own rosy predictions." Senator Proxmire said the
public was deprived of the opportunity "to receive unbiased analysis
of the basic factors in the economy" and demanded the presence of BLS
officials at monthly Joint Economic Committee hearings if they were not
going to have press conferences. News articles emphasized that the
Administration gave as a reason for cancelling the briefings the
"awkwardness of subjecting the professional staff of the.BLS to questions
with policy implications." (3)
It was not long after this that the White House declared a new
policy of issuing interpretations of such economic data from one source
in the White House. In midsummerwhen the rate had still not
significantly declined, the President was finally prevailed upon to
sign a measure to provide massive public employment legislation, not
unlike the make-work programs of the Depression, the WPA and CCC,
programs which clearly ran counter to his conservative instincts.
Finally, in mid-August, the continued high rate of unemployment and
inflation led the President to declare a wage and price freeze in
the hope of checking both rates. Suddenly, more than ever was
at stake for the Republican Administration in the movements of these
figures. This dramatic new policy's success would be judged by
the data, and reelection could depend on it. In October, Goldstein
was "reorganized" into a non-controversial long-term trends analysis
job, representing about half of his former responsibility, and
another offending BLS official, Chief Economist, Peter Henle, was
given a long sabbatical.
At present writing, suspicion and controversy among Congress,
political officials, career bureaucrats, and the press continues.
The Joint Economic Committee hearings provide a monthly forum
for denouncing Administration economic policies. The public is
increasingly aware of the controversy as it periodically breaks
into the news editorial pages.
Meanwhile, at least three professional organizations have set
up review committees to keep an eye on developments in the release of
unemployment data - the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference
on Income and Wealth, the American Economic Association and the Industrial
Relations Research Organization. In January 1972 the Administration
named a high level interdepartmental Task Force to evaluate government
fact-gathering on unemployment, with instructions for prompt reporting.
Too many people have a stake in the unemployment data to allow the
matter to drop.
Obiective of the Case Study
Cynics would say that data does not have much to do with political
decision-making, and that, in any case, accurate data is of little concern
to proponents of one policy or another. This account of the controversy
around the unemployment figures suggests that quite the contrary is true.
The Nixon officials clearly think the indicator has a good deal to do
with decisions or they would not be taking the political risks they
have in silencing the technicians. Moreover, groups of many different
persuasions feel they have a stake in the data's accuracy and dependability.
Certainly, the time, money and intellectual effort invested in
the unemployment figures have been tremendous. The tate has been
calculated on the basis of a special monthly sample survey of over
50,000 households. It is the largest such survey in the world, and
its principle purpose since its inception in 1940 has been to provide
unemployment estimates. Its methods have been refined, analyzed and tested
in its 30-year history to a degree that is unequalled for any single
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survey, and it serves as a model for surveys in many other countries.
The basic question that the following study will address is
how it happened that a piece of data, an indicator, became so important
to decision-makers. Why was so much effort invested in collecting
and publishing the unemployment rates2 and how did its existence and
its characteristics come to be so critical to so many people?
The answers lie to some extent in the environment and to some extent
in the indicator's basic nature. Its origin was in a deeply felt need
to deal with severe economic problems. Its evolution and growth into
its present-day role are products of the methods and concepts that
went into the indicator as well as the institutions and support that
grew around it. All these elements worked together to make the
indicator a successful one - that is, a widely accepted, used, and
seemingly permanent fixture in our policy-making apparatus. Some of
the important factors in this rise to eminence among indicators seem
to be its comparative simplicity, the capability of its methods to
reflect rapid change with seeming accuracy, its role in economic
theory and relevance to one of the most widely recognized and immediately
felt public issues of the twentieth century. The openness of the
indicator design and maintenance process to scrutiny and changeand
the institutionalization of interest group participation have
contributed to the indicator's present position.
CHAPTER I
ORIGINS OF THE INDICATOR
The Will Without the Way
1921 was the year when national attention first focussed on the
measurement of unemployment. Recurrent depressions and unemployment
date back into the nineteenth century. The Federal government had
made an effort to count unemployment in censuses as far back as 1880.
The start of a sustained national commitment to measure it, however,
was in 1921 when President Harding called a National Conference of
business leaders to consider the problem of unemployment. The
country was coming through a severe depression, and unemployment was
obviously high, though there were just guesses about the numbers.
A principal purpose of the Conference would be, according to
the Chairman, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, to inquire into
the volume of needed employment and the distribution of unemployment
and to recommend measures to ameliorate unemployment and encourage
business recovery. (4) Economic dislocations were frequent and
disruptive to business, and concern for the lot of the working man was
growing. Public feeling was growing that worker and job should be
more firmly attached. The report of the Conference stressed that
unemployment facts were necessary to plan for relief measures and
could help businessmen make better decisions, which might stave off
the low points in the business cycle.
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Both Harding and Hoover made one point quite clear, however, that the
responsibility for remedying unemployment should not fall on the Federal
Treasury (5). The solutions should be found through the cooperative
action of businessmen and through relief provided by the states. Even
the task of information collection and analysis was to be principally a
nongovernmental function. The studies that the Conference requested and
planned were conducted in the 1920's with private funds. At this time,
the U.S. had no employment programs, economic policy for employment, or
unemployment insurance. Hoover regarded Federal legislation for unemploy-
ment as "paternalism that will undernine the whole system." He viewed
the Federal responsibility as simply mobilizing the nation's intelligence.
Although Great Britain and several other European countries had instituted
unemployment insurance programs, that idea was apparently not much
considered.
In any case, the Conference set to the task of measuring
unemployment, and, in the process, draw sharp attention to the inadequacy
of their information. Their Economic Advisory Committee estimated
3,500,000 out of work, exclusive of farm labor. The Commissioner of
Labor Statistics, on the other hand, had estimated unemployment for the
Congress only two months earlier as 5,735,000. This discrepancy
of over 2,000,000 led the Conference's Committee on Unemployment
Statistics to do its own study of available data,
producing an estimate of between 3,700,000 and 4,000,000 unemployed.
In what must be one of the lowest points in the history of social
measurement methodology, the Conference voted on the number to
announce as unemployed, choosing a suitably high range of figures to
attract the nation's attention (6). One thing was obvious, that
if responsible statisticians confronted with available data could
produce such widely differing estimates, then the data was quite
inadequate. Certainly the Committee on Unemployment Statistics
declared in its report to the Conference that it found the data
inadequate. While tremendous precision is unnecessary for most
purposes, an estimate which is likely to be off by as much as sixty
percent is probably not much good for even the broadest kind of
public decision.
The data available for statistics at that time were
incomplete and scattered; the methods had to involve much guessing
about the missing parts. It was to be twenty years before a
substanLial improvement would be made in the methods which would permit
significantly more reliable national figures. The data consisted of
1) the results of special surveys in 182 cities where the district
Directors of the U.S. Employment Service asked such agencies as State
Labor departments for their estimates of unemployment; 2) monthly
reports of the number employed in a selected group of manufacturing
industries, as collected by the BLS; 3) quarterly reports of trade
union unemployment in Massachusetts; 4) estimates of reduction in
mining employment based on U.S. Geological Survey data on output;
5) monthly reports on the number working on railroads, collected by the
Interstate Commerce Commission; and 6) preliminary tabulations of the
number engaged in different occupations according to the 1920 census.
Obviously the estimates varied according to how much credence
one gave to each source, how one adjusted for the different time
periods of the data collection, assumptions about how well the data
collected represented the data not collected, and the assumptions one
made about what happened to those once employed in a particular industry.
As we did not have in 1921 any kind of unemployment insurance,we could
not collect by product data from that program to give even a ball-park
estimate of size or trend of unemployment. England was by this time
getting unemployment data from this source far better than any we had
since their insurance scheme included the great majority of workers,
and they had to register as unemployed in order to get benefits.
The data was not perfectly representative but far more reliable than
anything available in the U.S. ( 7). We had neither a
program nor a commitment to the collection of data.
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Not only was the data sketchy and the methodology undefined and
ad hoc>but the concepts too were very fuzzy. Unemployment and employment
were not precisely defined in the report of the conference or the later
studies which followed up in the twenties (8). The assumption
was that the unemployed were people who had worked, but now could not
find jobs. No agreement was reached on how to deal with the borderline
categories, like those who were on strike, too sick or too old to work,
or who would only take certain types of jobs. The analyses of the
problem do raise these issues, but in some sense it was not necessary to
settle them. The methods of estimating the numbers were so approximate,
and the available information on sickness or job preferences would have
been so poor, that a decision one way or another would have been pointless.
When these decisions on the preciss definition of unemployment were made,
it was not only on the basis of who ought to be considered unemployed,
but also on the pragmatic basis of what kind of information was most
measurable and useful. Without the latter two criteria much incentive
for a decision was not there,
The reasons the Administration, researchers and businessmen wanted
the data were strong, but like the concepts, not well defined. There
were to be no government programs to deal with the problem, but it was
increasingly accepted that the government should provide information that
would assist business in dealing with unemployment. Economic discussion
at the time centered on the idea of the business cycle. Most developed
countries, it was observed, went through continuous boom and bust periods.
One cause, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
committee which later studied the problem ( 9), was that
businesses were not well informed on conditions and accordingly made
poor decisions on production. Unemployment statistics, particularly
very current monthly statistics, could aid the businessmen and also
serve to help in determining fundamental causes of the cycles. The
important advances of Keynesian theory in explaining economic conditions
were, after all, not to come, let alone be widely understood, until
the mid-30's. The statistics were also viewed as useful for the vague
purpose of measuring the welfare of wage earners and planning
expenditures needed for relief. Presumably, they would be used for
forecasting future trends although there was not much of a model for
doing so accurately.
To review the situation then, in 1921, accurate unemployment data
was a high priority item, a focus of national attention. People in
many segments of society viewed the problem of unemployment as
serious and unlikely to solve itself. Most agreed data was essential
to beginning the solution-, but exacLly how it would be used was still
unclear. So the motivation existed for getting the data, and there
were some potential uses, albeit vaguely defined ones.
Several ingredients were missing, however, which were not to come
together until 1940 when the first really reliable figures were obtained.
First, there was no real commitment to do anything in particular about
unemployment and thus very little idea about how it could or should be
dealt with. Secondly, there was no adequate methodology to produce
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even reasonably accurate data. It was agreed that the data was needed
quickly and frequently, butas yet, sampling methodology was not well
enough developed to permit fast, reliable information from direct survey.
It was not even considered as a possibility. Thirdly, the concepts
were still far too undefined for accurate measurement. It would take
over ten years to light on satisfactory concepts, though the effort
would not begin in earnest until 1930 when the direct measurement
efforts began.
Congress is Activated
Meanwhile in the years between 1921 and 1930 research activity
on employment and unemployment data continued, as did planning for the
development of the statistics. The NBER sponsored extensive work
and the American Statistical Association appointed a Committee on Labor
Statistics in 1922, which studied the problems and made recommendations
from time to time, including some important ones which led up to the
questions on unemployment included in the 1930 census. The period was
largely one of research, beginning to define the issues and possibilities
of unemployment measurement and only marginal changes in government
statistical activities. It may be a period which, for unemployment data,
is a parallel to the current one for social indicators generally.
Congressional interest, which was to play a critical role in
later developments, was awakened in 1928 with the aid of the press.
Estimates of unemployment in the wake of a severe recession varied
tremendously and the press was highly critical. Administration critics
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were claiming unemployment was about 4 million, far more than the
Administration would admit. The Senate passed a resolution asking
for the figures on unemployment and the Labor Statistics Commissioner
replied by saying employment had shrunk by 1.8 million.
The Senate Education and Labor Committee decided to hold hearings
on unemployment, the first in a long series in Congress, which were to
perform a role in educating legislators and the public and focusing
the issues. No special legislation was involved; the idea of
federal responsibility for unemployment would have to await some
years of experience with the Depression. The hearings were broadly
investigatory and focussed in part on unemployment estimates (10)
The Committee Chairman was very conscious of press agitation about
the quality of the figures and expressed concern that there seemed
no way to resolve arguments in Congress without better data on the
size of the unemployment problem.
Commissioner Stewart of the BLS testified that direct measurement
of unemployment was not feasible and explained the indirect method.
Direct measurement, he indicated, would involve a complete census,
very expensive and slow to complete. It would not provide data fast
enough in any case. He did not propose the sampling method which was
later used. The method he used began with the data on employment,
collected by the BLS from primarily manufacturing industries.
Shrinkage in the figures between good and bad years plus estimates of
the behavior of employment in unmeasured industries was the closest
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approximation he could provide to unemployment. He stressed that
benchmark figures of total unemployment at some point in time were
essential to making this procedure work to provide reasonable current
unemployment estimates. Other expert witnesses concurred in his
views.
The Committee finally recommended (11) that questions on
unemployment be included in the upcoming decennial census to provide
the benchmark data. Although they were dubious of any Federal role
beyond statistics gathering, they did declare that the opportunity to
work was a fundamental right. They still considered the protection of
this right as the responsibility of individual members of society and
employers. Their declaration, however, was a preliminary step toward
the policy officially declared almost twenty years later in the
Employment Act of 1946, establishing a Federal responsibility for
employment. The growing level of public commitment coincided with
the growing intensity of measurement attempts.
CHAPTER TI
THE SEARCH FOR A MEASURE: MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES AND
CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT (12)
The advent of the Depression assured the inclusion of unemploy-
ment questions in the census, and launched an intensive search for an
adequate way to quantify unemployment. The search was to require ten
years of experimentation with methods and concepts, the effort of
numerous groups and individuals, and many mistakes and misjudgments
before a generally satisfactory solution was found. Ironically,
accurate national figures were never available during the period
when they could have made most difference. During the Depression,
estimates varied almost as widely as in 1921, and the massive work
relief programs and unemployment insurance were all enacted essentially
without data on the size of the unemployment problem, much less on
the characteristics of the unemployed.
The critical methodological and conceptual developments in this
period were of several kinds. One was the development.of the
stratified random sampling technique which permitted relatively small
samples to produce highly reliable results. This made it suddenly
feasible to collect unemployment data by direct monthly survey.
Another was in the discovery of ways in which questions asked had
to be carefully phrased and interviewers trained to assure that
meaningful,accurate information would be obtained. The earliest
measurement efforts showed extreme naivete from today's vantage
point about the ways in which questions may be misunderstood or
ambiguous. Statisticians, bureaucrats and politicians began also
to learn how important data presentation is to its acceptability,
and how important fair official interpretations were. This
lesson, however, is still being learned afresh almost daily in 1972.
Finally, the period saw the gradual
evolution and precise specification of concepts of employment,
unemployment and the labor force. To some degree, during the
period, the definitions changed to respond to pragmatic issues and
changing perceptions of the nature of the unemployment problem and
to some degree they simply were gradually more completely specified
as the measurement process required.
As indicated below, the story shows what kinds of considerations
influenced the development of these and how the development interacted
with the values and practical realities of the environment. Other
indicators are not likely to develop in quite the same overall way,
but many of the patterns and pathologies may nonetheless be familiar.
The 1930 Census: Measurement without Theory
Abruptly with the onset of the Depression, Congress decided that
the 1930 Census should measure unemployment. The action was sudden
since there was doubt about unemployment questions being included
right up to the last moment. It also caught economists and
statisticians unprepared since most of their attention had been
focussed on indirect rather than direct measures of unemployment.
Although Commissioner Stewart and others had been calling for
"benchmark" unemployment totals for some years, little groundwork
had been laid for making the necessary direct measurement.
The principal research group, the NBER, had focussed on ways of
manipulating employment and population data to measure unemployment
indirectly.
The precise definition required for direct measurement was
still a major hurdle. Congress had not made clear exactly what
they meant by unemployment, the exact purposes the data would
have were not yet obvious, and, in any case, economic theory,
later to depend on unemployment concepts, was still in its early
stages and did not provide much help in making definitions.
Accordingly, there were no clearcut criteria on which to define
unemployment. Because the issues had been so little considered, the
designers of the Census did not foresee the extent of the problem.
Instead of defining unemployment first and then measuring it, they
tried to measure it and thenfaced with problems of interpretation
of results, they realized that they had failed to make adequate
definitions.
The Census Bureau was not totally without guidance for its
efforts, though it could have benefited from considerably more ground-
work. The American Statistical Association Committee on Governmental
Labor Statistics had been working for the previous year on the questions
on unemployment they proposed for inclusion in the Census. (13)
The Bureau considered their recommendations and those of a special
expert committee they appointed to aid in framing the questions.
They also had the 1929 recommendations of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor that unemployment data be collected as a kind
of benchmark which would permit continuous unemployment estimates to
be derived in later years on the basis of employment data. (14)
The Bureau hired an economist particularly to supervise this aspect
of the Census. (15)
Nonetheless this effort to measure unemployment was a complete
fiasco. Most of what was salvaged from it were lessons about what not
to do. Certainly the unemployment figures themselves were not accorded
much respect and did not serve as a widely accepted benchmark in later
years. In fact, they were greeted with a shower of criticism, in part
because of the ambiguity of the information and, in part because of
inept handling of the release of the data.
The questions in the census represented an attempt to keep the
precise definition of unemployment open and flexible so that different
people could assemble the data in ways which suited them. Interviewers
first asked whether the respondent had a usual gainful occupation,
"gainful" implying work for pay or profit. If he or she said yes,
the next question was whether the respondent had worked at all on
the day preceding the interview. If not, then a further series of
questions was asked about the reasons for the idleness, and the
circumstances surrounding it. Ultimately, all the idle were classified
in 7 categories, A through G. The categories were differentiated by
whether the person technically had a job or not, and whether he was able
to work or looking for work (16). The idea was that for some
purposes people would want to group different categories together, and
in any case, it would absolve the Bureau of the responsibility of
deciding exactly who should be called unemployed.
The problem with this decision not to decide was that it left the
results open to charges of politics. In fact it gave the Bureau and
the Administration a lesson in the politics of statistic's - a lesson
which the statistical bureaus have taken to heart but of which later
administrations could well be reminded. The Hoover Administration,
eager to prove that unemployment was not as bad as commonly supposed,
pounced on some early census returns and triumphantly announced they
showed only two percent unemployed. Although the release indicated the
figures were only preliminary, the action set off a tremendous furor
and numerous attacks on the data as unrepresentative and misleading.
The Commerce Department had reported results of the first 1/4 of the
returns for only category A of the idle, those not working but actively
looking.
In the first place there was no prior agreement that this really
was the only group to be termed unemployed. Category B, those on
layoff without pay, were, as it turned out, very unlikely to get their
jobs back, and most analysts seemed to consider them equally unemployed.
Those out of work and not looking, for example, could be convinced no
work was available. Examination of the data in detail suggests that a
group at least 40% larger than category A would have to be considered in
any relief programs, and planning for relief was a primary purpose of the
statistics.
Not only was the definition not agreed upon, but also the rate
seemed obviously too low. It did not coincide with experience.
Newspaper and magazine criticism was particularly severe on this score.
The New York World (17) said "the Department of Commerce is again
offending common sense putting forth alleged figures of unemployment."
The New Republic called it an "attempt to minimize the number of the
unemployed," and said "it is impossible not to infer that the
administration was glad to have the underestimates pass as good
currency." (18) While it may not have been precisely clear at this
stage what was to be called unemployment, one thing was clear, the
Administration's definition was not it.
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Not only had the Administration been a bit free with its
assumptions about definitions, but it had also been very casual in its
methods and less than open to the public about the inadequacies. The
early returns, for one thingwere heavily weighted in several areas, which
did not yet fully reflect in employment patterns the effect of the
depression. Moreover, there was a high percentage of rejected cases
due to failures to fully complete the form. The effect of adding
these would have greatly increased unemployment figures. The statisti-
cians calculated the 2% rate on the basis of the number of unemployed
in relation to the total population, although a well-established
statistical principle was that rates should be considered in relation
to the population at risk, in this case gainful workers (19).
Otherwise the rate could fluctuate wildly for reasons quite unrelated
to the issue. Unemployment could go up while the rate went down just
because the birth rate was increasing. Later surveys used population
at risk as the basis for the rate.
The controversy led to the resignation of the Census Bureau
specially hired economistgCharles P.ersons, who was supposed to analyze
the data. Instead he wrote critical articles for several professional
andpopular magazines (20). Former Commissioner of Labor
Statistics, Royal Meeker felt compelled to comment as well and issued
a statement that although the figures were probably correct, they invited
misunderstanding because of the way they were issued and had been grossly
misinterpreted because of the narrowly limited definition of unemploy-
ment. (21)
82
He, like Labor Statistics Commissioners before and after him, was very
sensitive to the importance of issuing only the most accurate data,
with suitable explanations of their limitations, in a non-political
context. Their credibility and that of the entire statistical
system-was at stake. This was only one of many recurrent struggles
between technicians attempting to maintain their standards of accuracy
and politicians wanting to establish control over presentation and
interpretation. The politicians' efforts have often backfired, but
they continue to make them, nonetheless.
The upshot of this controversy and the deepening of the Depression
was that the Census conducted a second inquiry into unemployment in
January 1931. The interview schedule involved precisely the same
employment questions as the decennial census, but without the other
questions, and the special census covered 21 selected areas. The
results simply served to emphasize the inadequacy of the questions,
the interviewing strategy, the categories, and definitions. The
relative proportions in each of the groups of idle were quite different.
The "B" category, on layoff without pay, for example, was relatively
higher and the voluntarily idle group was only one fourth its former
size. The length of the idleness period was higher for the A
category and lower for the B group. The report on the census
attempted to account for the differences by changes that had taken place
over time ( 22). Certainly, economic conditions were changing
and January would be expected to be a very different sort of month
from April, when the original census was conducted, as far as the labor
market was concerned. However the changes were so many and complicated,
that no fully satisfactory explanation was given in these terms.
Even the official report suggested that the questions may have been
understood in varying ways by interviewers and respondents, and that the
relevant information may have been concealed because of the categories
used or not even obtained.
Other commentators were more blunt. Many became
convinced that one could not expect to get good information on-the
reasons people were not working. Either they did not know all the
facts themselves or would not admit them. For example, how could
they tell if they were permanently laid off or not? Moreover there
were many failures of the interviewers to fill in portions of the
questionnaire in the original census, in particular to fill out the
unemployment questions, perhaps because of the low remuneration for
doing so. Dr. Persons estimated (23) that for the State of
Delaware the number reported as unemployed would have been increased
by fifty percent if these had been included in the tabulation. This
was only one of many issues in the motivation and understanding of
interviewers which were to be gradually uncovered, but not really
well dealt with until close to twenty-five years later.
The whole approach to eliciting the information was fraught with
possibilities for error which were only to be uncovered through long,
painful experience. Morgenstern summarizes most of these well (24)
and it seems worthwhile to keep his list in mind as we examine the
development of the unemployment indicator. It has been subject to all
of the difficulties at various times, though today most of them have
receded into relatively minor problems.
The first source of error is respondent error, lies and mistakes.
The respondent may not want to admit he is not looking for a job or he
may not rememberhow long it was since he last worked. Housewives,
who were the usual respondents, might not have full information on all
household members. Observer error was the result of inadequate training
and instruction and of course,like respondent error,was far more likely
where questions were ambiguous or ambiguous answers were possible
and observers had to make their own judgments. This was definitely
the case with the 1930 census which involved an enormous instruction
book for classifying the numerous causes for idleness which might be given.
(25) . It was not all-inclusive, but in any case, one could not count
on all agents to memorize it. Census agents for the decennial census
at least, were part-time political appointees, almost invariably without
experience in this sort of activity, and unlikely to have professional
standards to meet. They could misunderstand answers, misinterpret
instructions and carelessly record or miscode the results. It became
obvious that they had done all of these things in 1930 and 1931 to an
unknown, but considerable,degree.
The other principal source of error, which aggravated both observer
and respondent error and permitted gross misinterpretations, was due to
the fuzziness of concepts and categories. The recognition of this
problem was an important result of the censuses and provided considerable
impetus to an effort to define clearer,more objectively measurable
categories. The groupings clustered people who did not necessarily
belong together for the purposes of most analyses. Often groups over-
lapped; people had more than one reason for not working and were
arbitrarily attached to one or another group. The rationale for the
categories was unclear when, for example, some who were desperately
in need of work might be classified together with others uninterested
in it. If the rationale and purpose of the classification had been
clearer, the decision rules for assignment to categories might have
been clearer, though borderline cases always exist.
The concepts also provided only very ambiguous information on
part-time workers, which seriously complicated interpretation of the
data. In general, the intention was to exclude information on part-
day employment entirely since it did not seem to be a serious problem
and was very likely to be a voluntary arrangement. (26)
But anyone with any work on the day preceding the census was considered
equally employed. If the person was employed on the day preceding,
he was returned on the schedule as employed and no further information
obtained. The job might have been a one-time or casual job and he
might have been very actively searching for a job. Those who did not
happen to work on the previous day, however, were closely questioned on
the amount of work they normally did and whether they were looking for
a job. Clearly the reference period of one prior daywhich was chosen
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for its immediacy to avoid the problem of failing memories, was
arbitrarily short. The categories among the employed, unemployed,
and-part-time were not all spelled out. The categories
were not designed according to the critical rule that they should be
all-inclusive as a group and mutually exclusive within the group.
The result was that some people who, most would agree, were basically
unemployed, were counted among the employed and vice versa. This
became obvious as people tried to interpret the results, and compare
the two censuses.
The two unemployment censuses of 1930 and 1931 served primarily
to point out, in a rather dramatic way, how far away we still were
from making adequate measurements in this area. Concepts would
require more careful thought, questions would have to be more carefully
designed and capable of simple, objective response. The psychology
and training of interviewers and motivations of respondents would
require far more study before we could have confidence in our
unemployment data.
Concept Formation: An Overview
The concepts involved in the census were not only too fuzzy and
ambiguous to be of much use for immediate analysis, they also turned
out to be fundamentally inappropriate for their intended principle
purpose: to provide benchmark data for the ensuing ten years.
The concepts were not even comparable with those involved in other
existing data on employment, which were to be used in conjunction with
these unemployment figures to provide future estimates. The concepts
changed because of this lack of comparability and the fact that the
Depression changed labor market conditions and therefore perceptions of
the problem of unemployment. Moreover, the search for ways of speci-
fying the concepts in objective detail contributed also to a gradual
evolution of definitions to a set which is basically the one we have
today.
The experience of this period demonstrates several of the basic
contentions of this dissertation. It was essential to the measurement
of unemployment to develop satisfactory concepts which made sense both
internally and externally. That is, the concepts had to have a consis-
tency and logic of their own and also had to fit with community percep-
tions and values as well with some reasonable model of reality. The
potential use of the data and the theories implied in such use had to
guide the choice of concepts. So long as the issues had not been well
thought through and at least some of the potential strategies identified
for dealing with unemployment, it was difficult to select the precise
definition. On the other hand, many aspects of the definition which
became the basis of the present day series, evolved in a de facto way,
out of the procedures chosen for the measurement process. Although
there may have been clear concepts guiding the choices of measurement
procedures, we find little evidence of what they were. Rather, we
have to deduce the underlying concepts from the chosen measurements,
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since there are few statements of full definitions. The evidence
suggests that the concepts took shape along with the efforts to
measure them, and are therefore to varying degrees, the product of
considerations of economic theory, pragmatic questions in the difficulty
of measurement and the relative size of various borderline categories,
and finally current value judgments about what issues or individuals
were important. (27)
The Major Concepts: Definitions and Issues
The basic concepts necessary to the measurement of unemployment
were three - employment, unemployment and the population at risk, that
is, for this purpose, the population capable of being employed or
unemployed. The concepts may appear to the reader to be straight-
forward enough ideas - certainly they must have appeared so to many
responsible persons in 1930. In the effort to classify people in the
various categories, however, a good many decisions turn out to be far
from obvious. The best way to settle them may depend on the purposes
of the classification,
Population at Risk. These are the people subject to employment or
unemployment, and their number is critical to any calculation of rates.
Until the mid-thirties this population was defined as gainful workers,
all those. over ten years old with a usual occupation for pay
or profit. Questions about unemployment in censuses well back into
the nineteenth century are based on the idea that this is the relevant
group. Only those with gainful work were asked further questions then,
just as in 1930 and 1931. For various reasons, which will be discussed
in greater detail in the next section, this concept of the population at
risk was not very useful. A lot of gainful workers grew old and
no longer employable, and a good many would-be workers without any
prior occupation sought work. For reasons which I will elaborate later,
the gainful worker figures were inadequate for comparison with other
data to estimate unemployment. In other words, the estimating
methodology required another concept. Moreover, the number without
gainful occupation and needing work, increased enormously in the
decade, and could no longer be ignored.
Therefore, the concept of a force of gainful workers was
gradually replaced by the more amorphous labor force idea, representing
generally those in the labor market. This group had no simple
defining criteria and ultimately came to be nothing more than the
combination of those defined for various reasons as employed and those de-
fined as unemployed. (28) This was a convenient, but not altogether logical
solution.
The issues involved in deciding who is a member of the labor
force have to do with who is too old or too young or too disabled to
work. They also have to do with what kind of activity takes precedence
over labor force activity so that anyone doing it should be classifed
as "out of the labor force." For example, perhaps a student or
housewife should be automatically classified as out of the labor force
no matter what else they may be doing since that is their primary
activity. In fact, however, since the labor force concept has its
definition only in terms of the definitions of employment and unemploy-
ment, it turns out that most issues were settled one way for the employed
part of the labor force and another for the unemployed part. The
lower age limit is common to both, but in 1972 one may be called
employed if one is also a student but not unemployed. Illness might
keep one out of the labor force count if one had no job, but not if
one had a job. The labor force is a convenient idea to provide a
base figure for rates but not one with life and logic of its own.
There is no particular reason why the labor force must be
such a passive concept as the sum of two others. It could have
been, for example, the group of persons who might potentially work under
certain circumstances. These might have been determined by demographic
or other criteria separate from employment and unemployment. Some
members of the labor force would fall into some third group,
although employment and unemployment sound like dichotomous
attributes, when one examines the concepts, one realizes it is quite
possible to belong to neither group and not be obviously out of
some reasonably defined labor force. The implication is that the
labor force concept as it has come to be defined is not after all a
measure of population at risk. This fact has come to cause considerable
difficulty in recent years because the size of the measured labor force
has fluctuated so drastically in ways still poorly explained
or predicted. If the actual potential employed and unemployed were
measured, this would provide a fairly stable base for the rates and
make possible better analysis of fluctuations of total employment
and unemployment.
Employment. An employed person, obviously, is one who is working.
A good many people are easy to categorize, in particular those who
work a standard full-time week and get pay checks regularly. The
question arises of how much work they should do to be called employed,
and whether being employed should preclude being unemployed. In
other words, can a person be considered partially unemployed?
The answer has been, no, until quite recently, but the decision
is one which can be argued either way quite readily. After all,
many people may be fully employed while working less than some full-time
standard number of hours, because they are not available for more work.
Others may be desperately looking for more work than they have. If
there is no intermediate category between employed and unemployed,
then some precedence rule is required as to whether the fact
of working or the fact of job-hunting is to be the criterion to
classify an individual.
Secondly, in defining employment we confront the question of
unpaid work. Surely the entrepreneur, even the one who is losing
money is employed, so we cannot make wages the single criterion for
employment. Once we dispense with the wage criterion we then have to
decide what kinds of work we choose to term employment. Is the house-
wife employed at household chores? And what about the teenager who
works on the farm after school? At first these questions were not
really settled and interviewers often used their own judgment, but
gradually all the details under which various activities were included
were spelled out. The criteria were to be partly pragmatic, and
partly theoretical, including most activity which entered into the
market economy.
A third major problem in defining employment precisely has to
do with people who have jobs, but for some reason are not working.
It may be clear that the person on vacation with pay is employed,
but the one on vacation without pay is a little more dubious. The
one on layoff who has been promised his job soon, or the person whose
new job does not start for a few weeks, is even more difficult.
And then there are the people whose jobs are waiting for them when
they get over some temporary disability. The decision rule for these
cases is not obvious. If we are interested in knowing employment
figures in order to gauge the actual amount of economic.activity or
number of workers at work we would make one set of decisions, but if
we want to know the number of persons without wages for relief purposes,
the decisions would be different. And if we wanted to know how many
jobs to create for people, we would require yet another configuration
of the concept. Clearly no choices will be ideal for all purposes,
but each choice will affect the data and our perception of the problems.
Unemployment. This is the hardest concept of all. In a general way
the unemployed have been considered to be those who wanted work but
could not get it. Unfortunately, this easy definition does not begin
to provide all necessary criteria. While it is clear that the worker
laid-off at the factory and looking desperately for any kind of work
to support his family is unemployed, few other types of people are as
easy to classify. There are the borderline cases mentioned under
employment (above), where it is unclear whether it really should be
labelled unemployment. There are also cases of people without jobs
who would like them if someone offered, but are doing nothing to find
one. In some sense they are in the labor market as they may suddenly
appear on the employment rolls without ever appearing as unemployed.
But, on the other hand, they are very difficult to identify. Other
people might be looking for work but do not really need it and will
only accept under stringent conditions. Still others may be
desperate for work but too discouraged to do anything to prove it.
The difficulty is setting up objective criteria by which to
judge unemployment. In some sense unemployment has to be defined
as a state of mind. Not all people without jobs would call themselves
unemployed certainly, but if we go by people's assessment of themselves,
we will have a very unreliable measure. Analysts finally were to set
up the activity of looking for a job as a criterion for unemployment
94
(see p. 114 ) with various modifications for special cases. The
decisions were to be based on the nature of the major groups generally
considered unemployed at the time and on the practical problems of
measuring unemployment objectively.
Development of Sampling Methods
A critical element that would have to be developed before a
dependable unemployment indicator could exist was a new methodology.
Countries like Great Britain, which had an unemployment insurance
system with fairly complete coverage, had been collecting reasonable data
as a byproduct of the activity. The U.S., however, was not to pass
unemployment insurance legislation until 1935, and then it was only
partial in its coverage. In this country, work continued therefore
on the development of methods that were ultimately to produce far
more complete and accurate data than any other nation.
In 1928, as Commissioner Stewart testified before the Senate,
only two methods of measuring unemployment were generally visualized.
One was through a complete enumeration of the population, but this had
many disadvantages. (29) It took time and a great deal of money to
perform a census and to tabulate the results. The Committee on Labor
Statistics of the President's Conference on Unemployment had, back in
1921, indicated that unemployment data was needed on a monthly basis
if it were to provide usable information. Not recognized were the
possibilities for error in a census with its thousands of slightly
trained agents and the possibility of bias as the agents are often
systematically unable to track down certain groups. The census was
regarded as cumbersome but accurate.
The only other method Stewart and many others in the ensuing
years envisioned was the indirect method of estimating unemployment by
subtracting employment estimates from estimates of the labor force (30)
(described more fully on p. 104 ). This method was relatively inexpensive
and had the advantage that it could be done monthly and the figures kept
quite current. Its disadvantage was that it involved so much guessing
that estimates varied widely and were not at all dependable. In 1928
Commissioner Stewart talked of ways this method might be improved in the
future, but,by the mid-thirties, it must have been obvious that the
methods could not be perfected to produce dependable data. Something
else would be required.
The method was to be that of the sample survey, which today
permits the U.S. to make highly accurate unemployment estimates within
three weeks of collecting the data. The method allows greater
accuracy than a census and isof course,far less expensive. The
accuracy of the method was to create a highly sensitive indicator, as
well as a dependable one. It seems quite likely that many of its
uses would not have developed without these qualities.
Sampling, of course was not a new idea in 1940. The idea of
evaluating the nature of the whole by testing some part of it is surely
as old as human experience. The idea of selecting observations in some
systematically random way to get a "fair," or representative, sample is
more sophisticated, however. Although the theory of probability was
established in the eighteenth century, it was apparently not applied
to the drawing of samples until the early twentieth century (31)
Tables of random numbers, not published till 1927, were to make random
sampling considerably easier. The idea of increasing the efficiency
of a sample by selecting deliberately from the full range of population
types was applied in nineteenth century studies. The method for
combining the two approaches however, and producing accurate total
population estimates on the basis 'of small, carefully chosen samples
was not to be developed until the twenties and thirties.
Sampling techniques were developed gradually and in a rather
dispersed way in such areas as agriculture, mining and population
studies. The developments of the thirties in the U.S., including
the efforts to develop a way of measuring unemployment, were to provide
the energy and focus to make the sample survey a practicalefficient
method. The institution of the large-scale work projects like the
Federal Emergency Relief Organization and the Work Projects
Administration (WPA) was to provide the manpower for experimental and
other surveys and research into the techniques. Depression conditions
and massive Federal programs demanded far more statistical information
than had previous eras. Therefore university and government statisticians
were mobilized to plan reorganization of statistics and new activities (32)
The Central Statistical Board was set up in this period
to oversee, encourageand coordinate mushrooming statistical activity.
This gave methodological developments some focus and permitted the
communication between different groups which had been lacking and slowing
the development of sampling. Certainly the whole statistical effort in
the thirties was catalytic for the development of sampling methods.
Many of the essential ingredients had existed for some time but now
came together.
Though many of the techniques had been developed in various
different contexts, sampling in 1930 was not widely seen as the answer
to statistics gathering problems. It took time to get the notion
accepted that sampling produced reliable estimates. The outline of
events relating to development of the unemployment sample survey is
approximately as follows. Throughout the thirties and even back into
the twenties, state and city officials did sample surveys of unemployment
in various local areas. The procedure was not efficient enough, nor the
cities rich enough to contemplate doing these on a regular basis, but they
did provide a body of experience for others to draw on. There was
considerable Congressional and press pressure for another unemployment
census, but the method was expensive and cumbersome and had not proved
itself well in 1930 (33). Moreover, the Roosevelt Administration was not
eager for national data which would almost certainly show how poorly the
economy was doing.
In 1937, however, Roosevelt finally asked for a census and Congress
readily passed an Act setting up a temporary Census Commission to conduct
a one-time unemployment census (34). To cut down on the expense of enumeration
this was to be a self-enumeration. The unemployed would fill out
postcards and return them. The biases that are inevitable with such
a self-selection process did not particularly bother Congress as they
felt all who wanted jobs, who were thus deserving of their concern,
would fill out the cards. It is probably significant that the Census
Bureau was not to conduct this investigation. Their standards would
have required a better sample selection.
The methodologists, however, managed to add onto the census a
special Enumerative Check Census which was a canvass of families on a
random selection of postal routes. The purpose was to check for
underenumeration of the unemployed and identify which groups these were.
Of course, this check census as we now know provided not just as much
information as the registration, it provided more and more accurately (35)
Statisticians concluded that the check census showed only 70% registration
of the unemployed and that there were a number of important biases in the
data from registration. The unemployment of women was relatively too
low because they tended not to register, whereas the registration of
"emergency" workers as unemployed was close to 100%. At this stage,
the sample survey was still a new idea, particularly, in the political
arenaand Congressmen would have been unlikely to trust its results
alone.
Statisticians, however, were satisfied and now convinced that
the sample survey was a more practical alternative to census or indirect
measures of unemployment. A basic set of concepts and questions were
100
included in the check census which seemed to work fairly well.
Accordingly the WPA, with its vast staff and considerable incentive
to discover the quantity and nature of unemployment since its
responsibility was to provide jobs, began work in 1937 to develop a
sample survey of unemployment (36). They studied the
concepts and methods developed to that time and did experimental'
surveys. Finally, in December 1939, when theDIpression was about
to be over, they instituted the Monthly Report on the Labor Force.
It was a survey of about 25,000 families chosen randomly within
population groupings clustered by variables found to have important
relations to the amount of unemployment, like geography and industrial
composition of the area. This stratified random sampling approach
was to be considerably improved upon in later years, but the sample
survey itself has continued uninterrupted down to the present.
When the WPA was disbanded during the war, the Census Bureau took
over the data collection and continued the survey. The present data
on unemployment represents then an essentially uninterrupted series
since 1940 when the major methodological breakthrough was finally made.
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Evolution of the Concepts
In 1931 it was clear that the concepts used for measuring
unemployment were unsatisfactory. They did not provide useful
information or permit unambiguous measurement. To arrive at adequate
concepts, a considerable period of trial and error would be required;
the direction of change was not obvious in 1931. The evolution and
choices of concepts for the 1940 survey were the result of the
demands of the unemployment estimating methodology, of the realities
of Depression unemployment and perceptions of the nature of the
problem, and of practical decisions about which concepts were most
readily measurable.
Much effort went into attempts to estimate or measure unemploy-
ment in the thirties. Business and labor as well as general research
organizations published regular estimates of national unemployment
rates throughout the period - estimates which differed widely though
they followed the same basic methodology. Unemployment censuses
and sample surveys were done in many cities throughout the period to
get information on local unemployment. These provided a testing
ground for questions and interviewing methods and, through their
procedures, helped to define concepts. Unemployment, though poorly
measured, remained obviously high and provided a constant incentive
to develop adequate measures. As massive relief programs were
enacted, public and Congressional demand for measurements to plan and
evaluate the programs increased /and the purpose.and focus of such
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measures became more sharply defined. There was considerable demand
for another national unemployment census, but none was made until 1937
because of a combination of methodological difficulties and
Administration reluctance. The idea of a national sample survey,
which would overcome most methodological difficulties of the census,
did not gain wide currency until after it was an established fact.
The Gainful Worker Concept. The idea that only those with previous
employment should be considered as liable to unemployment dated
back into the nineteenth century. The rationale for it was
principally that the goal was primarily a census of occupations,
rather than of employment. In any case, the gainful worker idea
must have seemed the obvious way to distinguish,among a group of
people, those for whom, it would be relevant to ask further questions
about time worked and not worked. In the nineteenth century, in
many classes, almost anyone was liable to work who could find a job,
wives, children or the elderly. It would have been hard to identify
the kind of demographic patterns then that we now tend to find
characterizing those prepared or not prepared to work. For some
reason unemployment of those who had never worked was not perceived
as a major problem.
During the Depression, however, this perception changed. The
Depression was the longest lasting and most severe of many depressions.
As time passed, it became increasingly obvious that the number genuinely
in need of work)but who never had been able to acquire a gainful
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occupationwas a sizeable and growing group. The sample surveys
done in the period reflect this increasing recognition,as a study
of their concepts and methods shows (37).
A steady trend existed in which later surveys tended to question all
looking for work instead of solely those with gainful occupations as
the early surveys did.
Inadequacy of the Concepts for Unemployment Estimates. Another
reason that the gainful worker idea and some unemployment definitions
were gradually abandoned was a more subtle problem which had to do
with the way unemployment was estimated. The basic principles
behind most estimates were developed in the teens and twenties
and have already been partially described. The estimates were made
by a number of groups, including most notably the AFL and the CIO,
the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), the Alexander
Hamilton Institute and Robert Nathan, who made them at the request of
the President's Committee on Economic Security, which was formed to
plan Depression relief strategies. At least two prominent newspaper
columnists, Dorothy Thompson and Arthur Krock also got into the estimating
business. Notable for its absence from this list is the BLS or any
other federal statistical agency. The data and methods were of such
dubious quality that such agencies shied away from making "official"
estimates. Certainly the estimates of "shrinkage" in employment
which the BLS provided in 1928 were the target of severe attack.
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Although the estimates of these groups varied widely, the methods
had many general features in common (38). All the estimates
were derived by subtracting estimated employment from the estimated
labor force. The labor force size was estimated with varying degrees
of care, starting from the bases of the 1930 census data on population
and gainful workers. Several estimates considered only the population
increase since 1930 and assumed a constant proportion of gainful workers.
Others made adjustments for the changing age composition of the
population, which during the thirties involved a relative increase in
the working age population. Some groups also considered the effect
on the proportion of gainful workers of changes in race and sex
composition of the population, immigration patterns, child-labor practices
and school attendance. Adjustments necessarily involved somewhat crude
approximations and the assumption of the continuance of past trends.
Specifically, the method implies that the 1930 gainful worker percentages
were normal. In the thirties, however, as secondary workers entered
the labor market in search of supplementary incomes, the assumption
was increasingly hard to make. In any case, it is not difficult to see
how it could happen that estimates of the labor force differed widely.
Estimates of employment were fraught with even more assumptions
and the necessity for individual judgments and guesses. It was in
this process that 1930 unemployment figures were intended to provide
important benchmarks. Most estimates did use them as such but only
with considerable adjustment, which brought the whole procedure into
question and caused considerable discrepancy in the estimates.
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Although the 1930 census did not actually measure employment, it purported
to measure unemployment and the population at risk (gainful workers)
so the number of employed in 1930 should equal the gainful workers
minus the unemployed. The trouble was that the census did not define
and identify clearly the unemployed. Instead they provided categories
of idle persons, many of whom might be termed employed for certain
purposes. This meant that the estimators had to decide what proportion
of the total of 7 categories of idle belonged among the unemployed.
Many, after all, had jobs or pay. The total in the census of these
was 3,888,814, and Robert Nathan and the AFL arrived at 3,400,000 as
the adjusted total of those who should be called unemployed.(39) The
NICB, on the other hand, calculated an adjusted total of 2,932,000 un-
employed (4 0 )-This was to help give them consistently lower estimates
than the other groups throughout the decade.
In addition many felt the 1930 unemployment concept of idleness
classes did not include all the unemployed. Either the concept of
questions resulted in underenumeration of the actual unemployed in
1930. The evidence offered was generally that an adjustment backward
of the 1931 special census by employment indices suggests that
unemployment volume was understated. Nathan, the CIO and AFL all
added 600,000 to their 1930 unemployment figures to make the adjustment.
The NICB estimates,which did not involve addition to unemployment
figures for underenumeration, were of dubious value. Projecting back
to September 1929 on the assumptions that their figures represented
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actual unemployment in 1930 and the difference between gainfulsorkers
and unemployed was equal. to employment, one gets negative unemployment
in 1929. The number employed in September 1929 was certainly larger
than the total gainful workers or labor force calculated by the NICB.
This kind of problem led to a discussion of how to deal with so-called
"additional workers" entering the labor force ( 41).
Many seemed to feel that the phenomenon represented only workers
temporarily joining the labor force for some reason - good or bad
economic conditions. These, many argued, were clearly not worthy
of the same kind of consideration as the "regular" workers. This was
one of many ways in which value judgments crept into analyses.
Certainly the orientation of the NICB towards business rather than
labor was not coincidentally related to its espousal of this view.
The difficulty with these unemployment estimates was not simply
that they varied widely, but also that they were used to calculate
employment, to provide base year or benchmark data. These employment
figures were compared with employment data from other sources in later
years to get current total employment and unemployment estimates. The
employment data used in the thirties was from a variety of sources.
The BLS collected wage, payroll and manhour data in a monthly sample
of nonagricultural establishments. The sample, however, did not cover
all types of industry and was poor on small or new firms. Other
agencies compiled their own employment data or indices, as did the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the National Consumer Section of the
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Commerce Department, for example. Unemployment estimators applied
indices of the change in employment from year to year to total employment
figures from 1930. Total employment was not available in later only
partial employment indices. Obviously benchmark levels were critical
to later calculations. These later figures would not be trustworthy,
however,insofar as their concepts differed from the benchmark concepts.
The 1930 concepts of employment, essentially the residue of
gainful workers not unemployed, were not readily compatible with the
employment data. Many persons carried on payrolls in a given month
would show up as unemployed because they did not happen to work on the
day preceding the census. This problem was due to the fact that the time
periods of the census and the employment data collection did not match.
Also, however, people were carried on payrolls even when they were
laid off,on the assumption they would be back. Moreover, since
employment data only covered some industries and types of firms and
census data covered all individuals, considerable extrapolation and
many assumptions were required to fill in the gaps. The 1930
definitions for agricultural employment were apparently accepted by
most estimators, but when the results of the 1935 Census of Agriculture
came out, they showed that about 2 1/2 million more persons were
employed in Agriculture than most estimators figured, by extrapolating
from 1930 figures. The discrepancy had clearly to do with the counting
of unpaid family labor, which was not clearly and objectively defined
for measurement until 1945.
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In short, then the concepts defining in 1930 the population at
risk, the unemployed and the employed, were too vague,
matched too poorly with concepts behind other data and, in some
important ways, failed to include all the relevant population. The
fuzziness of the concepts and the areas left open for judgment led
to wide discrepancies in unemployment estimates. This was a particular
problem since unemployment even at its greatest was relatively small
in comparison to total employment and total labor force, so minor
differences in the estimates of these could produce relatively large
percentage differences in unemployment.
The gainful worker definition of population at risk did not
prove very useful to these estimates or to sample survey designers
after the mid-1930's because it did not predict the size of the labor
force well, and was not readily usable in conjunction with current
employment information. Sample surveys also were intended to provide
benchmark levels to compare with local employment estimates, but if
only gainful workers were counted, it would be hard to account for
rises in employment totals due to the entrance of those never counted.
Forces Shaping the Concepts. The concepts that finally were to emerge
in 1940 as the basis for the labor force data series were determined by
several kinds of factors. The requirements of economic theory played
a relatively minor role. In fact the unemployment indicator was as
much a social as an economic indicator and was designed to reflect on
the social problems of unemployment as much as on the economic ones.
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In any case, the concepts were not defined by some prior standards and
then measures chosen to approximate the concept. Rather the concepts
emerged from a process of measurement efforts and were rooted in
reference to contemporary values and actual situations, neither of
which was immutable.
Although clearly some general views of the nature of employment
and unemployment guided the process of measurement in the thirties,
many aspects of these concepts, both in details and in the fundamental
respects, were worked out in the process, and because of it. The
process involved interviews and, thereforequestions had to be chosen,
phrased and placed in some order. Enumerators had to be instructed
about the meaning of the questions and their answers to guide their
decisions on coding responses. Tabulations had to be made and
responses grouped. Each portion of this procedure involved a further
specification of the concept. Moreover, the difficulties involved in
different parts of the process tended to dictate decisions about the
concept. In other words, the chosen procedures might well be the
easiest or most reliable rather than those suited to producing an ideal
concept on theoretical or other grounds. One could not define the
concepts fully without reference to a good many measurement procedures
and instructions, which would not necessarily follow strictly from a
broad conceptual definition of the indicator.
Not only did the exigencies of measurement methods shape the
concepts, but also prevailing values and perceptions of problems at
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the time affected decisionsas did the current size of groups
that would warrant special adjustments. Moreover, views about the
way the problems could be solved and the role the indicators might play
in planning the solutions also influenced the way it would be defined
in detail. In other words the concept was the product of a
current and very likely temporary situation and views. The concepts
crystallized at a particular moment in time tend to capture the
ingredients of a set of values and perceptions which happen to prevail
at the moment when the data series began. It will be shown later
that these concepts are not always equally suitable at a later time
but that they tend not to be readily changed. They do changebut
only lagging considerably behind changing methods, situations and values.
At least, if we recognize the relativity of the conceptswe need not
think there is something sacrosanct about their continued maintenance
in a particular form. There are other reasons to maintain some
continuity of concepts, but not that they represent some inevitable
truth. Likewise, in designing an indicator, we should not delude
ourselves into believing we are capable of defining the perfect concept.
The observations in the next sections tend to support the view
that one nation's concepts are not necessarily exportable to another ( 42).
This is particularly important with the unemployment figures because U.S.
"success" with these data has led to a considerable effort to transfer
the results of our experience to many other nations and institute
similar unemployment series. If concepts and their validation are
ill
rooted in existing problems and perceptions and in the nature of
respondents and enumerators, then, just as the same set of concepts
may not be equally useful over time, they may not be equally useful
over space. Space is a bigger problem than time in that we can
assume a slow change of the concepts through time, but a short-term
continunity of relevance. Although perhaps we can transfer measures
from one similar country to another, it is more difficult to be sure
of the important ingredients in the similarity.
In particular for unemployment measures, the nature of work
and of leisure may be very different in different types of societies.
In fact the whole organization of life is apt to be different and it
may be impossible to define "labor" in a way that will refer to the
same class of human activities in all societies. Much productive
work may be done on a communal basis so that it does not enter into
a market economy and receive pay or profit. Are all the participants
then idle, as they would be by our definitions? Or if we alter our
definitions slightly to define this as work then do we classify as
employed all the small children and grandmothers who participate in
what may be also a ceremonial or social function? In a very much
agrarian society it seems that work and leisure are not so well
separated as they are in more industrial societies, and the attempt to
apply some universal standard definitions to both would only obscure
what was really going on.
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Although this is an extreme example of the possible contrasts,
the next few pages should suggest how even smaller cultural differences
could influence the appropriateness or validity of the concepts. It
seems likely that concepts must grow out of a situation and even some-
what altered versions of measures suitable in one culture are not
necessarily appropriate in another. The problem may be more fundamental.
The nature of labor may differ as may be the purposes of measuring
some involuntary lack of labor.
Unemployment and Economic Theory. Economic theory did not
play a prominent role in the development
of unemployment measures though it may have had a kind of background
influence. The majority of the development of the indicator was
done by statisticans. The purposes had to do with immediate problems
of policy and programs at a time when economic theory was little used
to guide them. Moreover, the issues were seen as social problems
as much as economic ones. It was an issue, not just of diagnosing
the economy, but also of how to deal with the peoplc who were unemployed.
The indicator had to provide useful information about who they were and to
identify those deserving of aid. In this respect it was a social
indicator.
R.A. Nixon and Samuelson, writing in 1940 (43)
say that unemployment was usually conceived of as the difference between
"full" and actual employment. "Employment is full", they continue "when
individuals work as much as they would be willing to work at a given wage."
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It is the short-run real supply of labor and might be measured by the
difference between the total manhours, per month, for example,
which people wish to work and the total manhours actually worked.
This is only one of a number of possible ways of defining
unemployment in terms relevant to economic theory and it does involve
a number of assumptions about the nature of the labor market and wage
expectations. It is not necessary to go into these in detail. The
purpose here is simply to suggest the ways that the requirements of
economic theory may diverge from other demands for the indicator.
Economic theory is more concerned with the quantity of labor than with
the number of individuals, but unemployment has always been measured in
terms of people rather than the quantity of work they want. This has
been because of the practical measurement problems of finding objective
ways of getting answers to the hypothetical problem of how much work a
person would actually take if offered. It has also been due to the
interest in knowing the number and characteristics of individuals
unemployed-an objective primarily related to planning of programs of
relief or remedies directed at individuals rather than the economy.
Obviously also it is very important for economic theory to count
all those who are in the labor market but not to count any as unemployed
who are not actually available for work. The final concept departs
from these ideals in a number of ways, most notably that many people
are prepared to take jobs although they are not actively looking and
thus are not counted as unemployed. The criterion the economist would
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use is presumably whether such persons actually influenced the
labor market if they did not broadcast their intentions. Ideally the
economist would like the unemployment measure to include some notion of
the conditions under which individuals would take jobs - wages, hours
and so on. But this has proved impractical to measure, since even the
individuals cannot necessarily provide the answers themselves.
The unemployment measure evolved in 1940 was not ideal as an economic
datum, but neither was it useless as such. It measured unemployment
at a specific point in time, rather than, as early censuses had done,
tried to measure the total amount of unemployment over a long period.
Economists want to know what is the relation of the supply and demand
of labor at any giventime and could not find total duration of
unemployment very useful in explaining the behavior of the economy.
In other respects, too, the unemployment indicator did not seem to be
so far from the economists'need for a measure of unused, available
labor supply. In later years, it was to be an important, even if
imperfect, variable in economic models.
Definition of Concepts due to Measurement Procedures. The most important
influence of the measurement technique on the concept showed up in the
use of activity as the principal defining criterion for classifying
individuals. That is, a person engaged in work is called employed,
one looking for work is unemployed, and anyone doing one or the other is
in the labor force. There are some carefully spelled out exceptions,
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but the basic activity principle governs most classifications. Other
principles are conceivable, particularly in the unemployed classifica-
tion, such as the desire to work. The economist might want the number
willing to work at some going wage. Many unemployed by the activity
criterion might not accept employment at any available wage.
The choice of the activity criterion was dictated by the need for
an objectively measurable standard. The method of collecting informa-
tion was interviews, and a great deal depended on the understanding of
interviewers and respondents. Any area open to individual judgment
would decrease the data's reliability seriously. The activity criterion
is relatively unambiguous. Most people when they ask or are asked
whether someone looked for work would understand the question in
approximately the same way and respond predictably.
Other aspects of the concepts were decided at least partly on the
basis of objectivity of measurement. Many questions were designed,
expressly so they could be answered yes or no- The decision not to
count the number of hours work that were wanted, that is the amount of
unemployment in terms, not just of people, but of time, was based on the
need for objectivity. The decision to ask, not whether people wanted
work, but whether they were looking for it, was in part based on the
difficulty of evaluating desire for work. Two different people's de-
sires could be much less easily translated into comparable terms than
the simple fact of looking for work. Some of the changes in concept
since 1940 resulted from the finding that the original
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concept was not possible to measure objectively.
Not only were the concepts defined deliberately, in some ways
dictated, by the requirements of measurement, but also many fuzzy
areas of the concepts were de facto defined in the instructions to
enumerators. For example, the question may be "did you look for
work this week?" The answer may be that the person read the want
ads. The interviewer will have to consult the instruction book
to see if that counts as looking for work. The effect of
instructions can have both obvious and subtle ways of delineating
what is to be measured. The censuses of 1910 and 1920 provide an
example of how instructions to enumerators canin effect.,change
concepts though no explicit definitional changes are introduced.
In 1910 special emphasis was made in the instructions to enumerators
of the point that women and children might well have gainful occupations.
As a result a larger percent then expected was returned as gainful
workers,and the instruction was dropped for the 1920 census.
The proportion was low again (44). Although this could
be described as a problem of a poor measurement instrument, it is
also a question that enumerators in the two censuses perceived that
they were measuring somewhat different concepts because of the
instructions. Without the instructions, they were far more likely
to consider that a housewife or child had some other activity besides
gainful workwhich should provide the criterion for their classification.
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The number of these instructions has been cut down in recent
years as the principles of the concept have been more thought through.
The instruction book for the 1930 census was very largeproviding a
guide to the coding of all sorts of answers which were not obvious.
But if such elaborate instructions are given, it suggests that the
principles of the concept are still fuzzy. The implications of a clear
and consistent concept will be more obvious and require less spelling
out. The amorphous areas requiring much instruction have presented
a source of unreliability and misunderstanding of the data, and there
has been considerable effort to remove them. One of the most recent
changes in the indicator, for example, has been to spell out the possible
types of activities that could count as looking for a job on the
schedule itself.
"Sorter" concepts used in the various surveys ( 45)
around the country to separate out groups for further questioning are
also part of the concept definition. This ordering of questions and
implicit selection process was a de facto way of defining the concepts.
For example, if a person was a gainful worker and over a certain age,
he might also be asked if he was working. If not,then (and only then)
he would be asked if he wanted work, and then if he was able to work.
This procedure limited the information and the way it might be grouped
since a certain data was only obtained if people answered an earlier
series of questions a certain way. The order and choice of the questions
is part of the concept and may or may not have been deliberately
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designed in relation to some prior plan.
The Role of Contemporary Problems, Perceptions and Priorities. Some
of the decisions about the concepts were grounded in values and
perceptions of current problems. Sometimes the decisions seem-to be
quite simply fortuitous. One very basic decision that had to be made
was whether the fact of employment would have priority over the fact
of looking for a job. It was decided that if one had any work at all,
it would classify one as employed even if looking for more work.
It seems very likely that this priority was established because in the
Depression, anyone with any sort of job was luckier than many. It
was the totally unemployed that one wanted to find out about particu-
larly. Also for comparability with employment data from establishments
it was necessary to classify all those with any amount of work as
employed because they would show up on employment rolls. The value
judgment essentially was that it was more important to know the total
number employed than unemployed. If there had been a plan to deal
with all who needed more work, it seems likely that the total number
fully or partly unemployed would have taken precedence.
The WPA, In deciding on the final format of the questions for
its survey of unemployment, used the results of the 1937 Enumerative
Check Census to decide which questions could be omitted. (46)
They concluded not much would be gained by asking both whether idle
persons wanted work and whether they were actively seeking it since
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See Table 2 p. 124 for more detail on Labor Force concepts as they
120
the percentage who wanted work but were not seeking it was only 1.4.
Although some of these might have been genuinely unemployed "stranded"
workers, many,they concluded, were probably not available for work.
Work seeking was chosen as the more significant and objective of the
two criteria. They also used the check census tabulations to conclude
that a question on ability to work was unnecessary. Only 2% of the
population was enumerated as wanting to work but unable to. It is not
inconceivable that in other years these percentages might be quite
different. For example, recent feeling has been strong that the number
who are too discouraged to seek work is substantial. It is possible,
too, that if everyone were well insured for medical care and loss of
pay, a good many more would report themselves as unable to work.
The set of concepts of employment, unemployment and labor force
chosen by the WPA were the product of the time and place and the
exigencies of the methods. They were the result of many decisions,
large and small,and represented a kind of compromise of conflicting
forces, goals, uses, and perceptions. Because the survey technique
was finally operational, and because the WPA had funds to set up the
survey in late 1939, the ideas and methods current at that moment were
crystallized into a measurement process of unemployment. It was not
always to be ideally appropriate in later times and places, but became
institutionalized and persisted nonetheless. It seems quite likely
that its success was strongly influenced by the pragmatic way the
concept was developed. It grew very much out of the realities and
constraints of a situation, and these roots seemingly gave it strength.
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The War Years: Refining the Instrument
The advent of war brought changes which were to affect the course
of development of the indicator. The WPA survey was continued in its
same form under the Census Bureau throughout the war. Indeed the
survey we have today, the Current Population Survey, is part of an
unbroken monthly series which started with the 1939 WPA Monthly Report
on the Labor Force. There have been changes, but on the whole the
survey methods, questions and concepts are fundamentally the same ones
today as in 1939. At first glance it may be surprising that the survey
was continued through the war. It is true that it had been instituted
to deal with the single most visible and emotionally charged issue of
the Depression, unemployment, and. by the time the survey had
been going only a few months, unemployment was well on the way to very
low levels. It might have been discontinued except that the wartime
production and planning agencies needed information on the labor force.
Two circumstances changed basically between the Depression and
the war period. The first was that public scrutiny was off the
indicator since unemployment was no longer a major problem. This
fact quite plausibly made it possible for the statisticians to work
out methodological issues without the spotlight that might have made
the revelation of flaws in the methods embarrassing - that might even
have prevented their revelation or adjustment and certainly would have
diminished public confidence in the results. The second change that
122
affected the indicator was that wartime labor problems were very
different from Depression ones. Pressure existed to get different
kinds of information from the survey and the problems were of a
different sort. The interest was mostly in identifying potentially
usable manpower. Helping the unemployed was no longer the problem,
and there was considerably more acceptance of the idea of several
breadwinners in a family.
When the Census Bureau took over the labor force survey from the
WPA, they immediately began to apply their experience to making improve-
ments in both sample and questionnaire design (47).
The period was one of considerable thoughtful work and the changes
introduced had greater effects on the results than any later
methodological developments. The accuracy became relatively high,
and it appears that many of the major methodological problems were
dealt with fairly well,though changes to increase accuracy and
reliability are still being made. The first change introduced by the
Census was to reselect the sample using more detailed stratificaLion
criteria and choosing from more widely dispersed units than previous
sampling strategy (48). The WPA sample had giown rapidly
unrepresentative with wartime population shifts in and out of the
sample areas. The new sampling strategy was designed to minimize the
problem.
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Census researchers worked on tricky measurement problems and ways
of designing questions to get the most reliable replies. (49) In the process
concepts too were changed. (See Table 2 on the original definitions).
For example investigation showed that respondents and enumerators under-
stood a great variety of different things by the question on incidental
family chores. Accordingly, many people working practically full time
for their families were listed as not in the labor force and others
working much less may have been listed as employed (50). The researchers
concluded that it would be more reliable to distinguish economically
meaningful work by the number of hours worked, so anyone with more than
15 hours a week of unpaid family work would be counted as employed.
Investigators also discovered some of the ways that enumerator and
respondent attitudes were adversely affecting the results. When
respondents said they had no job and were not looking, enumerators were
supposed to ask why not. But since the same families were interviewed
by the enumerators in six consecutive months, and since the question
was a rather delicate one, enumerators tended not to ask Lhe question
at all. They often supplied their own answers. After some
experimentation the Bureau discontinued this question and left it up
to the respondent to volunteer any reasons. Since, among those not looking
for work,only a good reason would permit classification as unemployed,
not asking for the reason cut down on the unemployed. The decision
was to have repercussions much later when the reasons for it were long
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TABLE 2
DEFINITIONS OF BASIC CONCEPTS
ORIGINAL LABOR FORCE SURVEY
The Employed Population
The non-military, non-institutionalized population over 14 years
of age in one of the following situations:
(1) At work for pay or profit at least 1 hour in the week
preceding the survey.
(2) Doing unpaid family work other than incidental chores.
(3) Waiting to start a new job within 30 days.
(4) On layoff with definite instructions to return in 30 days.
The Unemployed Population
The non-military, non-institutionalized population over 14,
not employed (as defined above) in the week preceding the survey and
either:
(1) Active: took steps to find work within preceding week of
waiting to hear from efforts in last 60 days.
(2) Inactive: did not take steps to look for work because:
(a) Too ill to do so.
(b) Believed no work was available.
(c) On layoff either indefinitely or for over 30 days.
The Labor Force
All Employed or Unemployed.
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forgotten. The concept and measurement method were just not dependable
enough. (51)
The attempt to make statistics serve the war effort led to the
discovery of a serious methodological problem, which meant that the
survey results were seriously unreliable. To identify possible
sources of labor that might be enlisted in war production efforts a
question was added in March 1942 to the survey asking all those not
in the labor force whether they would take a job if one were available.
The startling result was that many replied they already had jobs.
Further study revealed that the question incurred a problem of
underenumeration of the employed due principally to respondent's
misunderstanding of the intent of the questions. Many, when asked
if they worked in the previous week, said no if they also happened to
be students or housewives, thinking the questioner wanted to know
their principal activity. The question was clearly producing
unreliable results, since those questioned clearly understood different
things by it. The Bureau added a question to the regular schedule
therefore, in 1945 asking what was the respondent's major activity
and followed this by asking those who did not say work whether they
also did any work. The effect of this was to increase the count of
employment by 2,500,000, of whom 1/2 worked at least 35 hours a week.
It also changed the composition of the group with relatively more
women, more young people, and more trade and service workers (52).
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These changes introduced considerable discontinuity into the
series because the effect was fairly large. However, with these
changes, it seems that the data reached a level of validity and
accuracy that was to be relatively satisfactory for some time.
Experiments and tests on the data continued and changes were to be
made in methods and concepts but none with so large an impact.
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TABLE 3
LABOR FORCE SURVEY: MAJOR CHANGES IN CONCEPTS, METHODS
AND PRESENTATION 1940-1971
1939 December. The WPA institutes the monthly survey.
1942 The Census Bureau takes over the survey.
1943 Change in the method of drawing the sample, to make it
more representative in the long-run and adjust for recent
population changes.
1945 New interview schedule introduced. Question added about
usual occupation. Question deleted about why respondent
not looking for work. Replaced by volunteered information.
Inactive category merged with active unemployed. Result:
a major discontinuity in the series. Employment estimates
increased by 2,500,000, almost
entirely women and those under 20. Unemployment levels
remained steady but composition changed. More specific
questions about unpaid family work, changing definition
from incidental chores to 15 hours or more.
1954 Change from 68-area sample to 230-area sample based on
the 1950 census results. No increase in funds. Sample
size kept to 25,000 households. Reliability increased
as if sample had been doubled. Discrepancy between
results of old and new sample. Unemployment estimates
in the latter were higher by 700,000.
1955 Introduction of seasonally adjusted data.
Addition of monthly questions on reasons for part-time
work (previously were done quarterly).
1956 Expansion to 330-area sample and 35,000 households.
Increased reliability of major statistics by 20% and made




a) Those on 30-day layoff and b) waiting for a job within
30 days are now considered unemployed instead of employed,
except c) those in school are now transferred to the "not
in the labor force" category. The effect was to increase
unemployment.
1959 Responsibility for analysis and publication of Current
Population Survey data transferred to BLS, which gave
regular technical press conferences. The Census Bureau
continued to collect and tabulate the data.
1961- Gradual updating of sample and ratio estimates on the basis
1963 of 1960 census returns. Increase to 357 areas. No increase
in sample size.
1963 Addition of two questions to monthly survey, one on whether
the' unemployed are seeking full or part-time work, and one
on the family responsibility of the unemployed.
1967 Expansion to 449-area sample. Size increased to 52,500
households, for increase in reliability and detail.
Concept changes:
a) A specific job-seeking activity within last 4 weeks must
be reporLed for a person to be counted as unemployed. This
reduces ambiguity of time period and definition of job-seeking.
b) Person must be currently available for work to be counted
as unemployed (eliminating students, among others).
c) Person with a job, but absent from it and looking for work
in survey week were now considered employed instead of
unemployed.
d) Unemployment no longer includes those who would have been
looking for work except for the belief none was available.
e) Lower age limit for labor force raised from 14 to 16.




1967 Addition of probing questions on hours of work, duration of
unemployment, the self-employed and availability
of persons for work. Purpose was to get better reporting
and more information.
1971 April. Elimination of technicians'press conference on
monthly release of the figures. Beginning of monthly
Joint Economic Committee hearings to replace it.
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CHAPTER III
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INDICATOR
The Employment Act of 1946
As the war drew to a close, and soldiers returned home, fears
began to mount that unemployment would climb back to prewar levels.
The concern led Congress to pass legislation which was to make un-
employment data a critical part of national level decision-making,
and in so doing to ensure that the labor force data series would
become a permanent fixture, highly visible and widely used. The
legislation had nothing directly to do with statistics, however.
In fact, Congress was apparently fed up with wartime controls and
arguments over statistics, as the House Appropriations Committee
rejected in 1944 and 1945 Presidential requests for statistical
programs to aid in planning conversion to peacetime economy.
Unemployment, however, was a very real fear, enough to bring
together conservatives and liberals to pass legislation to prevent
a recurrance of the problems of the Depression. (53)
The act is known as the Employment Act of 1946 and states a national
policy of the Federal government to "use all practical means.... to
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foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare,
conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment
opportunities, including self employment for those able, willing and
seeking to work and to promote maximum employment, production and
purchasing power" (54).
This was a landmark declaration since it was the first
time Congress had ever accepted a permanent federal responsibility for
maintaining employment levels. Even in the Depression with all its
work relief programs, Congress made no declaration of a continuing
commitment. The programs were planned to be temporary and no major,
long-term measures to deal with the economy were visualized.
After the war, however, things had changed. Most importantly,
Keynesian economic theory was beginning to permeate government circles.
Keynes provided an explanation of how it was possible for the economy
to remain at a low equilibrium level with high unemployment and low
consumption. Prior theory had assumed that high unemployment could
not persist; wagcs would go down and the economy would readjust. One
implication of Keynes? theory was that central government could and
might even have to take action if the unemployment probl'em was ever to
be solved. The government could use fiscal policy to increase demand
for goods, increasing government spending or decreasing taxes, or
monetary policy influencing the quantity of money or decreasing interest
rates. The full range of possibilities and effects of the various
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measures were not to be explored nor widely understood until considerably
later. One thing was clear - that it was possible for the government to
do something about unemployment.
In 1944 the British government issued a White Paper on Employment
policy (55) and William Beveridge published his influential
book on full employment (56). An important idea emerging in
these documents was not only that government could affect unemployment
but that it should have a target of full employment. This did not mean
no unemployment since it was agreed that some frictional amount would
have to exist if people were ever to change jobs. The problem was to
decide what this level was and arguments over it would consume
considerable attention in later years. A major contention was that
full employment was reached when the number of open jobs in the economy
equalled the number of job seekers. We have mentioned earlier one
economist's definition (p. 112). Others were to define it empirically
on the basis of unemployment in some good year. The important point to
be made here is that the whole idea of having an employment policy
involved a target level of unemployment. Measurement was clearly essential
to carrying it out.
The Employment Act required that the President submit an annual
economic report, including, among other things, a report on levels of
unemployment, an estimate of future trends in employment and a program
to deal with any problems. Since the act had clearly defined unemploy-
ment on the same principle as the indicator of the Census Bureau, there
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was little doubt that it would be used in the analyses (57). It does
seem unlikely that the Congress would have required, at this early stage
of large-scale statistical programs, that an important national policy
be predicated on an entirely new set of data.
The Act established, to aid the President,a Council of Economic
Advisors and also set up in the Congress a special Joint Committee on
The Economic Report. The Council was to be made up of persons whose
"training, experience and attainments" give them exceptional qualifications
to "analyze and interpret economic developments, to appraise programs and
activities of the Government and to formulate and recommend national
economic policy to promote employment, production and purchasing power
under free competitive enterprise." Clearly such a mandate would
produce council members who would demand and use the data. The Joint
Committee, whose sole task at first was to evaluate the economic report
for the Congress, was to become another source of expertise on unemploy-
ment and the data.
Although no new powers were established in the act, and no sharply
defined goals incorporated into it, it was to have far reaching effects.
Many Democrats had argued in Congress, as did the original proponents of
the bill, that a target of "full employment" perhaps defined at some
percentage level, should be part of the bill. They also spoke for
various new powers and tools to carry out the purposes of the
legislation. Although the bill's backers thought the legislation much
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weakened in its final form, without policy tools or targets, it
nonetheless proved to be very potent. The fact of declaring
a national policy and setting up the institutions charged with carrying
it out at critical points in the power and decision-making structure was
a significant step.
The requirement to publish data on employment and to project future
possibilities was probably one of the major incentives to later develop-
ments and policy changes. It was to turn the spotlight on the data both
for the Congress and, eventually, for the public. More specifically, it
was to focus attention on ways of lowering the rate shown by the indicator
rather than simply on a vaguely defined problem. In other words, it
gave the statistics a very direct role in policy design. The measure -
or at least one measure of good policies - was going to be the level of
a particular statistic. Suddenly the statistics would not only be power-
ful, but also any way in which they were inaccurate or failed to fully
represent the group they were intended or thought to represent would
have many repercussions. Moreover, anything they did not measure (for
example, part-time unemployment) would stand a relatively smaller chance
of being considered in policy discussions.
The legislation after all, did provide a tool for policy-makers -
statistics. This may have been the most effective tool that could have
been provided at that time. Many of the other tools that were suggested
would very likely have been unsuccessful since the concepts were relatively
nen and we were still without much experience in regulating the economy.
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The statistics, however, were to help keep unemployment very much in
the forefront of public discussion even when it might not have been
otherwise obvious that there was much unemployment.
Thus the Employment Act of 1946 did three critical things for the
future of the unemployment indicator. It for the first time established
as a national policy a permanent Federal responsibility for the state
of employment. Secondly, it established institutions in potentially
powerful positions with the responsibility to carry out the policy.
Thirdly, it required that these groups use the indicator in their analy-
ses and virtually guaranteed that the statistics would gain public
attention through such forums as Presidential Reports and Congressional
hearings. It gave them visibility, a specific role in the policy-
making process, and ultimately, through the public's awakened interest,
an independent existence that would assure their continuance.
This particular set of institutional arrangements has attained
much power and visibility though -ary Presidential Advisory Councils
and Congressional Committees have quickly faded into obscurity. The
reasons for the success of this set of arrangements are- very interest-
ing and have been the subject of a number of studies (58). It is not
germane to go into this matter here, but it should suffice to say that
the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and Joint Economic Committee (JEC)
have steadily become more potent and prestigious actors in the making
of national policy. What they say is seldom ignored. There are
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organizational and political reasons that they have become important,
but surely one significant reason was the availability of economic
theory on which to base recommendations and dependable data to
relate to it and suport their contentions.
Building a Base of Support
The years following the passage of the Employment Act were marked
by a notable increase in the number of interested and informed supporters
of the labor force data system. Suddenly, potential users found it
worthwhile to understand the data. It was also worthwhile for the
statistics producers to build a strong base of support for their data
collection efforts. Now that so much could ride on the indicator,
the design and data collection methods would themselves become part
of the political process. Attacking the indicator could well be
the most effective attack on unwanted policies.
Public Image of the Statistical Agencies. The agencies involved
directly were the Census Bureau, which conducted the sample survey, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which would eventually take over the
analysis and public presentation of the survey results, and the Budget
Bureau's Division of Statistical Standards, which had the responsibility
of coordinating government statistical activities. All three were
without operational responsibility except for the gathering and
interpretation of statistics, or the evaluation of statistical programs.
An agency, like the Social Security Administration, that produced
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statistics only as a byproduct of other activities, could be suspected
of having a bias toward data which would tend to prolong their own
lives. Because the work, particularly on the development of the
labor force survey, was at the forefront of its field, the statistical
agencies were able to attract highly qualified personnel. The.
agencies also had a positive policy of encouraging participation in
professional meetings, and many papers by staff appeared in the most
respected economics and statistical journals. Agency personnel
regarded statisticians and economists as their peer group, and it was
this group that they tried to please as much as they did the
politicians who were their bosses. This type of institution and
personnel give a solid basis for public confidence in the statistics.
But the agencies went further to strengthen their public image.
Whether or not they planned a deliberate strategy for this purpose, the
effect was to make the data far less vulnerable to the attack. All
three groups called in outside experts for assistance and advice at
critical points in the development of the data. The Census Bureau did
so back in 1930 to plan unemployment questions. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics did so in relation to its standard budgets, and The Office
of Statistical Standards in the Budget Bureau set up an interagency
committee in 1942 to coordinate and evaluate the labor force statistics
in the various agencies.
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The Usqeof Expert Committees. After 1946 the agencies stepped up
their efforts to reach out whenever a problem arose and sometimes just
on general principle. The Office of Statistical Standards appointed
a special subcommittee of the existing interagency group to review
concepts of labor force data in 1948 and again in 1954. They also
instituted the Federal Statistics Users Conference, a group of state
and local, public and private users of government data. Their
stated purpose was to learn about the statistics and contribute their
own ideas. Each year they made reports and recommendations and
worked informally with the agencies. Eventually the membership was
to become an important lobbying group for the indicator.
The most prominent use of a committee was in connection with the
redesign of the sampling process and institution of a completely new
sample in 1953 and 1954. (59) The results called the whole sampling
and interviewing methodology into question. The use of outside experts
turned cout to be, not only a way of finding the causes of the problem,
but also an excellent form of insurance against later criticism. In
1953 Congress had still not complied with requests for funds to expand
the sample for the survey, but it was clear when the results of the 1950
census came in that the old sample was obsolete due to shifts from farm
to city and city to suburbs and would no longer produce accurate esti-
mates. Therefore the Census Bureau decided to redesign the sample, with-
out the additional funds, choosing different sampling areas and expanding
the number from 68 to 230 to decrease the future rate of obsolescence.
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Enumerators interviewed old and new samples simultaneously in
January 1954, with the same schedules. As most of the areas in the new
sample were different from the old ones and enumerators are normally
local residents, the two sets of enumerators were mostly different
individuals. The result was an astonishing discrepancy. The new
sample produced an estimate of unemployment about 25% higher than the
old sample. The basic credibility of the data and the whole
methodology of sampling was suddenly threatened, particularly as a
similar discrepancy had been observed between survey results and both
1940 and 1950 censuses. Faith in the procedure of sampling was not
widespread enough at that time for people to assume the problem was
purely technical and soluble.
The Commerce Department called in an investigatory committee to
determine what had happened and what to do. The committee was headed
by Frederick Stephan, a statistics professor from Princeton who had
worked with governmental statistical agencies before, and included
two professional researchers, one representing labor and another
business. The three experts agreed on a 34-page report (60)
which said, much to the surprise of observers, that the new sample was
more correct than the old one and blamed the discrepancy almost entirely
on operating and administrative difficulties rather than any basic
methodological issue.
To save funds for training new enumerators, the Bureau instructed
and supervised the old group almost entirely by mail for the-previous:six
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months, while the new enumerators had been receiving intensive personal
training. Since to classify someone as unemployed requires more care
than to classify him as employed, the old enumerators, careless as
their employment drew to an end, classified many unemployed as not in
the labor force. The truth of this became obvious when the results
for the old sample for February and March came in. The discrepancy
began to diminish as the enumerators realized they were under scrutiny -
unemployment went up in the old sample relative to the new. The
committee also recognized that the new sample was more sensitive to
changes in the population than the old one. They did not feel that
the differences in the drawing of the sample could account for the
discrepancy, which occurred only, to any serious degree, in the unemploy-
ment figures. They concluded that the problem with the enumerators'
sloppiness was in part due to inherent vagueness of some of the
concepts-in particular, the fuzzy area where employment and unemploy-
ment overlapped. They recommended a thorough overhaul of the concepts.
Congress Informs Itself. Meanwhile, the Congress, in particular the
Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was gradually informing itself about the
data and becoming a highly supportive group. In the process they
provided some criticism and directed agency attention to certain types
of problems. Congress formed special committees in the fifties to
study unemployment and often got into the subject of measurement. In
1950 the JEC sent questionnaires to major data users and producers
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to get their opinions. (61) In 1954 the JEC formed a new subcommittee
to oversee economic statistics. Its Chairman, Congressman Talle, said
that the statistics were important to the stability and growth of the
economy. He visualized them as an aid to taking corrective measures
before problems become terribly obvious. This recognition on the
part of a Congressman was unusual, especially at that time. It may
not be a coincidence that Congressman Talle was a professor before
he was in Congress - another kind of politician would have been less
likely to perceive the potential of statistics in the making of policy.
In any case, the subcommittee began by holding hearings in 1954
that were largely exploratory. (62) They invited bureau heads, asking
for opinions on the concept of a system of statistics, on weaknesses
and gaps in the existing statistics and on what information was needed.
The discussion roamed widely over these vague topics, with the
bureaucrats leading it, in general. Although the hearings were held
shortly after the big sampling discrepancy, there was little discus-
sion of that. The CQngressmen still had much to learn, and their
questions were not very pointed. By the 1955 hearings, however, they
seemed to be more incisive. (63) it was then that the Appropriations
Committee was finally persuaded to appropriate funds for the
expansion of the sample now that there were more articulate spokes-
men. At this time, the JEC as a whole even held hearings on
economic statistics as part of their work on the President's Economic
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report. (64) The subcommittee was to develop its own expert staff and
work with the agency statisticians, eventually commissioning a thought-
ful volume of papers on important measurement issues (65).
Improving Public Relations. During the 15 years after the Employment
Act of 1946, the agencies made a number of moves to improve usage and
understanding of the data. These included changing the date of the
survey to correspond to the data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
establishment reports on employment, publication of a monthly joint
release on labor force data by the agencies collecting data and finally
the BLS was assigned the job of analyzing the Census data. The Joint
Economic Committee began to publish an annual Descriptive and Historical
Supplement to the monthly publication on Economic Indicators which had
existed since the late 40's. This was an interesting idea - that
something should be provided for the layman to read not only explaining
the concepts and methodology behind such indicators as unemployment, and
price indexes and GNP, but also giving a historical account. It was
a recognition that indicators are products of their time and history.
There were changes in press releases to speed them up, to give more
complete information, explain trends, and methods.
Internal studies of methodology and checks for errors in the survey
began to be increasingly published though even in 1950 officials
were reluctant to discuss the difference between the census and the
survey results. This new openness of discussiQn was a sign of
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increasing confidence on the part of the statisticians as they came
to recognize by comparing it with employment and unemployment data
from other sources, that the survey was actually more accurate than
the census. Even a few laymen began to recognize this.
Between 1946 and 1960 unemployment evolved as a more widely
understood and accepted statistic. This expansion of the under-
standing of the statistic's implications was a critical element in
the future of the indicator. It is not clear whether the agencies
responsible realized how important this would be in later years;
however, it is clear that the opening up of discussion of indicator
design and methods and informing of the public was a deliberate
process.
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Defining Full Employment: Models and Targets
Although the Employment Act avoided mention of full employment, it
was probably inevitable that its mandate to maximize employment would
lead those in and out of power to try to define unemployment targets to
measure failure or success. Indeed decision-makers and the public
used unemployment data in the 10 or 15-year period after passage of the
Act primarily to define a national unemployment goal and assess our
position with respect to it. Economists and analysts also looked at
such data as unemployment composition and employment trends, but public
discussion seemed to constantly return to the single statistic, the
national unemployment rate as a summary of the problems. This
statistic did not turn out to be useful for understanding the nature
of the problem or cause, but was principally a broad indicator of
economic conditions and the extent of unemployment.
The choice of a full employment level of unemployment depended
on one's model relating unemployment to other variables and interpreting
past events. I use the term "model" here in its broadest sense - any
abstracted description of how things work is a model. This usage
should not be confused with the specialized one denoting econometric
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or mathematical models with many equations spelling out all relationships
in detail. Even those who do not understand such models operate by
some kind of model, even if it says no more than that the future will be
like the past. The varying definitions of full employment grew out of
various models, differing in degree of sophistication. Over time the
models, originally used to pick out a single target figure,came to raise
increasing numbers of questions which led to public examination of more
detail in the data. But in this early period of the late forties and
fifties the unemployment indicator was still very much a single
variable, and discussion focussed on the appropriate level for that
variable.
The policy tools to deal with unemployment were relatively
undeveloped in this period and certainly not closely connected to the
data. The Act itself was vague on how the data would be used. It
directed the Council of Economic Advisors "to gather timely and
authoritative information concerning economic developments and economic
trends, both current and prospective, to analyze and interpret such
information in the light of the policy declared in Section 2 (to
promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power) for the
purpose of determining whether such developments and trends are inter-
fering or are likely to interfere with the achievement of such policy..."
(Employment Act of 1946, Section 4(c)). The data would be used to
describe the situation and make projections. There is no reference to
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analysis of causes or planning of solutions.
The idea of the Act was that the President would submit a budget
each year which would incorporate projections of GNP and expected
unemployment. It involved a model (unspecified) wherein government
spending, GNP and unemployment could be related and it required the
President to recognize explicitly any increasing trend in unemployment.
The Act implicitly required the development of a target unemployment
rate. Although conservatives had prevented the incorporation of an
explicit "full employment" goal in the act, it was implicit.
High employment has been an accepted national goal since 1946 and
reaffirmed frequently since then. (66) The early Councils of Economic
Advisors began by setting unemployment goals, usually about 3%. They
soon stopped talking in terms of specific numbersbut they continued
to speak of the principle. When unemployment rose in 1949 from below
4% after the War to 5.4%, the Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
as it was then called for hearings on unemployment. They were to do
so almost every time the rate rose to near 6%. The Committee's
objective was to examine the problem of rising unemployment trends,
but since the trend reversed abruptly with the onset of the Korean War
in 1950 they cancelled the hearings, but published a report anyway (67)
The report was evidence not only of Congressional interest in
unemployment data, but also of a desire to attach values to various
147
unemployment levels and set up norms which would evaluate unemployment.
The report stressed the importance of statistics in implementing employ-
ment policy and talked principally of solutions involving the expansion
of the economy or public works projects. The report included the
results of a questionnaire the committee had sent out to business and
labor leaders and government officials, which asked, among other things,
what level of unemployment is "alarming," what level "serious" and what
level "normal." They were trying to select unemployment norms through
some kind of consensus. The Secretary of Commerce replied as one might
expect a representative of business to, that the existing level of
unemployment, 3,400,000 was "not abnormal." The Secretary of Labor
took issue with the question, saying the level was not important, only
its rising or falling tendency and pointed out that a simple level
cannot indicate what ought to be done. In general, the group agreed
that the statistics tended to conceal important facts about special
unemployment problems in certain areas or among groups.
Nonetheless, the focus on the choice of a target level was to
continue right up to 1972. Eisenhower's National Goals Commission
accepted the goal of "full employment" ( 68 ). After a period of
average unemployment well above 5% since 1950, President Kennedy's
Council of Economic Advisors finally stated explicitly the "interim"
goal of 4% unemployment ( 69 ), but they were still hoping to achieve
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closer to 3%, eventually. In the midsixties, unemployment dropped back
to a level between 3% and 4%, and the target became less of an issue.
However, the problem has raised its head again recently with unemployment
levels hovering near 6% for most of 1971 and 1972. The Republican
Administration's response has been to attempt to defuse the issue by
redefining the target rate, which has been traditionally no higher than
4%. Ezra Solomon of the Council of Economic Advisors has suggested that
4.5% might be too optimistic. Ex-Secretary of the Treasury Connally
has suggested that a new target level is necessary, and a number of
articles have suggested that the "normal" rate of unemployment has
shifted upward (70).
The discussion stems, not only from a desire to eliminate some
discrepancy between the goal and the reality, but also from the models
through which the target has been chosen. These models provide an
example of the varied ways in which the statistic comes to defuse
problems and is reminiscent of Pound's description of managerial
problem finding (see p. 24). At first, in 1946, it was quite unclear
what should be taken as the working definition of full employment and
Senator Paul Douglas, at the time a labor economist and not yet a Senator,
suggested 6%. After experience with the data, however, in non-war,
non-Depression years it became possible to use an historical model.
Three percent was the lowest level achieved after 1947 and that was
during the Korean War. In comparatively good years it was usually
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closer to 4%. The assumption that the present and future could and
should be like the past led to a considerable degree of consensus on
somewhere between 3% and 4% unemployment as the full exmployment level.
There were other efforts, however, to define full employment
theoretically or, at least on the basis of a more explanatory model
than the historical one. It was such a model that led to recent
suggestions that there was reason to suppose "normal" unemployment
should now be higher than it used to be. As far back as the twenties
analysts tried to break down the components of unemployment according
to cause. In the 40's and 50's thinking about unemployment focussed
largely on such categories. By this model unemployment was the sum of
frictional unemployment, due to changing technology and requirements for
labor and cyclical or economic unemployment due to the basic health of
the economy. The usual argument about target unemployment derived from
this model has been that it should equal "frictional" unemployment or
perhaps "normal" unemployment, which might include some structural elements.
Economists arguing for a higher expected level in 1972 say that the
population and labor market have changed to create a larger structural
component of unemployment than before. A higher degree of skill and
education is required for a greater percentage of jobs, while the youth
and minority or disadvantaged population is growing relative to other
groups. Although close examination of unemployment data does give
information about these groups, and deliberate efforts have been made
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in recent years to expand such information, we cannot actually measure
structural unemployment or any of the other ccmponents. It has never
been possible to identify whether a particular individual is frictionally
or structurally unemployed or unemployed for economic reasons. Questions
about the reason for unemployment in the 1930 census represented a
dismally unsuccessful attempt to get at these components. Efforts to
measure duration of unemployment have been another imperfect attempt to
get at the distinction between types of unemployment. Ultimately we have
guessed at the size of these components historically by assuming at some
point, in a good year, that all or most unemployment was due to non-
economic reasons. This then we assume to be the frictional level,
perhaps including some temporary problems of mismatches between people
and jobs as well. From there it is a simple step to identifying such
a level as the "normal" or target level.
The simple categorization became transformed into a discussion on
the basis of Keynesian theory in 1958 and 1959 when unemployment was
persisting at close to 6% though other economic indicators were
comparatively better. Politicians finally listened to Keynesian
economists for an explanation of how this was possible. - John Maynard
Keynes had formulated in the thirties a theory of the national economy
which would, among other things, explain how it was possible for
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unemployment to remain high and consumption low. His ideas were to
form the basis of the modern theory which has guided national economic
policy in recent years. When unemployment remained high after the
recession of 1957, the national search for causes boiled down to a
discussion of whether the unemployment was due to the inadequacy of
total demand for goods or to structural changes in the labor market (71)
On the one hand, there might be plenty of jobs for all who wanted them,
but the job hunters might not be qualified for the available jobs or,
on the other hand, the economy might be balanced at a low consumption
level so that it could not be expected to provide enough jobs in any
case without some stimulus.
The policy implications of the two analyses were far reaching but
vastly different. The fact accounts for the tremendous Congressional
interest in the issue ( 72 ) and eventually widespread public interest
(see p.174f). Acceptance of the structural notion implies that the
emphasis in remedial efforts must be on job retraining and providing
information to Job hunters about jobs. The inadequate demand theory
implies that fiscal measures should be taken to stimulate the economy.
The former is far less expensive than the latter, and the latter implies
the use of an unbalanced budget. Both facts made the structural
argument far more attractive to Republicans than Democrats throughout
the sixties ( 73). Major programs based on both types of theories
were to be undertaken in that period (see p. 174 for more detail)
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including the tax cut of 1964 and the Manpower Development and Training
Act of 1962. Unfortunately, however, until much later, the unemployment
data did not shed light on whether structural or demand issues were the
primary ones. On the other hand, the debate provided considerable
incentive to develop data on job vacancies and on the nature of
unemployment rather than just the number of unemployed.
Of course, the data did provide some information on the
characteristics of the unemployed - the age, sex and race of the unemployed
for example. Statisticians and economists cited these figures often
in Congressional hearings on policy analyses, but the intensive
discussion and further development of such information was not to occur
until the sixties.
The unemployment data also became a key element in another
analytic approach. In 1957, A. W. Phillips published the results of
an analysis of British wages, prices and unemployment for the previous
fifty years and demonstrated an empirical relation between them.
He-plotted the relation of the change in wage rates to the unemployment








The curve provided another way of setting unemployment targets. We
would choose unemployment goals at levels where inflation was acceptable.
We would pick out the point on the curve where inflation was reasonable,
say 2%, which would correspond to a particular unemployment level.
The issue of how to make this kind of tradeoff had dominated the last
10 years of economic policy discussion relative to unemployment.
The trouble with this model for choosing the target was that it
assumed that labor operated in a perfect market - that is, that
information was perfect and all units of labor interchangeable.
This essentially ignored the structural argument - it was certainly
possible to do so using overall unemployment rates, which conceal
questions of the characteristics of labor and jobs. The result is
that in 1970 and 1971 it appeared that the curve had shifted up and
the same inflation - unemployment tradeoff no longer was valid. That
is, a particular inflation rate no longer matched the same unemployment
rate ( 74). This fact has been explained as the result of a changing
labor force, which increasingly includes more young people due to the
"baby boom" of the forties and more disadvantaged groups. Whatever the
reason, it is now clear that the "Phillips curve" was never an adequate
explanatory model for the relation of unemployment and inflation, though
policy-makers have accepted it for some time, as reports of the Council
of Economic Advisors or Congressional Studies reveal.
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All these ways of thinking about unemployment influenced and
were influenced by the unemployment indicator, its characteristics, and
behavior. The emphasis throughout the fifties and, even to a great
degree in the sixties, was on an unemployment norm, a simple figure
which would sum up the situation and provide an easily communicable
criterion for judging how things were going. This effort to simplify
the data is probably a very natural one when an indicator comes into
a national arena, and many types of people with varying backgrounds
must use it. Unfortunately, the models used to choose the targets
were also highly simplified, and somewhat ad hoc rather than grounded
in basic economic theory. Moreover, the target as an overall rate
did not give much clue to needed methods of approaching it. The
sixties would be marked by an increasing effort to design and use the
data in ways more appropriate for analysis.
A Change in Definitions
Since the labor force survey began in 1940, the definitions of
employment and unemployment have been changed twice, in 1957 and 1967.
The changes were marginal and did not affect the basic principles of the
definitions. In fact, many principally methodological changes had a
greater effect on the results. However, it is worthwhile to recognize
that changes in the concepts did occur. It was not considered necessary
that they be fixed for all time.
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When the changes did occur, they were not the result of direct
partisan pressures, as journalists often charged in later years. On
the contrary, on both occasions the definition changes resulted from
the deliberations and recommendations of expert committees. The
factors they took into consideration in making their recommendations
included both prevailing views of what employment and unemployment
should mean and the size and nature of the actual problems. There
seems to have been virtual consensus on the changes recommended in
1957. The committee did not recommend other more controversial ones.
In both cases the committees looked at the movements of the data on
various groups of the population that were not obviously classifiable
as employed, unemployed or not in the labor force to determine with
which group their behavior would best place them. The effect of
using the criteria of prevailing opinion and current behavior of the
data for redefining concepts is of course to make it likely that the
concept will require change as times and perceptions change. It
means accepting the principle that the concepts are basically only
valid for a time and place.
The 1957 changes in definition came as the immediate result of
the investigations of an interagency committee appointed by the Bureau
of the Budget specifically to review labor force concepts. (For a
discussion of the origins of the 1967 changes see the next section,
Emergence to Public View). The history is far longer than that,
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however. The Bureau of the Budget, in its capacity as coordinator of
statistical programs, was concerned with comparability and validity of
definitions. It had appointed an interagency committee in 1942 (75),
when the Census took over the labor force survey, with representatives
from all agencies collecting labor force data to oversee and communicate
on decisions about the various series. Then, in 1948 and again in
1954, the Bureau appointed a subcommittee of technicians to examine
the concepts. This was one of a good many ways in which the
opportunity was created to test the validity of the concept. The
business and labor advisory groups to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and the Federal Statistics Users Conference also provided feedback on
usefulness or appropriateness of the concepts, but their effect was
principally later. The agencies were quite consciously concerned
with testing the validity of the concepts. It is not a coincidence,
however, that the subcommittee was asked to do its reviews in two
recession years. When unemployment rosethe unemployment indicator
became the subject of questions and criticisms. The subcommittee
provided a way of disarming and responding to such attacks.
These committees viewed the concepts not only from the point of
view of their own expertise, but also from the view of user§ whom
they consulted extensively before making their reports. The 1948
committee recommended no changesbut the work of the 1954 group was
followed in 1957 by the changes in definitions that they recommended.
157
The change shifted two groups from the employed to the unemployed
category - those laid off for a definite period of thirty days.and
those waiting to start a new job within thirty days. A small
subset of these who were still students were categorized as not in
the labor force. The reasoning behind the changes involved
principally consistency of the definitions and common user perceptions
or values about who ought to be considered unemployed. It appears by
comparing the subcommittee report to testimony of many witnesses
in the 1954 and 1955 Joint Economic Committee hearings (76) that the
subcommittee's recommendations did represent an area where there was
a definite consensus.
The subcommittee's original mission was to "make an extensive
exploration and review of the concepts of the labor force, employment
and unemployment used in population surveys, establishment reporting
and administrative records.... The subcommittee's survey will be
undertaken from the point of the appropriateness of the concepts for
analysis of current economic developments, taking the account of
technical limitations in herent in the sources of data. It will look
toward obtaining consistency as well as maximum usefulness for economic
and social analysis." (77)
The subcommittee sought a general concept of the labor force as
a beginning for evaluating the-definitions. It was not spelled out
for them nor was it obvious. The report said "Those in the labor
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force are thus distinguished from those outside the labor force by their
current activity. Exceptions to this general criterion are made for
special cases where current activity is an inadequate basis for reporting
labor market attachments - ranging from cases of persons with a job and
not at work to persons who would have been looking for work except
temporarily ill in the survey week.
"The intent, however, is clear. It is to provide a measure of
persons currently in the labor force and not the total number of
persons in the potential labor supply." (78) (underlining mine)
The point was that they did not have a clear statement of the
intent of the measurements to use, but rather they deduced it by
observing the actual measures and then used the statement as part of
a criterion for judging the measurement. The committee mentions that
the main problem with the labor force concept is distinguishing between
the unemployed and those not currently in the labor force. The report
adds that "for many situations there are no inherently correct
definitions and, given a set of definitions there may be differences
of opinion in their application to specific cases." The report clearly
acknowledges that concepts are not given truths, but rather ideas
grounded in realities and adds that the "intent of measurement cannot be
separate, for practical purposes from the questions of the success of
measurement." (79) Thus the committee considered it important to deal
not only with how to define appropriate concepts but also how the
measurement procedures may affect them.
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The committee rejected the idea proposed by many of measuring the
potential labor supply (including those, say who would like jobs though
they are not actually looking) instead of the actual labor supply on the
ground that the latter was subject to rapid change while the former was
not. Current measurement was intended to reflect current economic
conditions principally, the report said. Interestingly enough, the
model of the relationship of such variables as measured unemployment to
economic conditions was to change so that in 1972, the view is beginning
to prevail that the relationship of the current and potential labor
supply does indeed reflect current economic conditions. The potential
labor supply includes today an increasing number wanting jobs who have
simply given up looking and others, such as women or students, who move
in and out of the officially defined labor force often. Without
information about such people, we are finding it very difficult to predict
the amount of investment needed to bring official unemployment rates
down to desired levels.
The 1957 changes in definition principally concerned the borderline
area between employment and unemployment. The committee noted that
there was continuing criticism of the inclusion in the employed category
of those on short-term layoff and waiting to start new jobs. Labor
leaders for example had commented on this in hearings. The criticism
led the committee to conclude that excluding these two groups did "not
conform to general public or economic conceptions of unemployment."
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They checked this impression by looking at the data and found that the
numbers on temporary layoff usually increased just before a period of
rising unemployment. Apparently employers were using the layoff as a
modified form of firing but workers tended not to look for new jobs
because of a stronger sense of attachment to work than they once had due
to union agreements. Thus changing social and realities along with
public conceptions of the issues dictated the changes.
Meanwhile the committee rejected other proposals for concept
changes - proposals that were to come up frequently throughout the years.
They did not make a special category for the underemployed or partially
employed, though in 1972 this notion is finally being experimented with.
They decided, as mentioned above, not to count the potential labor
supply, nor to limit the with-a-job-but-not-at-work category to those
with pay, as labor unions wanted.
In any case, the subcommittee's recommendations were essentially
accepted and implemented as they were published in the Joint Economic
Committee hearings. (SC) The changes ini definition were very
cautiously made with a great degree of consensus behind them. The
subcommittee had considered the changes originally in 1948. They had
then and in 1955 consulted a wide range of users. Their proposals
for change met with no real opposition in the Congressional hearings
where they were aired. The changes could have been introduced by
administrative fiat instead of through a public discussion and a
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committee of technicians. Nonetheless, the changes and motivations
behind them would soon be subject to vicious attack. This cautious
method of introducing changes through committees and consensus would
provide an important defense at that stage.
Emergence to Public View: The Indicator Withstands a Challenge
In September 1961 an extraordinary series of events was set in
motion. It began with an article in the Reader's Digest entitled
"Let's Look at the 'alarming' Unemployment Figures",(81) which attacked
the very foundation of the indicator. The article dealt with concepts,
methods, and the integrity of the responsible agencies. This was not
the first challenge to the indicator on such grounds. Academic
discussions had considered these issues at length, but this was the
first such commentary to appear in a mass magazine. It marked the
emergence into general public view of, not just the indicator, but of
the issues involved in its measurement. The repercussions of the
criticisms were felt throughout the government,but the indicator weathered
the storm well because of the way it had been developed and handled
through the years and because of the informed interest groups, carefully
nurtured during that time. The issues had all been considered before,
in an open process, so the agencies had satisfactory answers ready and
satisfied users to vouch for their integrity. Ironically, the net
effect of the furor was to strengthen the indicator. It was now not
just widely known,but widely known as a respected, non-political and
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comparatively well understood data series. Moreover, the discussion
occasioned by the controversy led to considerable additional investment
and improvement in the methods and an increase in the information
elicited by the survey.
Specifically, the article set in motion not only critical
articles and editorials nationwide, but also an elaborate official
evaluation of unemployment data, which entailed two sets of Congressional
hearings, quantities of position papers, analytic pieces, speeches
by agency personnel and extensive investigation by a specially
appointed Presidential Committee. The Digest article was capable of
catalyzing this chain of events for several reasons. First, James
Daniel, the author, had armed himself with a good many facts, and his
criticisms were sharply pointed. Secondly, the Reader's Digest has a
vast readership as one of the most popular magazines in the U.S.
Most important was the combination of political and economic
situations in 1961. Unemployment had been "stuck" at a level of over
5% since the 1958 recession, and national attention had been focussed on
the causes for this unusually high rate for otherwise prosperous times.
Meanwhile, President Eisenhower's benign regime had been replaced by the
administration of the youthful and liberal John Kennedy. Conservatives
were fearful that he would seriously try to implement the mandate of the
Employment Act and institute spending programs to lower the unemployment
rate. If anyone had any doubt about the connection between the official
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figures and justifications for programs, then it was dispelled by
Secretary of Labor Goldberg. By 1961 he had begun to hold press
conferences personally on the release of the monthly statistic and to
combine them with policy announcements. (82) This kind of.politicizing
of the statistic had proven dangerous to the statistics credibility
as far back as the 1930 census, but politicians continue to take the
chance even in 1972. (See p.61-64) It should not be surprising that
the attack on the indicator came at allthat it came from a conservative
publication like the Reader's Digest, nor that it struck a responsive
cord in many readers. Daniel's article suggested quite bluntly that
there was a conspiracy in Washington to inflate the unemployment figures
and provide the excuse to set up more federal programs. To support his
argument he cited such things as the comparison with European data,
which showed lower rates, elimination of the inactive worker category
in 1945, the vagueness of the questions identifying who is looking for
work, the sampling fiasco in 1954 and the inclusion of some who are not
actively seeking jobs among the unemployed. He spoke disparagingly of
the sampling approach as a method of getting accurate information and
concluded that, since the censuses of 1940 and 1950 showed less unemploy-
ment than the survey, the survey interviewers were deliberately inflating
unemployment figures. European unemployment data provided him a kind
of validity check on U.S. data. He saw no reason why our unemployment.
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should be higher than in Europe. He did not recognize the reasons
for the lack of comparability (primarily that they usually represent
the registered unemployed, a self-selected group), but simply concluded
that,since ours were higher,they must be incorrect.
Although the account contained a number of inaccuracies or outright
misrepresentations (Daniel claimed, for instance, that the enumerators
asked respondents "How many people here want a job?" instead of the
more specific questions they did ask about job seeking), Daniel had
brushed against some fundamental issues. He did not know the exact
questions that were asked, but he was correct that there was a vague-
ness in the concept of unemployment and in questions about who was
unemployed. The elimination of the inactive unemployed category
was not done deliberately to conceal the figures as he implied, since
there were so few in 1945. However the move was a clumsy attempt to
gloss over the technical problems of getting accurate information on
the reasons for not working or not looking for work. Significantly
too he attacked the whole definition of unemployment, raising issues
that had long been troublesome about who "ought" to be included among
the unemployed. First he sneered at the permissive attitude in the
decision to include among the unemployed those who do not look for work
because they think no work is available. Then he pointed out that
many -counted as unemployed did not deserve to be because they had quit
their jobs to find better ones or needed only pin money and part-time
work. He basically disagreed with the value judgment that ignored all
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such considerations in favor of counting all who demonstrate that they
want work whatever their circumstances.
The article was remarkable in that it appeared at all in a mass
publication like the Reader's Digest - that the Digest considered its
audience interested in such detail on the nature and quality of dry,
government statistics. Their publication of the article was undoubtedly
a reflection of increasing public awareness of the role of the statistics
in government policies and increasing public sophistication about the
issues. This last was due in great part to the stepped-up public
information efforts of previous years as well as to the prospect of new
federal programs. Daniel's criticisms in. any case,began to reverberate
throughout the system. Editorials in papers across the nation (83)
echoed and reechoed the comments, and debates began on the floor of
Congress. The Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic
Committee, which had been planning a thorough investigation of unemployment
statistics at that point themselves, had commissioned a report on many
of the issues.(84) The hearings they held in late 1961 however,
concentrated on Daniel's comments. (85) Public confidence in the data
had been undermined. The issue became so visible that Secretary Goldberg
requested that President Kennedy step in. He appointed a committee to
appraise the statistics (The Gordon Committee), and in their report a year
later (86) they made it quite clear that the Digest article had prompted
the study.
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The most remarkable aspect of this chain of events was not that
a Reader's Digest article was written, nor even that it caused the
President to appoint a prestigious investigating committee and a major
congressional committee to devote much of two major sets of hearings to
issues raised in it. It was rather that when all was said and done, so
little that was fundamental changed,and so few of the criticisms were
found valid. The indicator actually stood on firmer ground afterward
than before.
Of course all the furor did have some effect. The.definitions of
labor force concepts were sharpened and slightly altered, survey questions
were changed to require less subjective responses, the sample size was
enlarged, and the data presentation removed more clearly from the
political arena. These were the most obvious, formal changes resulting
from this controversy and none represented radical departures from past
practices.
This extended discussion had other results more subtle than these
formal changes, but equally, if not more, significant to the indicator,
its contentand public perceptions of it. Many Congressmen and much of
the public were awakeneded to the significance of so-called "technical"
issues in the data that was used to build policies. The agencies, the
BLS and Census Bureau, were forced to think out their positions and the
rationale for them clearly in order to respond to criticisms. (87) In
many informal ways the work of the Gordon Committee economists and the
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congressional staff with the agency personnel produced changes in the
way such things as press releases or data quality checks were done.
Moreover, this calling of attention to statistical activities gave the
proponents for the first time a national audience for their requests
rather than just the Joint Economic Committee in Congress and some
limited interest groups.
Such developments were distinctly marginal, however, to criticisms
of the fundamental concepts, methods and integrity of the agencies.
Daniel's specific criticisms were disposed of in short order. They
did contain some false statements, and unjustified implications about
the intent of certain decisions. However, these would not likely have
been recognized so promptly and unanimously if it were not for the fact
that the government had been doing its homework thoroughly. The
agencies and congressional committee had brought many outsiders into
the process of analysis and evaluation of the indicator, and their
response in 1961 showed that they accepted, and even identified with,
the indicator design process.
Representatives of the major unions, the Chamber of Commerce, the
National Industrial Conference Board, the Chairman of the Federal
Statistics Users Conference and academics rushed to defend the indicator
and the statistical agencies. They wrote letters to newspapers and the
Joint Economic Committee, and many testified at the hearings and
conferred with the Gordon Committee personnel. Their faith in the
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integrity and professionalism of the agencies was virtually unanimous.
As proof they cited the openness of the process by which decisions are
made and the qualifications of the staff. Although interest groups each
desired changes in the indicator which they took the opportunity to
describe, they supported the unemployment indicator in all its basic
respects. That is, they accepted the fundamental ideas that a
sample survey could be representative of the nation, that accurate
information could be elicited by interview, that the questions were
in general appropriate and certainly not deliberately misleading, and
that unemployment was suitably defined by the activity of seeking
work, with some minor exceptions for presumed hardship but not by need
for work. Daniel had challenged directly or by implication most of
these ideas, but he clearly could not convince these, by now, ardent
fans of the indicator, who presented an almost impregnable front.
Who would give credence to a journalist when so many distinguished
individuals of differing political views contradicted him?
As for the Presidential committee, Kennedy had looked for its
membership largely to the academic community in his customary fashion
and had appointed six highly professional men. These included three
professors of economics, Robert Gordon of Berkeley, Robert Dorfman of
Harvard and Albert Rees of Chicago, and Frederick Stephan, a Princeton
statistics professor who had headed the 1954 investigation of the
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sampling discrepancy. Along with these he appointed research
directors of the AFL-CIO and National Industrial Conference Board,
both of which had for many years had their own data series on
unemployment. Such a committee's recommendations were bound to
have the respect of Congress and the public and to be considered
objectively arrived at and carefully thought through. They were
also quite likely to produce a fairly sympathetic report. As
professionals rather than politicianstheir standards were similar
to those of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Moreover, at least
three committee members had worked with the data for some time and
could well be said to be part of the process they were called on to
investigate.
The Committee concluded "unanimously" and "categorically" that
"doubt concerning the scientific objectivity of the agencies responsible
for collecting, processing and publishing these data is unwarranted."
They examined the issues of definition, of survey methodology,
comparability of related data, questionnaire design, international
comparisons and seasonal adjustment methodology. They did a thorough
investigation of the basic questions from a technical point of view.
Their report is a thoughtful one which gives much useful analysis
for any student of labor force statistics, but it is not a strongly
political document, nor does it take a strongly critical position.
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The Committee's findings gave much support to the status quo.
They endorsed the basic definitions of unemployment, in particular
the activity criterion. They said the sampling method was good but
could be better - provide more reliable and detailed estimates - if
the sample were larger. They encouraged greater use of a recently
introduced technique which altered the data presented to the public,
the seasonal adjustment. They recognized some of the dubious
assumptions involved in this procedure for smoothing out the
seasonal irregularities in unemployment, but suggested further
research and use. Most importantly, the Gordon Committee endorsed
the integrity and objectivity of the data collecting and analyzing
agencies.
The Committee did, of course, make criticisms as well and the
BLS acted upon many of these. (88) In particular, they recommended
sharpening the definition of unemployment through more detailed
questioning and specification of activity which constitutes seeking
work and a period in which work must have been sought. They had
questioned the reliability of an interview which depended only on
volunteered information about job-seeking. One result of this that the
Committee recognized as a necessary byproduct of an effort to get
consistency, was the exclusion from unemployment totals of the
discouraged workers not looking because they believe nothing is
available. The change was made, but the latter exclusion was to
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receive criticism later as a deliberate attempt to conceal unemploy-
ment. (89) This is ironic in view of the fact that the 1957 definition
changes, also recommended by expert committee, were criticized as a
deliberate attempt to find extra unemployment.
The Committee made a number of other suggestions and comments
which were followed up. They urged the expansion of information on
persons not in the labor force reflecting their doubts on how well
the concept defined the appropriate individuals. They pointed out
that "policy determinations in the 1930's required a count of
unemployment - particularly a measure that would suggest the minimum
number of jobs necessary to take care of the jobless. Very little
effort seems to have been devoted to establishing an independent
concept of the labor force or to indicate its relation to labor supply.
It was apparent then there was more than sufficient labor supply to
meet all needs." (90) The Committee recognized how the need for
particular concepts may arise from particular circumstances. They
also rejected the exclusion of those with less than five hours of
work a week from the employed. The principle the committee wanted
to follow was one of "job attachment" alone and not degree of job
attachment. They also said "the need to present the data in a
nonpolitical context cannot be overemphasized." (91) They
commended the Department of Labor for inaugurating after the Daniel
article the practice of announcing well in advance the publication
dates of the monthly statistics. They added that they would like to
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see more information and explanation in the early press release that
gathers so much public attention. Clearly the Committee considered
the issue of public information a critical part of their job of
evaluating the indicator.
The net effect of this controversy was to vindicate the indicator.
The Presidential committee, the users and the Congress gave it and
its sponsors a ringing endorsement. (92) The methods, concepts and
presentation were "improved" as a result of the discussion, but not
radically changed. The indicator's success in meeting this challenge
was proof that it had arrived in some real sense, that it had become
institutionalized and was widely accepted as a reliable policy tool.
It might not be invulnerable, but it would require considerable
effort to dislodge, alteror politicize it in the future.
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE SIXTIES: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
INDICATOR EMERGES
A New Era
Developments in the theory and tools of social and economic
policy in the sixties and changes in perceptions of what ought to be
done changed unemployment data and the way it was used. Since 1960
many more dimensions of unemployment data have come into wide use.
That is, policy-makers have come to talk, not just of the overall
rate, but also of the rates for special groups, of the duration of
unemployment and the characteristics of the unemployed. The concern
for the target overall unemployment level still exists, but the
models for choosing it have become more complex. The precision and
reliability increased and this fact, along with the seasonal adjust-
ment had meant that users and the public put increasing faith in very
small movements in the data. Moreover, new tools and perceived
problems required some new concepts. In short, the new problems
perceived in the sixties, opportunities presented by new methods, and
new willingness to take action led to an evolution of the indicator
and its uses. It became less a single, national figure and more a
multifaceted indicator. It was used in a greater variety of more
complicated models, and it was manipulated in more elaborate ways.
It became, if anything, more politically potent than ever and more
widely used.
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Fiscal Policy Since before the passage of the Employment Act,
economists and even some decision-makers were aware that the level of
government spending or taxation could be manipulated to halt a
recession or put brakes on an economic boom. But the large-scale
econometric models which permitted precise estimation of the effect of
various changes were not to be developed until the late fifties.
Certainly, Congressional debate over the Employment Act revealed that
Congressmen understood very little of the most basic economics.
For example, when they talked of government creation of jobs, many
showed no recognition of a multiplier effect most would recognize now.
They assumed that the total number of jobs created as a result of
government action was equal only to those directly created and did not
see that many would be indirectly created.
By the time of the great debate on the causes of unemployment in
1958-1960, Congressmen and administrators were considerably more aware
of economic theory and its potential use in manipulating the economy.
The debate did noL seLLIe whether inadequate demand or structural
problems in the labor market (p. 151 ) were the causes of the persistent
high unemployment, but it did call attention to the possibilities and
help define policies to deal with both problems. In the sixties
federal policy attacked unemployment from both the structural and the
demand vantage points. Both strategies were to make new demands on
the data.
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The commitment to deal with unemployment and confidence in
economists' calculations led the Congress to approve the tax cut of 1964.
It was unprecedented that Congress would make the counterintuitive move
of cutting taxes to increase the GNP and ultimately raise the tax yield.
This was exactly what happened and the results were close to predictions.
The national budget was not unbalanced and unemployment improved.
It was a victory for the Keynesians to be able to show that the theory
of inadequate demand was explanatory and would even permit calculation
of results of policies.
Ever since, fiscal policy measures have been more accepted as
national policy tools which could work. This type of policy solution
maintained the focus on the aggregate national unemployment rate, but
also required more than ever that it be dependable, reliable and
accurate. The potentiality that significant decisions might be made
to implement fiscal policies designed in part to improve unemployment
made the exact figures more important than ever. Certainly the
demands for improvement have increased as the policy developed.
Moreover, the potential impact of deliberate fiscal policies made it
more important than ever to settle the debate on the relative roles
of structural problems and inadequate demand in causing unemployment.
The desire to shed light on the argument was a principle factor
leading to the development of an experimental program measuring job
vacancies in 1969, and the publication of regular data. (93)
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The number and type of job vacancies could be compared with the number
of unemployed to evaluate whether demand was too low or the unemployed
improperly qualified. The increasing use of fiscal use to deal with
unemployment affected both the quality and nature of the data demanded.
An Active Manpower Policy. The debate of the late fifties served to
awaken an awareness of the potential of a manpower policy to deal with
unemployment. However, this type of approach required wider use of
components of the unemployment rate than was common before. The
aggregate national figure was not very useful in selecting appropriate
programs.
In brief, manpower policy was an attempt to deal with imperfections
in the labor market. (94) It rested on the notion that unemployment
was, to some considerable degree, caused by a mismatch between jobs
available and the unemployed. Either the latter's skills, age or
location did not match the requirements of jobs, or perhaps they
simply did not know where to find jobs. The implication, of course,
is that the principle problem is nor one of inadequate numbers of
jobs because, in that case, the focus would be on improving demand.
The usual method of dealing with this is to alter the job-seekers'
characteristics through training rather than to alter the jobs.
The principal exception has been the effort to develop new industry
in depressed areas. Information services for job seekers are also a
part of manpower policy.
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The U.S. had virtually no manpower policy until the 1960's.
The Employment Service, which existed as an information service since
1920, was of little value since it was always optional for employers
to list opportunities with the service. During the recession of 1949
President Truman initiated the policy of channeling federal spending
toward areas of"substantial labor surplus," but we did not go much
further with manpower concerns until the passage of the Area Redevelop-
ment Act, in 1961 and the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962. These too were the basic legislation for manpower policy.
They have been reevaluated and amended several times since their
initial passage with the aid of labor force data. The former
provides special assistance for areas with serious labor surplus and
the latter sets up a range of training, retraining and general
education programs for the unemployed.
To administer, evaluate and amend both these programs a wide
variety of labor force data was used. It was important to know
the incidence of unemployment criterions of the age, sex, education
or skills of the unemployed to plan training programs and select
highest priority groups. The duration of unemployed was important
now too and the incidence of long-term unemployment since those who
could readily find new jobs were not the focus of manpower programs.
Suddenly many of the data economists and BLS statisticians had been
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citing for years became important to politicians. This new interest,
combined with the assessment of the Gordon Committee, provided the
justification for a considerable expansion of the sample and the
questions in the labor force survey during the sixties.
Manpower policy has received considerable attention recently
with unemployment and inflation both rising. It may be one way to
keep unemployment down without adding to inflation as fiscal policy
would. Also the recent hypothesis that the Phillips curve is
shifting (95) suggests that structural unemployment is getting worse
and causing the persistent high inflation. To use manpower policy
efficiently (and the Nixon Administration has apparently opted in favor
of economic controls instead as the primary tool) job vacancy data
is an important tool. The data must provide sufficient detail on the
nature of job openings to assist in planning training programs and
providing information to the unemployed. The pressure for improving
manpower policy has undoubtedly led in part to the new commitment the
BLS has made to developing a job vacancy series.
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The Problem of Poverty affects Unemployment Data. The inception
of' the Poverty Program in 1964 marked the awakening
of a new set of values and problem perceptions which were to influence
the thinking about unemployment data. They were to turn attention
further away from the overall national unemployment data and focus it
on such things as comparative unemployment rates by race and income of
the unemployed and the number who would be family breadwinners. The
concern with poverty also demanded the creation of new concepts as
well since the unemployment data had been designed to reflect the
state of the labor market and not the needs of the unemployed.
The unemployment data requirements for planning or evaluating
anti-poverty strategies grew out of models of the causes and effects
of poverty. The original poverty program was based on the notion
that it was the failure of opportunity for youth that was a principal
cause of the attitudes and circumstances of the poor. A common
way to characterize the problem of poverty in the mid-sixties was in
terms of a cycle in which the lack of a job led to poverty, which led
to the eroding of incentives and lack of opportunity for education,
which in turn meant that children would not have jobs. .Social
analysts and the public saw the problem of poverty in the sixties as
primarily one of the long-term poor, the fundamentally disadvantaged.
It was just being discovered, for example, that many families had been
on welfare for three generations. The emphasis was on the urban poor
or the "pockets" of rural poverty in depressed areas.
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The kinds of solutions proposed for these problems included
training programs focusing on the so-called "hard-core" unemployed,
rather than the displaced worker. Programs such as the Job Corps
were designed not only to train workers but also to remove them
from their harmful or demoralizing environments. Poverty was seen
as geographically defined and programs were concentrated in designated
poverty areas. Basic education as well as skill training became
part of the remedial effort.
The tremendous investment and public attention given to
anti-poverty efforts provided an incentive for new formulations and
concepts of labor force data. Manpower policy had focussed attention
on the unemployed individual rather than simply on an undifferentiated
labor market. Poverty policy intensified this focus, emphasizing
the relation of unemployment and need. In trying to identify the hard-
core unemployed, it became clear that many would not be identified at
all through the labor force survey since they would be listed as not
in the labor force. Moreover, a problem of the poor was also that
they had inadequate work. Many might be hidden among the official
"employed" totals though they were able to get only casual, part-time
work.
These issues have led to a BLS effort to define a new concept
of "subemployment" or "underemployment." (96) Initial experimental
surveys suggest that the number of unemployed by standards including
broader considerations is about 50% larger than the number counted
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under present definitions. (97) The BLS also conducted a special
labor force survey in poverty neighborhoods originally in conjunction
with the Concentrated Employment Program. The highly localized
data was needed for programs designed to lower unemployment which
was disproportionately high in certain areas. The usual survey
questions were inadequate to get at the problem of unemployment in
such neighborhoods and had to be supplemented with questions on the
desire and need for work.
Thus, once again, changing problem perceptions and changing
realities made new demands on the data. New concepts and new
dimensions were added to the unemployment data and its uses as a
result of a concern with poverty. These will, it seemsrequire
the same political tests that the earlier uses did. This data too
tends to force problems on reluctant administraters for solution
and permit unfavorable evaluations of policies. The Nixon
Administration in late 1971 called off urban poverty neighborhood
surveys, which have shown very high unemployment, on the pretext
that the sample suddenly became out of date with the 1970 census. (98)
Other less politically potent surveys based on 1960 census data have
continued, however. The results of a special unemployment census
using subemployment concepts have mysteriously been suppressed.
After one newspaper report on Washington D.C. results the data
suddenly became "unavailable" through the Government Printing Office.
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A few complaints have been heard, but there is no really organized
interest groups yet to protect these data.
Current Prospects for Unemployment Data
In spite of Nixon Administration efforts to suppress or politicize
unemployment data, it seems likely that its informed supporters both
inside and outside government will protect it from the kind of
manipulation that would make it useless. Groups representing the
range of political persuasions have become convinced they have a
stake in accurate, reliable data and they have organized their own
investigatory groups. Moreover, the monthly congressional hearings
on the data keep developments in the indicator at least potentially
on the front page and provide an opportunity for critics of all
kinds to be heard. The basic data and survey seems likely to emerge
unscathed, particularly if unemployment begins to decline and the
data becomes less politically changed.
The trend towards the proliferation of dimensions in the data
and their widespread use in increasingly complex models seems likely
to continue. Manpower and poverty policy, have required the
exploration of more variables, and it seems likely that many of these -
like for example, a measure of the hard-core or perhaps long-term
unemployed - will take on the same importance that the national
unemployment targets did at an earlier stage. This will undoubtedly
depend on whether our commitment to such policies continues, on the
process through which disputes about the data are handled, and finally
on success in defining appropriate concepts.
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PART III
THE -STANDARD BUDGET: A MEASURE WITHOUT A THEORY
PREFACE
A Controversy over Substandard Wages
On February 4, 1972, five Congressmen joined the Distributive
Workers of America in picketing a Manhattan chandelier manufacturer.
Their action was a sign of deepening controversy between the Cost of
Living Council on the one hand and Congress and Labor on the other. (1)
If the latter were to have their way, over fifty percent of the work
force would be exempted from wage controls and, in the Council's view,
the war on inflation will be seriously set back. The immediate issues
centered on an indicator, the Bureau of Labor Statistics "Lower Level
Budget," (2) but the underlying reasons for the discussion involve
basic values.
After President Nixon instituted wage and price controls in 1971,
Congress amended the enabling act to read "Wage increases to an individ-
ual whose earnings are substandard or who is amongst the working poor
shall not be limited." (3) The report of the House Banking and
Currency Committee stated its understanding that this exemption from
control would apply to those whose earnings were below levels established
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (4) The Bureau had been collecting
data on family budgets for the Congress over a period of close to 100
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years and, at the express request of Congress, had on several occasions
composed and priced standardized lists of goods and services to repre-
sent a moderate level of living for a typical American family. The
Bureau designed such a standardized list in 1967 for a lower living
level in response to widespread public concern for poverty. Congress
was interested in a standard by which to evaluate needs for and results
of the Poverty Program.
In 1970 this Lower Level Budget, designed for the average-sized
4-person family, cost $6,960. The Cost of Living Council, unable to
accept so high a figure, made "statistical adjustments"to bring the
criterion for substandard wages to an annual $3,968. This level, they
said, was appropriate because it assumed, not one wage earner per
family, but the average of 1.7. Their lower income line would mean
that only twenty percent of workers would be exempted.
The most significant aspect of the argument in the present thesis
is the fact that it has occurred at all. The standard lower level
budget is, an official" statistic published by the highly respected
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), just as is the unemployment rate.
No government agency is likely to reformulate the official unemployment
rate for its own purposes, nor is anyone likely to pay attention if
an agency did so. Individual agencies, Congressional committees and
civic and labor leaders, however, use a wide range of income criteria
in analyzing problems and establishing social programs or wage demands.
Many have used the official standard budgets in such contexts, but
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many have not. These same people, on the other hand, have almost
unanimously accepted and used official unemployment figures without
question, though recent studies of "hidden unemployment" suggest that
the figures may well have been wide of the mark. Certainly, these
data users have all had reasons to want the figures higher or lower,
but they still accepted the official ones. They apparently agreed to
agree on them.
Moreover, recent Administration efforts to suppress "technical"
analysis of unemployment figures have met with powerful, wide opposition
and little, if any, support. In contrast, the Commissioner of Labor
Statistics in the fall of 1971 proposed discontinuing the standard
budget data series. Though this threat is far greater to the standard
budgets than the current threat to unemployment figures, the opposition
has come from comparatively few sources and received little publicity.
At the present writing, the possibility remains very real that the
series will be ended.
The question to which this study will address itself then is how
it is possible for an "official" statistic like the budget, which has
existed for so long and is still very popular, (5) to have its very
existence suddenly in doubt. Many of the answers lie in the particular
form of some current political questions on wages and welfare. The
budgets provide an excellent weapon to many ia this discussion and,
accordingly, are unwelcome to others. But this answer still begs
the question, which is how is it possible that such an indicator might
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be eliminated because it has suddenly found enemies? The unemployment
indicator's opponents, have never been able to jeopardize its existence.
It is the contention of this thesis that the central impediment to
the indicator's independence from such attacks lies in its own nature.
It has never become institutionalized like the unemployment rates with
its own coterie of powerful supporters and organized groups keeping it
under the scrutiny necessary to maintain public confidence. One reason
is that we as a nation have not had an unambiguous commitment to policies
which would require the use of the budgets in important contexts until
recently.
But the more significant reason is that the indicator itself lacks
the conceptual clarity and objective methodology which are critical to
common understanding, wide acceptance, and genuine usefulness. The
-standard budget is a measure of an imperfectly defined concept. It is
designed in a highly empirical way; its components are selected on the
basis of little theory relating measurable phenomenon to concept. The
final mcasure fits into no large theory of human behavior. The result
is that the budget is understood in different ways by different people,
that it is filled with hidden value judgments, and inexplicit, partial
models or assumptions about behavior. Accordingly the budget is not
widely trusted, or understood.
It is possible, even likely, that if the budget had been a less
ambiguous indicator, it would have been accepted and used in many policy
contexts through the years than it was. Certainly the opportunities
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did arise since the adequacy of income was frequently an issue, but
almost invariably the budget was criticized, actually attacked, or
ignored when someone attempted to make it a part of policy discussion.
If it had been accepted in such discussion it might well be institution-
alized by now in the same manner as unemployment data.
To help us understand why it has not become a similar institution
and what its prospects are for the future, this thesis will examine the
story of the standard budgets, their origins and development over the
years, their conceptual and methodological bases, and the uses, misuse
and nonuses of their indicator. Hopefully this story and its contrast
with that of unemployment rates will suggest parallels with other
indicators planned or proposed for important policy roles.
DEFINITIONS
Before going into the story of how the standard budget developed
and came into use, it is important to clarify some of the concepts and
terms involved in the story. The definitions do not necessarily fit
our a priori notions about the meaning of the terms. Most of the
definitions will be expanded later, but this section should serve as a
kind of introduction and orientation.
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Standard Budget
A quantitative measure of the annual consumption requirements for a
family or individual to meet some specified standard of living, such as
"minimum subsistence" or "health and comfort." The budget itself may
be a list of the quantities and costs of goods and services or a summary
figure of the income required to purchase them. It is normally specific
to a particular family type and size. Thus a large family purchases an
entirely different array and quantity of goods than a small one, and an
elderly couple already has many items a young couple must purchase.
Federal statistical and operating agencies as well as state agencies,
private welfare organizations and special interest groups have all
designed budgets.
The budgets are constructed by adding together "requirements" for
consumption in different categories such as food, recreation, or housing,
each determined in independent and, often quite different ways. Thus
budgets are designed, not the way families make choices, starting with
a given income and trading off among possible purchases, but rather,
determining the level within each category as if it were the only one
needed. The selection of budget items even for a single budget is
usually based on several kinds of criteria, usually intermingled.
These include the judgment of experts or the budget designers themselves
about what people want or ought to have, scientific criteria about what
people need for their health, and criteria derived from actual consumption
patterns. These judgments then may be modified to make the choices mesh
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with what is actually available in the market.
Standard of Living
A shared objective of a group, for a style and level of living,
a realistic ideal or norm. This term has also been used to mean the
actual way people live but here it will have the former meaning, as
the normative conception is more usual in the U.S.
Level of Living
The way people actually do live. It may and usually does
approximate the standard of living, though that exists in people's minds
rather than in practice. The level may influence the standard, and
as it rises, so may the standard.
Standard of Consumption
A shared objective for goods and services. It differs from the
standard of livingwhich is an all-encompassing term applying to the
quality of life generally. One's standard of living may decline when
the air becomes polluted, though one's consumption standard may increase
since it will come to include an air conditioner. The standard budget
represents an effort to measure the consumption standard and, as such,
is a partial representation of the living standard. For many years,
the budget was the closest approximation to a measure of the standard of
living, or criterion for evaluating levels of living. Only recently
has anyone attempted to measure systematically other aspects of life
quality. The literature on budgets usually says they measure the
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standard of living, though it means consumption. This thesis will
follow the same usage to avoid confusion, though it is imprecise.
Level of Consumption
This item is parallel to level of living and represents the actual
consumption level enjoyed. It is this level that we compare with the
standard budget to assess the adequacy of consumption in terms of our
standard. (6) Again this thesis will use the term "level of living"
instead of the more exact one.
Expenditure Surveys
Much of the data used in selecting the goods and services for the
budget comes from an expenditure survey. (7) Its objective has been to
obtain from families either the amount of expenditure for various cate-
gories of purchases or the quantity and qualities of items purchased.
In the latter case, the costs may be obtained from time to time in a
separate survey of prices. The methods ranged from direct interviewing
of families to use of family account books and even, in the early years,
the collection of information from local stores about family purchases.
The surveys also covered family incomes, and the results are tabulated
according to average expenditures in the various categories, usually
by several income levels and family sizes,but also by other factors
like nativity or, recently, a wide range of social and economic variables.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics did most of the major surveys for a
variety of reasons, of which budget design was only a secondary object-
ive, if it was involved at all. The purpose was usually to get new
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weights for a cost of living index. The data would have to undergo
considerable manipulation before it could be used for standard budgets.
Cost of Living Index
Despite its similar sound, a cost of living index is very different
from a standard budget. However, its history is closely intertwined
with the budgets' history because, in a sense, both measure different
aspects of the same thing and more importantly, because they rely on
the same data. A cost of living index or, as it has been more accurate-
ly renamed in recent years, a consumer price index, is an index in the
specialized sense of the word. That is, it is a measure of change,
not of absolute level like the standard budget. The level of the
index has no meaning except in a relative sense. Thus if it is 1.20,
it means prices have risen 20% since the base year, when the price
level was taken to be arbitrarily equal to 1.0.
Economists and govenment statisticians developed the principles of
designing such a price index in the first two decades of this century.
The basis of the index is a market basket that is, the typical set of
goods and services purchased annually by the blue-collar worker with a
family. Statisticians select representative items from this market
basket, price them, weight them in relation to their importance in the
market basket and in relation to the other similar items they are taken
to represent, and finally combine them into a single, weighted average.
The choice of weights for the index depends heavily on expenditure
surveys since the weights for expenditures are those actually found in
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family budgets. However - and this is where confusion with standard
budgets may enter in - the design of a consumer price index depends
only on average consumption patterns. The relative importance of
various items in the average working man's market basket differs in
many ways from their role in the standard budget.
Pricing the Budget
Although many of the earliest budgets at the beginning of the
century specified only the cost of some items, present budgets detail
the quantity and quality of all items. The advantage of this specifica-
tion is that it becomes also possible to price the items in the budget
in retail outlets at different times and in different places. The
quantity itself is assumed to change more slowly than the prices
because underlying life styles change only slowly. In practice, the
Federal government and the others who have designed budgets over a
long period, have made new quantity lists only infrequently - once
every ten or fifteen years - but they have repriced them on numerous
occasions in between. (8)
The "Normal" Family
This concept is fundamental to the standard budget and dates back
to the first expenditure surveys. In the early years, often only
"normal" families would be included in the sample or analyzed. The
criteria for the "normal" families included a middle income range
excluding poor and rich, and an occupation, usually blue-collar workers
or wage earners, although occasionally low-salaried workers as well.
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The families could not have too few or too many children and no
boarders or lodgers to confuse analysis of expenditures. Collecting
agencies often tabulated expenditures in terms of these "normal"
families. "Normal" was not average, but a selected family type
considered important. There was a normative element inevitably involved.
As such the normal family concept was an important antecedent to
budgets. Although the concept has been dropped in recent expenditure
studies, which in this country now cover the total population, "normal"





The forces that originally came together to create the standard
budget have left a permanent mark on the indicator. The same kinds of
forces continue to exist today, influencing further development of
budgets as well as thinking and planning for other indicators. A
first essential ingredient in getting the standard budgets started was
a widespread conviction that the Federal government had responsibility
for collecting and disseminating statistical information - a conviction
which is as strong today as it ever was. Budget design on a national
scale has required such extensive data that only governments could
collect it.
Another motivation behind the data collection and analysis
essential to budget design was a general curiosity about the human
condition. In the nineteenth century one focus was on the structure
of family life, but today sociologists and policy-makers have defined
many questions which provide the framework and motivation to the creation
of new statistics.
The third force was from the empiricist tradition. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century a number of statisticians and engineers
around the world decided to attempt to further knowledge about the
human condition by gathering as much data on it as possible. The fact
that they did so at that time, the information they chose to gather, the
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methods they established,and ways they tabulated the data all left
their mark. Empiricists today are undoubtedly leaving their mark on
future indicators as they stockpile information in vast computer
storage.
Then too, some specific issues spurred on interest in the data,
creating a demand for budgets and shaping their nature and the way they
would be regarded and used. For the standard budgets the issues that
motivated their original development have been the same recurring ones
throughout the years: poverty and wage rates. Certainly important
issues of the day can focus attention on needs for specific data.
Indeed such issues may be critical to the evolution of an ordinary
statistic into a well-used indicator.
Finally in the history of the budget at least one man played a
catalytic role in bringing the forces together. In doing so he
left his personal stamp on the indicator and the institution that
produces it. His position, knowledge and foresight combined to give
him the opportunity to capitalize on certain events and situations and
set up the data collection, and methods that were the essential
foundation for the budgets. It is probably not chance that someone
came along to do the job he did, but it is certainly chance that he
combined the particular views and capabilities that he did.
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Government Responsibility for Statistics
The idea that the Federal government has responsibility for
gathering data goes back to the original U.S. Constitution,which
included requirement for a regular census. The Federal government
and state governments accepted responsibility for statistics gathering
on many subjects long before they accepted responsibility for action.
In 1869 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts set up the Bureau of the
Statistics of Labor to gather and publish data pertinent to the welfare
of the rather large industrial working class in the state. Other
states followed suit, as did the Federal government in 1884. Though
congressmen and labor leaders among others had advocated the establish-
ment of a Department of Industry or Labor since the Civil War, Congress
20 years later agreed to establish a Bureau but empowered only to
gather labor statistics. It was not until 1913 that Congress finally
set up the Department of Labor "to foster, promote and develop the
welfare of wage earners of the U.S., to improve their working conditions,
and to advance Lheir opportunities for profitable employment." (9)
This last development was so long in coming because the positive policy
role was almost invariably less acceptable than the seemingly benign
statistical one. This attitude is quite pervasive and also prevailed,
for example, during the first discussions of the unemployment indicator,
at the 1921 President's Conference on Unemployment.
A Senate report in 1892 on the results of a special survey a
Senate resolution had authorized, expresses evidence of the demand for
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statistics and for budget data in particular:
"One of the principal causes that led to the adoption of the
Senate resolution (to gather certain data) was undoubtedly the exist-
ence of a constant demand from legislators and economic students for
reliable statistics in regard to the course of wages and prices in the
U.S. The absence of such statistics has led to a constant and inter-
minable dispute over the facts in every economic discussion. Without
them it has been impossible to judge even with approximate accuracy of
the progress of the people of the country and the changes which have
taken place from time to time in their relative condition." (10)
Amassing Data
The statisticians or empiricists' approach to analysis, that of
collecting large quantities of data, dominated nineteenth century
research on family life styles. (11) With this method one can perhaps
be more certain that the data one does have is representative, but one
must be content with simpler and
get from a more intensivenarrower study. (12) Moreover, those whose
principal interest is in amassing quantitites of data tend not to be
very selective. They collect data with hope or intuition that it will
be useful, but no explicit model of what is needed or why. The ways
they formulate and tabulate the data may be chosen arbitrarily or for
reasons irrelevant to later concerns, and at best they may provide
distorted categories for analysts, or simply shape the framework in
which later analysis will occur. At worst, the data will lie unused
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forever.
While the empirical approach has its drawbacks which did leave the
budgets with handicaps, it would not be fair to downgrade the contri-
bution of these nineteenth century statisticians. Without their
monumental efforts, it is doubtful the budgets would have ever been
created. In their interviews of thousands of families, and organiza-
tion and tabulation of the data, they established basic methods, questions
and categories that are still part of current data collection and on
which budget designers must still rely.
Ducpetiaux, a Belgian statistician who did major work in the 1850's,
was one example of such a statistician. He was a follower, like many of
the others, of Adolphe Quetelet, who had strongly advocated the
application of probability theory to social data. The insight was
very important that data on large numbers of people selected approximate-
ly randomly (there was still a long way to go before statisticans under-
stood how biases arose in population sampling) would reveal patterns
in which individual peculiarities cancelled out. Dn ux inter-
viewed hundreds of workmen's families about their incomes and expend-
itures. He tabulated results by family income and expenditure category,
such as food, housing etc. and he focussed attention on what has been
termed the "normal" family, with three or four children. His purpose
was to evaluate the adequacy of wages, which he did by such techniques
as comparing workers' diets with government-supplied soldiers' diets.
The basic tabulation categories, indeed the whole concept of collecting
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and organizing the family expenditure material this way, which was to
greatly influence the way budgets were designed, is due to Ducpetiaux
and his colleagues. The "normal" family was to become the budget
family. Ultimately, the budget would be a more elaborate attempt to
do what he had tried to do - evaluate wage adequacy.
Laws of Consumption
Another aspect of the empiricist movement which was to leave its
mark on the budgets in some subtle ways, was the search for "regularities"
in the masses of data. One man in particular in the late nineteenth
century proposed some "laws" of consumption which were to dominate or
color most later analyses of family consumption and to become hidden
assumptions in budget design. Ernst Engel, a Belgian engineer-turned-
social-scientist and follower of Ducpetiauxexamined the data in
particular for a relation between income level and the proportion of
income spent on various consumption categories. (13) Engel was looking
for a measure of comparative welfare. He hypothesized that "the
proportion of outgo used for food, other things being equal, is the best
measurement of the level of living of a population," and"the poorer an
individual, a family, or a people, the greater must be the percentage of
their income necessary for the maintenance of physical sustenance, and
again of this a greater portion must be allowed for food." (14)
He based the notion on the data which showed, among other things, that
the lower income families tended to spend a greater proportion of their
income on food than wealthier ones.
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Engel's simple contentions and, in fact, the entire principle
behind his approach, has dominated family consumption analyses and the
design of expenditure studies as well as budgets ever since. His idea
of ranking families by income and looking for patterns in the proportions
of income spent on particular categories as an index of well-being is
basic to the design of the current BLS budgets (see p. 271). The
concept that the proportion spent on food in particular was a reliable
index of one comparative welfare in any society or situation was a
particularly attractive one then, as it is now. It seems to bypass
the welfare economists, who argue that it is impossible to compare
individual welfare levels.
Engel's principle has reappeared often, but most notably as the
basis of the current "official" U.S. poverty line. This line is an
income equal to about three times the cost of the cheapest adequate
diet for a family. The rationale, which clearly goes back to Engel, is
that the average family spends one-third of its income on food, and
therefore, a 33% expenditure of income on food represents an adequate
overall welfare level. If one can purchase an adequate diet for that
porportion of income, then one can purchase adequate amounts of other
things. There are certain gaps in this logic, but the outlines are
Engel's.
Expenditure surveys in this country and abroad tended to be
designed to test the truth of Engel's "laws" and to expand them. (15)
The effort undoubtedly consumed much of the energy and attention of
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consumption analysts. Certainly the questions they asked and the ways
they organized the data were greatly determined by this objective.
The patterns set in the early expenditure surveys have remained fairly
constant to the present. The information contained in the survey both
limited and shaped the way budgets could be designed.
Engel's consumption "laws" were not really laws, however, in any
scientific sense. That is, they were not behavioral or causal relations
tested in experimental or quasi-experimental situations. (16)
Rather, they were observations on cross-sectional data about spending
patterns of income groups. The laws did not say that the income-
expenditure proportion relationship was immutable or provide a causal
model for the relation. One could not, on the basis of Engel's evidence,
say that increasing an individual's income would change their proportion
of expenditure on certain things, nor could one predict how changing
relative prices, life style or social values might affect the relation.
It was, after all, no more than an observation of a broad correlation,
without an explanatory element.
The peculiar and unfortunate aspect for the future of budgets was
that analysts' attention became riveted on Engel's laws in-such a way
that they did not develop other kinds of analyses. No other empiricist
of Engel's capabilities followed on to develop other descriptive laws,
nor did any theoretician take the observations and look for explanations
and models of the underlying relationship. The work on patterns of
family expenditure never was to progress much beyond where Engel left it.
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Carroll Wright Plays a Crucial Role
Often one individual in the right place and at the right time may
facilitate or, indeed, make possible a new program, or new approach to
public problems. It might have happened any way, though one can never
be sure. But one individual most certainly may hurry or slow the
process, and if the person has great capabilities and vision, he will
leave his mark on the product.
Carroll Wright, the first U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics
from 1885 to 1905, was such a man. (17) His contributions were several.
He pulled together the best ideas about expenditure surveys, conceived
of important uses for them, and convinced Congress of the need for them.
Under his direction, the Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted the first
two Federal expenditure surveys, representing a major commitment of
money and effort. The methods of the surveys established the basic
patterns which U.S. surveys still follow. Moreover, he established a
firm tradition of nonpartisan professionalism for the Bureau which also
remains to the present.
The Bureau was never to design a budget under his guidance, but
many of the methods and approaches to budget design were to depend on
the patterns he established. Certainly the budgets would never even
have been a possibility if Congress had not been persuaded to authorize
expenditure surveys, or persuaded of the usefulness of measuring wage
adequacy. Nor would national budgets have had any significant impact
if the Bureau had not had the reputation for impartiality. A budget
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is too value-laden a measure to withstand doubts about its designers.
Wright, as Statistics of Labor Commissioner in Massachusetts in
the 1870's, was interested and well-informed about European statistical
work, particularly on family expenditures. He supervised the gathering
of data in Massachusetts similar to that of Ducepetiaux for comparisons
of the workingman's living levels here and abroad. (18) He used the
data also to test some of Engel's laws, which were always to be of
particular interest to him. When the Federal Bureau of Labor was
established Wright, as the leading practitioner of government statistics,
was the nonpolitical choice of a lame duck President. He was reappointed
in three administrations of both parties. He was to establish very
quickly the Bureau's reputation for competence, for being influenced
by day-to-day politics and for producing a service equally valuable
to both sides of important questions.
Wright took advantage of one of the major public issues of 1888
to create a demand for expenditure surveys. The question of whether or
not to reduce the high protective tariffs was among the most consuming
and political problems of the period. International trade was an
important part of the economy and congressional opinion on the tariff
divided very much on party lines. The Republicans wanted to protect
home industry in the North, and Southern Democrats were interested in
buying manufactured goods more cheaply from abroad. In the
Congressional debate in 1888, proponents of reduction argued that the
levies were much higher than the cost of U.S. labor would justify,
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while opponents said the tariff meant U.S. workers had higher wages and
real incomes than European workers. They used Wright' s data from his
Massachusetts survey, which he had compared with Belgian and English
expenditure data. They pointed to the fact that U.S. workers were
able to save a larger percentage of their incomes. The latter contention
was almost certainly injected into the debate by Wright, as a compara-
tively technical comment.
One of the central arguments of this critical debate had come to
revolve around "facts" of family living and the comparison of real
income or welfare of U.S. and European workers. Wright seems likely
to have been responsible for defining the issues in such a way that
massive surveys would be called for. He had written a pamphlet some
years earlier on the scientific bases of tariff legislation, in which
-he developed the thesis that a tariff, to be just and fair to all,
must be based on the comparative cost of production in competing
countries. This would include the cost of labor which, by implication,
was to imply adequate consumption levels of necessLties. An associate
of Wright's wrote that Congressman Mills and his colleagues accepted
his idea and entrusted Wright with carrying it out. (19) He did so
with a survey in 1888 of over 8,000 families, which was popular enough
to be followed by an even larger one of 25,000 families in 1901. (20)
Wright appears to have provided the channel between the intellectual
developments and the politicians, and to have manipulated contemporary
issues to further his goals. The remarkable fact is that leaders of
220
both parties backed his proposals. Both the Senate and House voted
virtually unanimously to conduct a cost of production survey, though it
was clear that the results could cut either way. Wright had apparently
managed to convince them that the accurate "facts" would be in the




Though a tremendous number of researchers and analysts conducted
expenditure surveys and designed budgets (21) over the years, and a
large number of individuals and groups used the data, the methods, uses
and supporting institutions do not show the growth or evolution that
they did for the unemployment indicator. It is only recently that
there has been some general agreement on methods and a diminution of
the number of competing budgets. In the thirties there were about
eight or ten competing unemployment figures, and for at least twenty-
five years, the single official figure has been virtually the only one.
Moreover, institutions for its production and use have grown and
evolved while its methodology has been gradually improved.
For the standard budget, on the contrary, the methods of today
are similar to the original ones at the beginning of the century.
Few of the problems have been resolved. Moreover, the institutions
that would support and promote the indicator have not emerged. How and why
there has been the lack of methodological and political development may
be partially explained by the overall patterns in the indicator's
history. These will be outlined briefly here before going into more
detail about specific events, because many of the general patterns do
not clearly emerge from the focus on individual events.
FIGURE 1 CHRONOLOGY OF STANDARD BUDGETS IN THE U.S.
YEAR POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SETTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETS
1850-1900 Development of methods and practice of expend-
iture surveys, Europe and U.S. Massive data
gathering, dominated by the empirical approach.
1853 Ducpetiaux studies expenditures of 153 Belgian
families, establishing important methods of
data collection and tabulation.
1850-58 Ernst Engel analyzes published expenditure
data and formulates "law" of the relation of
income to proportion of expenditures for
necessities.
1875 Carroll Wright as Massachusetts Commissioner
of the Statistics of Labor produces a study
of expenditures of Massachusetts Working-
men's families and a comparison with
Belgian and English data.
1884 The U.S. Bureau of Labor created.
(To become the Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
1888 Congressional debate on tariff reduction.
Wright's Massachusetts data becomes part
of the debate. Congress orders Bureau of
Labor to conduct expenditure survey of
workingmen's families to discover the cost
of living and evaluate wages.
POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SETTING
1888-91 Wright as Commissioner supervises
the first U.S. Federal expenditure








Growth of union activity and bitter disputes
with management. Movements for labor reform,
higher wages and better conditions.
Congress orders a new expenditure survey for
up-to-date living cost data and the design
of a food cost index.
The first standard budget published in
England, B.S. Rowntree's effort to
define a"poverty line."
Anthracite Coal Strike Commission hears
arguments about the need to pay workers
to maintain the American Standard of
Living.
First U.S. standard budget, for New York
City by Louise More. A less than average,
but above subsistence level.
Many minimal budgets designed by state,
city, and private agencies to evaluate
wage levels and plan welfare.
Congress orders a study of the condition
of women and child wage-earners.
Wright supervises an expenditure
study of 25,440 families.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETSYEAR
POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SETTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETS
First Federally designed standard
budget done by BLS for families of
cotton-mill workers in connection
with the Congressionally ordered





Public and private groups start to design
a higher level, "comfort" budget to
evaluate wages.
The War. Institution of government
controls and stepping up of production.
The National War Labor Board uses a wide
variety of budgets to settle wage dis-
putes and help determine the substandard
wage. Arbitration boards also use
budgets extensively in wage disputes.
The Joint Commission on the Reclassification
of Salaries requests an official budget from
the BLS for its use.
1920
Several Federal expenditure studies,
local and nationwide, of wage-earners
and clerical workers to construct a
full cost-of-living index and measure
wartime changes.
The first complete quantity and cost
budget, designed by the BLS. The
"Health and Decency Budget" for a
family of five in Washington, D.C.
BLS designs a generalized version
of the health and decency budget
for the nation.
1929 Onset of the Depression
YEAR
1909
YEAR POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SETTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETS
1934-36 Institution of massive work relief Massive Federal expenditure surveys
programs in the U.S. to revise weights in the cost of
living index and general research
on living patterns in Depression.
1936 WPA designs Emergency and Mainten-
ance Level budgets for worker's
family of four and prices them in
59 cities, to decide wage levels
for its worker.
1939-43 BLS reprices WPA budgets annually.
1939-45 The War. End of the Depression.
1942 Presidential Order declaring substandard
wages exempt from wartime controls.
1942-43 Controversy over the War Labor Board's
use of the cost-of-living index as a
wage increase guideline.
1944 Textile workers price (with BLS aid)
WPA Emergency Budget in mill towns to
demonstrate to War Labor Board that
their wages were substandard.
1945 Congress requests the BLS to design a
new standard budget on which to base
analyses of income tax revision.
1946 BLS publishes The City Worker
Family Budget, CWFB, a "modest but
adequate" standard for the urban
worker's family of four.







Inception of the War on Poverty. The
Administration declares an official
poverty line.
Congress authorizes funds for three
budget levels for families and elderly
couples on a continuing basis.
Election of a Republican President
President Nixon announces proposal for
a Family Assistance Plan
BLS, for the first time, requests
funds from Congress to do a budget
revision.
BLS requests funds to do two levels
of budgets for families and elderly
couples.
BLS publishes revision of CWFB for
1966.
BLS publishes three budgets for






THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETS
BLS reprices CWFB annually.
BLS conducts a nationwide expendi-
ture survey to revise weights in
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
BLS does interim revision of CWFB
at request of Congress. Weights
based on 1950-51 survey.
BLS conducts nationwide expenditure
survey to revise weights in CPI.
POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SETTING
Congressional debate over new welfare
proposals uses BLS lower level budgets.
1971 President invokes economic controls
provided under the Economic Stabilization
Act to forbid controls on substandard
wages. The Committee report uses the
BLS lower budget as a criterion.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL BUDGETS
The Commissioner of Labor Statistics
proposes eliminating the budget
series.
The Cost of Living Council defines
substandard wages at a level below
the BLS budget.
A Federal Court declares the Council
acted against the intent of Congress
in defining substandard wages so low.
The Council redefine "substandard"
at a higher level, exempting 10






The most notable pattern in the history of the standard budgets is
its repetitiveness. Interest in family budget data and setting budget
standards rose and subsided with the times. It was-greatest whenever
real incomes were caught between prices and some kind of wage depressing
factor. That is, it was greatest during war times, when prices were
rising and wages were controlled, and during depressions. In the
intervals research efforts on methods or concepts died out. When
there was a resurgence of interest, most workers had to start afresh
and could not build on past experience. Morever, this transitory
interest in the problem meant that neither Congress nor interest groups
felt it necessary to set up permanent arrangements to assure and oversee
the regular collection of data and design of budgets. Though the BLS
was authorized to conduct expenditure surveys every ten years, it was
for revision of the cost-of-living index, not budgets.
Each time a new U.S. budget study has been authorized, until 1965,
it has been at the instigation of Congress rather than an interested
executive agency. Though many Federal agencies use budgets in their
analyses of public problems and in setting assistance standards, none
has taken the responsibility for asking for or conducting new research.
The BLS particularly has shied away from the budgets primarily, it
appears, because of their highly normative nature. If they had taken a
continuing interest, perhaps the history would not have had this
erratic quality. And though Congress has taken the initiative in
asking for budgets, it was always on an ad hoc basis. A temporary
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committee on salaries asked for them in 1919 and the House Appropriations
Committee asked for them in 1945 and again in 1959. It was never a
permanent legislative committee that might have taken a long-term
interest in the data and developed an expertise, as one did for unemploy-
ment. Indeed the demand for budgets was never in connection with a
legislative program; if it had been it might have helped sustain the
interest in the data through slow periods.
Another aspect of the historical pattern is that by far the
greatest effort and creative interest in family budgets occurred at the
beginning of the story, the latter part of the nineteenth and early part
of the twentieth centuries. The greatest input of ideas and the
largest volume of work was at that time. The majority of methods and
approaches used today are basically the same as those developed in the
early period. There have been changes, but marginal ones, particularly
in comparison to the methodological change in unemployment data
collection that came with the institution of the survey in 1940. The
basic idea conceived 70 years ago remains today. Data is collected
by home interview, a standard budget is structured by adding together
ideal amounts of various categories of expenditure, selected by
combination of consumer-based criteria and expert judgments.
Although the number of studies was great, far more than for
unemployment data, they did not seem to add up or greatly capitalize
on one another's experience. Certainly the greater volume of effort
did not produce correspondingly greater results than the work applied
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to unemployment. A principal reason for this may well have been the
highly empirical tradition in which most work was done. Data was
collected without much guiding theory and the budgets put together
without much reference to sociological or economic theory. In fact,
the separation between theorists and data collectors has been almost
complete throughout the period. (22) Economists have been interested
in the data only to discover a relation between savings and income, to
get "propensity to save" variables for econometric equations. Other-
wise the data collection, tabulation, and analysis has proceeded very
much on an ad hoc basis and much of the data amassed has been virtually
unused.
Finally there has been a tremendous diversity and separation
among the designers and among the users of budgets. The purposes were
so varied in government and outside that users had little to bind them
together outside of their interest in the data. It uses were less at
the national policy scale than unemployment data so the data received
little nationwide press, which might have unified thinking about it.
Without such a press and without common interests to turn users into
lobbying groups, the public's attention never was to focus'sharply on
issues surrounding the indicator.
Because of the comparative lack of developmental stages in the
history of budgets, this study will examine their characteristics and
uses in ways which are not primarily chronological. In general the
story of the standard budgets is one story told over and over. The
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central focus of this study is the search for possible explanations
for this stagnation, this failure of the indicator to become an




The First Standard Budget: Quantifying Poverty
Though the present study concerns primarily U.S. standard budgets,
they were designed along parallel lines in Europe and elsewhere.
The concept of a standardized budget is British in origin and dates
back to the turn of the century. The best known and most influential
effort was that of Seebohm Rowntree. His objective was to define a
"1poverty line" to demonstrate quantitatively the human effects of
unemployment and low wages in the hope of social reform. He devised
a standard budget based on a concept of physical efficiency. He
selected and priced quantities of goods which were supposedly the
minimum on which a family could maintain health and activity for a
year.
His method had much in common with methods used today, and was
in some ways more sophisticated and logically consistent, though in
others, less so. First he did a massive study, even by present day
standards, using direct inquiry of 11,560 families in the town of
York (23) to get data on income, occupations and expenditures.
Stratified random sampling was still unknown so he aimed to get as high
a percentage coverage as possible, apparently unaware of the severity
of potential bias. In composing the minimum budget he was able to
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use "scientific" nutritional standards to get food quantities. The
3,500 calories per active male per day including 125 g. of protein is
not very different from recommended quantities in 1972 because much
research had already been done on this topic. He selected actual items
that the poor bought, finding that they could buy efficiently, getting
considerable nourishment for their shillings. For housing, he simply
surved what was available in York, primarily four-room houses, and used
its rental cost. For clothing quantities, he examined the amounts
bought by the poorest families and inquired of the poor about the
cheapest way to purchase.
The final standard was just barely a subsistence budget, allowing
nothing for personal care or fresh meat and consisting essentially of
food, rent and clothing. He then compared the price of this standard
with family incomes to find the number in poverty. This basic idea
was to be followed time and again in the somewhat more generous U.S.
budgets. Rowntree also developed the concept of two levels of poverty,
primary and secondary, which gave a poverty baad rather than an
arbitrarily sharp line. He also analyzed the life cycle to find the
periods when the incidence of poverty was highest. One cAn respect
his insights in this analysis as we observe how analysts in the sixties
were rediscovering these issues after at first attempting to use a
simple poverty line.
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Early U.S. Budgets: "Fair" Standards of Living (24)
U.S. budgets from the start represented a considerably higher level
of living than Rowntree's. Their purpose usually was not to find out
how many were living in abject poverty, but rather to determine what
would be a fair wage or decent level for welfare payment. The concern
was for more than physical necessities, allowing usually something for
such things as savings, pleasure, transportation, and periods of illness.
The various budgets designed in the U.S. before 1918 all represented
some socially rather than physically defined minimum, but none were
luxurious or even particularly comfortable by contemporary standards.
Most involved some local expenditure survey, followed by budget design
based on a combination of the researcher's standards and standards
deduced from actual consumption decisions. The precise method for
selecting the quantities was seldom made clear.
Independent research and city and state organizations sponsored
the first budgets. The very earliest U.S. budget appears to be one
designed in 1903 by Louise More, who studied the income and expenditures
of 200 New York families. Her budget allowed a few pleasures, periods
of sickness and unemployment as well as savings. (25) Later, in
1907 Robert Chapin, in an often-cited study,(26) calculated the cost of
a "fairly proper standard of living" in New York. His sponsor was of the
New York State Conference of Charities and Corrections. The motivation
for this and many other studies grew out of social workers' desires to
know the exact content and cost of a "normal" standard in order to
set income standards for services offered.
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Clearly they would not be interested in starvation level incomes as they
would provide assistance to those somewhat better off.
The first Federally designed standard budget was unobtrusively
done as part of an extensive study ordered by Congress in 1907 (27)
on the condition of women and child wage earners. It never was much
used. Many of the privately designed standards were far better known
at the time, but it did mark the beginning of an official cognizance
of the idea of a standard budget. Moreover, the study set out the
definition and philosophy behind the budget which was to remain through-
out the Bureau's later efforts.
One of the many analyses in this many-volume study (28)involved
the specification of "minimum" and "fair" standards of living for cotton
mill workers. The object was to evaluate whether wages were high
enough to keep women and children in good health or to permit children
to attend school instead of working. The Bureau defined the minimum
standard as one sufficient to maintain physical efficiency. It had
been observed that mill-worker families were ill-fed and underclothed.
The question was whether low income was the cause. It was commonly
felt that the lower classes did not have the proper values or judgment
to spend their income well. For public policy it was important to
know if the income was adequate in any case.
"The fair standard" was intended to allow not only for physical
efficiency but also for "satisfaction of human attributes." It
included such things as tobacco, school books and insurance. It
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represented a norm including only things that many families had and
supposedly that most wanted. The rationale for use of such a standard
in preference to the minimum was that, first of all, it represented a
more realistic view of human needs. The report stated that "Human
needs as well as human frailties put man into a class where food and
shelter are not the only necessaries of life." (29)
Secondly, on a more pragmatic level, as long as families aspired
to this living level, it could be expected that women and children would
go to work to help the family meet it. The data on family incomes
and number of wage earners bore out this notion. The "fair" standard
was to mark a growing conviction that would become increasingly incorp-
orated into later budgets, that a woman's place was in the home and
the children's in school. Only a few years later in 1913 the Bureau
conducted a study in Philadelphia and established a "fair" standard
level for families on the assumption of only one wage earner, (30)
for which they were severely criticized in 1921 by the National
Industrial Conference Board, an employer's research group. (31)
One of the recurring themes of discussion when labor later used budgets
to support wage demands was that the wage should be enough to support
a whole family. The employers were to fight a losing battle for the
acceptance of more than one wage-earner to a family.
Budget studies continued to proliferate in the years from 1909 to
1920, each with its own separate rationale and sponsoring organization.
Most of the standards in the earlier studies represented something like
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the "fair" standard, primarily to evaluate wages. The University of
Chicago Settlement, a social work organization, in 1909-10 did a study
of family budgets in the stockyards district, settling on the price of
a "minimum decent" standard. (32) A Factory Investigating Commission
in New York and Buffalo in 1914 produced "decency and efficiency"
budgets to help evaluate wage levels. (33) In 1916 Congress became
interested in a minimum wage law for women and authorized the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to do an expenditure survey in the District of Columbia
which would also help answer recurring questions on wage earners'
standards of living. (34) A study in Dallas in 1917 and one in
Philadelphia in 1916 were done to provide a guide for wage advances to
municipal employees. (35)
Minimum Comfort Standard
Another type of budget began to appear around 1917, a "minimum
comfort" budget, which represented a higher level of living than the
"fair" level, something perhaps closer to the proverbial American
standard. It was based on the budgets of higher paid skilled workers
and included items most people, even those workers, were not prepared
to label necessities. The movement was in part instigated by the
pressure that war conditions put on prices and wages.
Many of these budgets as well as minimum ones, were designed in
direct connection with wage disputes, or wage issues. A professor of
consumption economics at the University of California, Jessica Peixotto,
prepared a budget to maintain a workingman's family at a "minimum
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standard of wholesome living and not mere subsistence." She designed
it for the use of an arbitration board called to settle a Railway
Conductors' strike in San Francisco. In Seattle both sides of a labor
dispute designed and submitted budgets to the appointed arbitration
board to bolster their arguments. The National War Labor Board had
to settle many disputes, and asked William Ogburn of the University of
Washington to establish both minimum and higher level budgets for their
use. (36)
The trend continued toward higher level budgets. The reason may
have been that fewer people by then lived close to the line of physical
subsistence. Also the war was increasing living levels for the more
skilled wage earners, and their increasingly effective unions wanted
to protect the new levels. In any case, although less formal and
carefully documented low level budgets continued to be designed at state
or local levels for minimum wage legislation for women or for relief
needs, the thrust of the standard budget came to aim towards the
middle-class, skilled worker. The American standard of living was an
increasingly popular concept.
The Health and Decency Budget: A Congressional Initiative
After the war, a Congressional Joint Commission on the Reclass-
ification of Salaries requested that the Bureau of Labor Statistics
provide a quantity budget for government workers' families in Washington
D.C. (37) As it would for other Federal budget studies, the
authorization came at a period of stress in 1919 after a long period in
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which there was considerable evidence that real wages had fallen and
not kept up with general prosperity. This was the first of several
explicit Congressional requests for normative quantity budgets to aid
them in making some specific decisions. As in most other cases also,
much of the necessary data had already been collected in connection with
expenditure surveys to revise the weights in the cost of living index.
The budget was intended to represent a bottom level of health and
decency below which a family cannot go without danger of physical and
moral deterioration. It had no provision for savings, vacation or
books, but did include some amusements, some health care and contribu-
tions to church as well as domestic help with the laundry. (38)
This budget was unusual and set patterns for later ones in that it
involved precisely specified quantities and qualities of goods which
could be priced over a period of time. Earlier budgets contained
quantity and quality information on many items, but on many others
where this was difficult to define, simply the cost information was
given. The precise description of the items was necessary, however,
if the budget was to be repriced at some other time or place.
Moreover, although the Bureau set many of the standards for budget
components by judgmental methods, it did call in outside experts to
assist in the process of deciding on the appropriate quantities and
quality criteria of such things as housing, decreasing somewhat the
level of subjectivity.
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In the prosperous twenties there was comparatively little further
development of budgets and budget concepts as apparently there was
little demand. Some of the existing budgets were repriced by the Labor
Bureau and the National Industrial Conference Board, as well as the BLS.
A series of budget studies that was to be influential for the next forty
years did start, however, in this period. Jessica Peixotto, who had
designed the 1917 Railway Conductors' budget, became chairman of a
privately funded group at the University of California, the Heller
Committee for Research in Social Economics. She followed up on her
interests to do budgetary studies on different income groups, (39)
and soon the Committee's standardized budgets for as many as four
income levels were being used and depended on by the California Civil
Service and the welfare agencies as well as private business. The
pressure of these groups encouraged the institution and maintenance of
this budget series.
Depression Budgets: The Standard Declines
Pressure for major new expenditure studies at the Federal level
grew with the Depression. As usual the cost of living index was the
high priority problem. A high-level governmental committee
of experts and the findings of the newly formed Central Statistical
Board concurred that the life styles and available goods had changed so
much since 1919 that the weights of the index were seriously wrong. (40)
The 1919 budgets were hardly useful under Depression conditions.
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Ultimately, the Federal government conducted two major surveys, one
to revise the weights for the costof living index and the other, a
massive study, to provide general purpose data on American family
incomes and expenditures. The latter study, which involved five
separate agencies and a sample of 300,000 families was designed to.aid
the National Resources Committee, a short-lived central planning
agency, in analyzing national consumption. More significant, however,
was the fact that this was a Works Progress Administration (WPA) project,
and the purpose was to employ as many people as possible in socially
useful projects. It is improbable that such a massive undertaking
would have been made for research purposes alone. (41)
Once again a major Federal budget study grew as an afterthought
out of expenditure surveys done for other reasons. The WPA wanted a
-basis on which to set pay scales for its vast numbers of new employees.
The BLS health and decency budget was not only 16 years out of date in
a period of rapid social and technological change, but it also represented
a level of living unnecessarily high for emergency work. Moreover, if
the WPA was to pay salaries that provided only marginal living levels, it
would have to take into account local cost-of-living differences.
Therefore, the WPA used the data from the surveys to construct its
ownfemergency" and "maintenance" level budgets, both to help determine
absolute need levels and to compare the cost of a given standard in
different cities. Although the documentation on the design of the
budgets is limited, (42) the WPA appears to have approached the problem
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much as did their predecessors. They chose quantity and quality
standards through a combination of actual consumption patterns, expert
opinions, scientific standards and their own judgment. The WPA said
the maintenance budget represented "average minimum needs for industrial,
service and other manual workers." It was intended to give consider-
ation to psychological as well as physical needs.
In fact, however, even if one takes into account that the
representative family was now four instead of five, the cost of the
budget in 1935 dollars was not much more than the cost of the 1919
health and decency budget in 1919 dollars. The level of living being
measured was distinctly lower, as were standards generally. The
emergency budget allowed "more exclusively, though not entirely, for
material wants, but it might be questioned on the grounds of health
hazards if families had to live at this level for a considerable period
of time." ( 43) The WPA priced these two budgets in 59 cities, and
figures were published widely. Once the war began and the WPA was
dissolved, the BLS continued pricing the budgets.
The City Worker Family Budget: The Routinization of Budget Design
Controversies during World War II over the cost of living and wage
regulation (44) called attention to the inadequacies of the WPA budgets
for use in that period. Their levels were too low for a prosperous
period. Moreover, wartime conditions radically changed life styles and
the array and relative prices of available goods. The WPA budgets were
obviously no longer pertinent by the time the War ended, and the BLS
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recognizing this, had stopped pricing them. However, the demand for
standard budgets remained from organized labor, business, and public
and private agencies. They continued to use the WPA budgets for a
wide variety of purposes inspite of the injustices their use might
cause.
Therefore, when Congressman Engel rose on the floor of the House
and denounced the WPA budgets and demanded new ones based on postwar
values, (45) his ideas were accepted. The immediate reason for his
speech was that Congress was considering income tax reform and
elimination of high war taxes. They wanted to set tax deductions on
a basis of both equity and need. To do so a measure of the money cost
of living and the comparative costs for different family sizes would be
desirable. The Appropriations Committee, led by Engel, then prodded
a none-too-enthusiastic Labor Statistics Commissioner to provide a
statement on how the BLS would design new standard budgets. (46)
Commissioner Hinrichs had come to the Committee with the request for
funds to extend the cost of living index to more cities, but the
Committee was more interested in budgets. Their principal concern
seemed to be that the budgets were inappropriately used in wage disputes.
The Commissioner protested that the Bureau had never endorsed the
budgets as representing appropriate living levels, and had always
issued caveats with the figures. But the Congressmen were unimpressed
by this argument, pointing out that so long as the data were easy to
misuse, they would be. In other words, they wanted the data in spite
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of the pitfalls, which they recognized, but they wanted it to be designed
to prevent misuse or misunderstanding.
Congress allocated the Bureau a sum to do new standard budgets in
1946. The money allocated, however, would only cover the new budget
design, and not the vast investment required for new expenditure
surveys. In any case, Congress felt that with pent-up wartime demand
beginning to emerge, expenditure patterns would be difficult to interpret
or generalize from. Once again a national standard budget was demanded
by Congress as a sort of side issue in a larger problem, here tax
reform, and it only authorized minimal expenditure.
The Bureau, in its tradition of avoiding heavily value-laden or
politically charged statistical activity, had not done a budget since
1920. To protect itself and to get the expertise it lacked on its
own staff, the BLS appointed a Technical Advisory Committee. This
Committee was to establish the methods and procedures as well as set the
standard and to advise the Bureau in carrying out the budget design
process. Experienced budget designers from the Heller Committee, the
Department of Agriculture, unions and universities, representing a
range of political views, all were in the group. With their advice the
Bureau designed a budget in a new way. The Committee established
techniques and procedures, which, while they were not free of value
judgments, were objective in the sense that they could be explained and
reproduced by others. Moreover, the standard selected was for the
first time one that was felt to be applicable to the urban population as
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a whole, rather than just the working class. No longer was it
assumed that different classes aspired to different levels of living
but rather that there was a commonly shared American standard. This
City Workers Family Budget (CWFB) was called a "modest but adequate"
level and intended to "satisfy prevailing standards of what is
necessary for health, efficiency, the future of children and for
participation in community activities." (47) It represented a level of
living higher than the WPA budgets and even the 1919 "health and
decency budget." It included such things as a washing machine, a
vacuum cleaner and a car in many cases as well as more clothing,
medical aid, and recreation.
The data on consumption patterns for the budget, however, came
primarily from the Depression years and the large consumption studies,
updated by estimation for categories of consumption that seemed to
have changed radically. The Bureau, after repricing for several years
the budget it brought out in 1947, discontinued it. Without weights
based on new consumption patterns, the BLS felt it was subject to the
same criticism as the WPA budgets had been in the early 40's.
By 1950 we were in the prosperous times of the Korean War, and
there was little effort to reinstate the budgets until the recession
toward the end of the 50's. At that time data had become available
from the expenditure survey done in 1950-51 to get new weights for the
renamed Consumer Price Index. Comparatively little marginal effort
would be required to bring the City Worker's Family Budget (CWFB) up-to-
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date. Again the incentive for the move came from Congress, and the
authorization for the project came via the Appropriations Committee.
The Bureau had had little intention of continuing the budget series so,
in 1959, when they began work on the revised budget, only one staff
member who had worked on the 1946 version remained. The Bureau had
done no further research on methods or any aspect of budgets had been
done in the Bureau since then. The Bureau called its 1959 budget an
"interim" revision. (48) They would require considerably more time
to develop techniques for including the cost of owned housing, for
example, on an annual basis. The new expenditure studies showed that
home owning had become very common by then.
Other Budgets
In the 40's and 50's more and more special purpose state and local
budgets appeared. Most states had minimum wage laws whose purpose was
to assure that women would be paid enough to live a moral, healthy
existence. (49) Many of the laws appear to have been originally
conceived of as a way of preventing prostitution. The Federal
government has never provided budgets for a single, working woman, and
therefore many states have collected budgetary data on this topic.
States have also had to produce some kind of budgets for setting relief
standards in welfare programs. Budgets were important in these since
they would not only indicate the relief level but also justify the
need for various special grants. The Bureau never collected budgetary
data for dependent families and the "modest but adequate" budget level
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was higher than desired welfare payments. Thus the states and cities
designed subsistence standards, though of course, without the large
professional bureaurocracy of the BLS.
Voluntary agencies also got into the budget-making process, because
they viewed measures of income adequacy as critical to their activity.
They wanted not only to establish income limits for free services but
also to set up a payment scale based on need. Therefore they wanted
to measure several absolute levels of income adequacy for a particular
family size and to compare the levels of living possible with a given
income for families of different sizes in order to set payments that
could fluctuate with income and family size. These agencies, like
the states, operate within aspecific geographic area, so average
national figures on budget costs are not precise enough. Such agencies
or federations of agencies composed local budgets in various ways, (50)
but often they used BLS figures and methods, making local alterations.
These are some of the most carefully done and best documented of
budgets.
Standard Budgets Become Part of the BLS Program
In the 1960's the standard budget indicator entered what may be an
important phase. For the first time in their history, a Federal agency
accepted the responsibility to design, reprice,and redesign standard
budgets on a permanent basis. Until then budgets had always been
ordered to deal with some very specific problem and then discontinued.
Accordingly, there never developed the kind of bureaucratic and
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Congressional constituency and expertise that would be concomitant with
a continuing program. Events of the sixties, however, suddenly made
budgets more visible and raised the possibility that they would become
as permanent and influential as unemployment figures.
For the first time, in 1965, the BLS itself requested permission
to design a new budget, this one to replace the 1959 interim one.
Their initiative grew out of a perception of a need for income criterion
to carry out public and private social programs which had been so
rapidly expanding since the late fifties. The Bureau had called together
once again in 1963 a Technical Advisory Committee to assist the Bureau,
this time in evaluating the need for new budgets and changes in old ones.
Not surprisingly, they provided the motivation and justification for
more budget studies. The Committee's report (51) served, as expert
reports had on many occasions in the past, as an important exhibit in
BLS arguments to the House Appropriations Committee for the budget.
It lent a certain air of impartiality to their requests, though it
was highly supportive of a budget program, as most of the experts on
the committee were, of course, budget users.
The Committee recommended not only revision of the moderate level
CWFB, but more importantly, the development of a lower level budget and
budgets for elderly couples as well. (52) These recommendations
approximately coincided with the inception of the Poverty Program and
a growing demand for identifying and measuring poverty and progress
against it. The Bureau and its Commissioner, Ewan Clague, saw an
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opportunity for the Bureau to play an important role. He went to
Congress in 1965 requesting funds to develop both lower and moderate
level budgets. Though Congress did not allow the lower level budgets
that year, by 1966 it had become plain that the crude poverty index
offered by the Administration was unsatisfactory (see p. 330
for a fuller story of the poverty index.)
Accordingly, Congress authorized the BLS to develop, reprice and
revise three levels of budgets for two family types on a continuing
basis. They saw a need for them in their evaluation of proposed and
existing Federal programs, The third standard budget was higher than
the moderate level. Labor unions feared that the introduction of the
lower budget would jeopardize their use of the moderate level as a
reference point in wage negotiations, and therefore opposed introduction
of a lower budget without balancing it with.a higher one. There were
certainly uses for such a budget, though perhaps not compelling enough
ones to get it started on its own. Public and private agencies
would use them administratively, and business would use them to provide
geographical wage differentials that would give equivalent real incomes.
These budgets, originally published in 1969 and 1970, (53)
have been repriced with the aid of the Consumer Price Index in 1970 and
1971, and it is these that are now in jeopardy. Their uses (see
p. 338 ) have made them controversial and the Bureau's"permanent"
commitment may be cut off under an unsympathetic, macroeconomist
Commissioner, Geoffrey Moore. The redesign of the budgets on the basis
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of the new data from the 1972-72 Consumption Survey will not be done if
the Nixon Administration has its, way. The reasons it may have its way,
and halt the institutionalization of this indicator have to do with
the highly political nature of the issues to which it pertains, the





The Budget Concept: An Ambiguous Norm
Standard budgets are designed to represent the consumption requirements
for a family of specified size and type to meet a particular standard of
living. As such, they have two features which distinguish them as
indicators sharply from unemployment rates. The first is that budgets
attempt to measure something far more abstract and subjective than unemploy-
ment - a set of consumption objectives. The objectives are not those of
any individual, but those society has for itself or groups within it.
Secondly, the budgets involve their designers in the selection of a level
for the indicator rather than simply the design of a scale,like the un-
employment rate,on which to place observations.
The important consequences of these distinctions are several. To
measure unemployment we can set up a simple criterion and inquire directly
as to whether individuals are unemployed. But as we cannot ask society
about its objectives, we must devise more indirect inquiry techniques
whose validity and reliability are far more dubious. But the elaborate
measurement models necessary to use such techniques in a credible way have
not been developed,so inevitably the methods have been unsatisfactory to
many.
One reason that the standard of living is difficult to measure is that
it is difficult to define in specific or unambigous terms. A typical
example of a definition of what a standard budget measures is the
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following which pertains to one of the most reputable and long-lasting
budget series in this country.
"...an attempt to measure the cost of maintaining the commonly accepted
standard of living... by the'commonly accepted standard of living' is meant
the sum of those goods and services that public opinion currently
recognizes as necessary to healthful and reasonably comfortable living."(54)
(underscoring mine). Not only does this definition do little more to
specify the living level than to exclude the luxurious and the deprived,
it leaves many fuzzy areas which are subject to wide variations in indivi-
dual interpretation.
Even the basic outlines of a budget do not follow from such a
definition and, as a consequence, the methods and judgments used in con-
structing it become its definition by default. As the model to guide
choice of these methods is so sketchy, the standard budget is an instance
of a highly operationally defined measure (see p. 30). The result has
been that the budgets mix and obscure different kinds of objectives and
models. The measure is therefore complex and, ultimately, ambiguous.
This factor in combination with the fact that the budget itself is a level
and thus contains direct normative political implications has been a serious
obstacle to the indicator's development and use. It is difficult to use
in theoretical analysis or research when its precise meaning cannot be
summed up unambiguously - when the variable it represents is not defined.
Moreover, since a budget is the product of so many judgments, in the
political arena, its use is highly suspect, and accordingly, it may serve
little function.
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Income Adequacy: Concepts and-Measures
The purpose of a standard budget is to provide a standard against which
to assess income adequacy. The norm it attempts to measure is one we
presume to exist in the consciousness or attitudes of society as a whole.
But other possible ways of setting and measuring standards for income
adequacy do exist. They involve different definitions as well as
different measurement methods from the standard budget. To examine them
helps shed light on the ambiguities in the budgets since a great part of
them is due to the fact that the various kinds of distinct criteria of
income adequacy are obscured in budget design. Looking at the various
alternatives also provides a backdrop against which to understand
reasons that the standard budget became popular and the reasons for the
objections to it.
Physical Efficiency Criterion. One simple criterion for an income
adequacy standard is the maintenance of physical efficiency. The goal
could be defined in fairly objective terms involving good health and
maximum capacity for activity. Both are comparatively susceptible to
measurement, and both are ones on which there would be general agreement.
The requisites for this standard could be determined in a basically
"scientific" fashion. That is, after defining health, one could set up
standardized tests to find out what the requirements are to maintain
health, Though one would have to use some kind of average to gloss over
individual differences in setting standard quantities, the relation between
the budget items and goals would be unambigous. Such a budget would
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probably contain nothing more than food to supply the cheapest available
nutrition, clothing and fuel to maintain warmth and keep one dry and
clean, and housing with sufficient sanitary facilities to protect against
disease.
This subsistence level of living has not been measured in this country
for the purpose of budget design, though in the nineteenth century Rowntree
and other social reformers tried to measure it. It is interested that
we do not measure such a level since, judging by payment levels, such
programs as Social Security seem to have implicit in them a subsistence
criterion. Standard budgets, however, usually do contain some elements
of such a physical subsistence standard, in the choice of food items for
example. Usually when budget designers speak of "scientific" criteria in
budget design, they are referring to items included because they are
supposed to maintain physical efficiency.
Consumption Criteria. Another approach to setting norms for income levels
is to use actual consumption patterns. This approach involves a certain
circularity; however, in that it means incorporating and accepting many
aspects of the social or economic situation into a standard - aspects which
may be undesirable. For example, the distribution of income, or the
supply and relative prices of various goods may be far from ideal, but a
standard based on actual consumption would enshrine these patterns and
incorporate them into goals.
Although the consumption-based approach draws on behavior patterns,
it necessarily also involves an element of designer judgment, some behavioral
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or normative model, or, at least, an arbitrary decision on how to use
consumption data. The simplest approach is to use the median or average
expenditure level as the representation of a moderate standard of living.
A good many social scientists have suggested taking an income equal to
half of the median as a poverty criterion. Neither idea has been widely
accepted, but both types of income lines do appear in policy analyses
from time to time. In some sense they are arbitrary, but, in another,
the simplicity of the choice makes their implications clear. Moreover,
it represents a reasonable and distinct definition of income adequacy to
say it is determined by one's relative economic position. This represents
of course an entirely different dimension of income adequacy than does the
absolute level defined by physicial efficiency.
Another consumption-based standard dates back to the nineteenth
-century expenditure surveys, and it depends on a behavioral model. The
so-called "breakeven" criterion involves selecting as an adequate income
the level at which families of the specified size are just barely able to
achieve some savings. At this point, it was assumed, families reach a
consumption level that satisfies them, as evidenced by their saving.
It was such a level that Carroll Wright referred to as an implicit income
adequacy standard in his cost of living studies. The normative model
involved in using such a standard is that savings are not a necessary part
of an adequate living level. The circularity here, however, has dis-
couraged the continued use of this standard. Different groups of people
may have different time preferences, some abstaining from present con-
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sumption to save for the future, and others the reverse. Moreover, various
factors in the economy may be forcing saving, like the scarcity of housing
after a war, for example. Finally, judging by most standard budgets,
savings themselves are now considered essential to protect a family
against hazards of the future. Savings are part of the standard of
living.
The official federal poverty standard represents another approach to
establishing an income adequacy criterion and it combines consumption and
scientific elements. It has its roots in Engel's idea that the proportion
of income spent in food measures welfare and is dependent on the assumption
that the level of dietary satisfaction of a family is correlated with the
degree of satisfaction of other consumption standards. The construction
of the standard begins with the cost of an "economy" food plan devised by
-the Department of Agriculture to describe the minimum cost of diet that
would be adequate for an emergency. An income of approximately three times
the cost of this diet became the poverty standard.
The reasoning grew out of analysis of nationwide data on actual family
diets, incomes, and expenditures. (55) The multiplier was chosen because
the data from the 1955 Agriculture Department Household Food Consumption
Survey showed that all families of two or more averaged an expenditure of
one-third of total after-tax income on food.(56) (More detailed study gave
slight variations in the multiplier by family size).
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Many other possibilities exist for drawing standards out of consumption
data. The income-elasticity of expenditure approach to selecting
quantities of items for the BLS standard budgets (see p. 271)
is another example. The Heller Committee includes an item in its budgets
when 50% of the target population uses it. Thus the criterion emerges from
a combination of actual behavior under the constraints of the world as it
happens to be at the moment, and the budget designer's decision about how
to manipulate the data, which may be guided either by no model or one of
undetermined validity. Consumption-based criteria play a large role in
standard budgets, sometimes directly and explicitly and other times in
more hidden ways and blended with other criteria.
Judgmental Criteria. For any kind of income standard that does not
purport to be solely for physical efficiency or to be purely relative to
prevailing patterns, only judgments are available to set levels. Judg-
ment, of course, enters into use of the first two criteria, but it is the
only tool we have for designing a standard which approximates many kinds
of goals, beyond simple physical efficiency.
In particular income standards used in the U.S. have virtually all
attempted to represent the requirements for some kind of social efficiency.
That is, they include provision for such things as self-respect, personal
satisfaction, and participation in the community. What people actually
are able to do, or choose to do, may or may not coincide with these goals.
For example, people may not buy a newspaper regularly, though society's
standard would say they should do so to participate as citizens. Once
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we posit goals -like self-respect for our income standard, we cannot stick
with pure consumption criteria, but must add judgment to our methodology.
These judgments may be of a variety of types and qualities of course,
but it iF. doubtful whether we could dignify any decision about how to make
possible a socially acceptable level of personal satisfaction with the term
"scientific." The concept is too individualized and too hard to measure
for us to set up the necessary standard tests by which to measure relation-
ships between consumption and the goals. The various kinds of judgments
in the budgets have been first those of the designer of the income
standard. These may be very personal and unrepresentative, and, in any
case, often suspect since designers of standards often also use them in
argument. Secondly, "experts" may be called in to design standards,
usually for particular areas of consumption. Their judgment about what
is adequate tends to be less personal and based on a wider experience with
desires and community values. It may, of course, also be professionally
self-serving.
Finally, one can simply ask for the judgments of the consumers them-
selves on what their standards are. The Gallup poll each year, for
example, inquires of a sample of families of various incomes what income is
required for a family of four to get along on a minimum income.
Interestingly enough, the answers do seem to converge on a 1969 level, for
example, of about $5200. (57) They could also ask what was the cost of a
moderate level or even what specific items were needed for a particular
standard and thus create a new budget. The advantage of this approach is
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it is a very direct way to inquire into society's standards, and it does
not require skepticism about the philosophy ard competence of the
"experts." However, it does involve a major problem, perhaps insoluble,
of designing questions about these subjective ideas in a way which will
be clearly and similarly understood by all who are asked.
Design; of a Standard Budget: An Example
An understanding of the design procedures for a standard budget is
essential if we are to understand what it does and does not represent
and many of the problems that arise in its use and interpretation.
As we have said, the definition does not fully describe what the budget
represents. The many complex decisions involved in its construction do
not follow of necessity from the definitions. Each procedure involves
-certain assumptions that we may not recognize without close examination.
Moreover, the decisions are made in several kinds of ways, using various
kinds of criteria, "scientific" for physical efficiency, consumption-
based for a relative standard, and judgmental for a number of other kindo
of implicit or explicit objectives - at most, vaguely defined. The
various objectives and criteria are well blended in the process and
careful study is required to disentangle them. Finally, we need to look
closely at the design process because the stated objective of the budget
indicator may not be what it actually turns out to measure, particularly
when the concept is as subjective as a standard of living.
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The so-called "City Worker's Family Budget (CWFB) for a Moderate
Living Standard," (58) provides an example which should clarify how a
budget is put together. There have been a considerable number of budgets
designed over the years, each with its own methods. However, the basic
approach of all is similar. They all begin with selection of a family
type and proceed with selection of budget items within approximately the
same consumption categories. They all involve a mixture of individual,
expert, "scientific" and consumption-based criteria. The design process
is easiest to understand if we focus on a single budget. This section
will examine the CWFB primarily because it is better documented than most
and differs from most other budgets principally in that its designers
made the decisions more carefully and explicitly. The "scientific" and
expert standards they used were as widely accepted as any employed for
budgets, and the data based on as reliable a sample as any. Problems with
the reliability or uses of this budget will exist for other budgets as
well. Finally, the CWFB (later the "Intermediate" level) has been the
best known and most widely used of budgets in recent years.
The Concept and a Model for Measurement. The general concept that the
BLS defines as the objective of the CWFB is that it represents a living
standard providing for the "maintenance of health and social, the nurture
of children, and participation in community activities. This is not a
'subsistence' budget, nor is it a luxury budget; it is an attempt to
describe and measure a modest but adequate standard of living." 69)
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A "standard of living",according to the BLSrefers to the "goals we set
for ourselves as consumers of goods and services and as users of leisure
time and to our norms for conditions of living. Standard budgets measure
the total costs of maintaining the levels and manners of living represented
by these goals." (60) This is perhaps the clearest statement of the
purpose of a budget.
Having stated these goals, the BLS then provided the model by which
they would attempt to measure their object:
"...In the actual experience of families there is a scale which
ranks various consumption patterns in an ascending order from mere sub-
sistence to plenitude in every respect... This consumption scale is
established by society. It can be discovered only through observations
of the expressions of society's ratings of the various existing levels of
living. These ratings of the various levels of living are expressed in
the judgments of scientists, such as medical and public health authorities;
and secondly, in the behavior of individual consumers. Scientific
judgments are based primarily on the studies of the relation between
family consumption and individual and community health. The expressions
of consumer judgment appear in the choices made by consumers as economic
barriers are progressively removed." (61) The statement amounts to a
descriptive model, though a sketchy one, of the nature of family preferences
or utility for goods. It states first of all that there is a set of
prererences common to the social group. It posits that this utility is
ordered on a (presumably) linear scale and that it derives in some way
from socially determined values.
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Finally, the statement provides a model for relating observable data
to this underlying preference set in saying that consumer behavior and
scientific judgments reflect it. Unfortunately, the nature of this
relationship is not spelled out, nor is the method of selecting a level
for the standards. The statement provides only the most general frame-
work for making the measurements. "Scientific" and consumer criteria
may well be in conflict with each other and, in any case, even if we can
agree that the two do reflect society's values, we still have no theory
with which to draw the underlying values out of masses of data on con-
sumption or the varying testimony of experts.
The BLS statement is the nearest the budget designers approach to a
measurement model. Its sketchiness testifies to the empirical nature of
the tradition from which the budgets emerged, and in which they are still
steeped. The nineteenth century social scientists and statisticians
who pioneered the expenditure surveys amassed vast quantities of detailed
data on the minutiae of family expenditures. They did not justify the
collection of any specific portion of the data in any specific terms,
but rather felt its obvious meaning would emerge. (It is not clear it did
emerge, because such expenditure data has been very little used). We
can see the same absence of much prior model in the design of budgets and
the same lack of concern for any tidy structure. It is replaced rather
by reliance on intuition and the empiricist's confidence that the truth
- will emerge from the data.
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Outline of the Basic Design. The first step in budget design is to
select the type of family. Over the years it has almost always been a
workingman's family of approximately average size,. The CWFB is for a
very specific urban family of four with an employed husband of 38, a
housewife, a boy 13 and a girl 8. The next step is to locate or gather
data on consumption behavior of this type of family. Many of the early
twentieth century budget designers collected data on a small sample of
households, perhaps as much as 800 or 900. The major Federal budgets,
however, used data from the massive household consumption surveys con-
ducted primarily to develop and revise cost of living indices. The
CWFB employed data from several nationwide surveys on special topics as
well.
A scientific criterion in this context is one thought by experiment,
experience or perhaps simply "expert opinion" to permit calculation of
essential levels of items required for physical efficiency.
The budget items are then selected according to whatever convenient
criteria may be found. Most selection processes combine judgmental,
consumerand scientific criteria in their own ways, and- differently for
each category. The items are usually listed and described in great
detail so they may be priced in retail outlets and so that users may
inspect the content and make adjustments for special purposes, adding
or eliminating items. The BLS has designed and published individual
budgets for most major cities and many smaller Ones. The content of
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the various city budgets differ primarily in housing, clothing, food
and transportation and takes into account climatic differences, different-
ials in quality of public transportation, regional preferences for foods,
and the differences in types of available housing. Thus it would not
make much sense to promulgate a national standard for say, multiple-
unit housing and apply it to a major city such as Los Angeles which
contains virtually no such housing, even for the poor. Moreover, if
common national food standards were used, they would be far more expensive
in some areas than others. The budgets for various cities differ, not
only in content but also in prices since the BLS prices them locally.
BLS budgets are the only ones ambitious enough to apply to many
cities. Most other budgets have either involved a very approximate
national standard or, most often, applied simply to one or a few local
areas. This narrow applicability of most budgets to a very limited area
has unquestionably been a factor in the growth and development of the budget
as a social indicator. Until the BLS developed its standard budgets for
many cities, no budgets had a really national audience or user group.
Equivalence Scales. Finally, the BLS has provided equivalence scales for
the CWFB.(62) An equivalence scale is a table
which provides the factors by which to multiply the cost of the standard
four-person family budget in order to get the cost of a presumably
equivalent living level for other family types. The Heller Committee
devised quite different budgets for different family sizes, but the BLS
uses a short-cut solution to estimate these costs. . An equivalence scale
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is an old concept dating back to the nineteenth century surveys and the
scales for equivalent nutritional levels for different ages and sexes.
Each family member was assigned, for example, an Adult Male Equivalent
number, indicating what percentage of an adult male's nutritional needs
he or she required. In any case, the equivalence scale, developed
principally by the BLS for its budgets were very important in that they
multiplied many times the possible uses of the budgets. The scales
made it possible to apply the income adequacy standard of the budgets
to many family types. Accordingly, administrators in public and
private agencies could use budgets almost exclusively for setting
eligibility and benefit levels. The scales gave them a way of comparing
welfare of families of different sizes and incomes, and they used them
also to set sliding fee scales. Thus the equivalence scales have had
a very direct and large financial impact on millions of families.
It is therefore important to be aware of the assumptions and methods
with which they were designed.
BLS derivation of these scales was much influenced by Engel's basic
contention that "The proportion of the outgo used for food, other things
being equal, is the best measure of the national standard of living of a
population."(p.214) In fact this idea seems to permeate thought about
consumption behavior as it reappears in many contexts and forms. In
any case the assumption that families spending equal proportions of
after-tax income on food have attained equivalent levels of total
consumption underlies the BLS equivalence scale. The proposition,
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however, is not unassailable since it is far easier and relatively
cheaper to get an adequate diet than to get housing that meets public
standards. In fact the latter may not even be accessible to many
families who spend quite a small proportion of their income on food.
This kind of mismatch of assumption and reality is common when we
simply accept ideas like Engel's that may have originated out of a
very different reality. In the nineteenth century, housing took a
relatively much larger percentage of a poor man's budget and food a
much smaller one than today.
The index numbers in the scale were derived on the basis of data
from the 1960-61 Survey of Consumer Expenditures and a formula relating
average food expenditure for the family type, their average money income,
a measure of the usual relation of food expenditures to income for the
family type and the income elasticity of food expenditures. (63)
While it would be tedious to analyze all the technical questions in
this formulation in the present context, we should note that it is
basically a statistical smoothing process. As such there are some
groups for whom at the extremities of the distribution the scale is
probably quite far off. The BLS notes, for example, that the figure
used for elasticity of food expenditures with respect to income (1/2)
was furthest off for the highest income classes and one-person
families. Moreover, the user of these scales as a way of
comparing utility for money between family types must not only ignore
individual differences, but also accept that Engelian "law" that says
food expenditures have an essentially firm, predictable relationship
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to other necessary ones.
Selection of Budget Quantities: The "Scientific" Approach. For several
consumption categories, budget designers usually use what they would term
a "scientific" approach, larded with heavy doses of judgment, usually by
professionals, to select budget items. That is, they felt there was a
need in some physical sense and that there is some absolute way of
defining how to fill it. The reasoning may or may not be scientific
in the sense that it depends on well-established evidence; on the
contrary, there may be a lot of guesswork involved. But the under-
lying principle remains that for certain consumption items there is a
desirable level that may be determined on a priori grounds by evidence
apart from actual preferences. Of course even these items in most
budgets and in our example of the CWFB, are not limited to the physical
efficiency level, but provide considerably more. The excess is
usually the result of some implicit or explicit consumer-based criterion.
The nutrient standards in the CWFB are the official ones promulgated
by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Research Council.
Department of Agriculture home economists have translated these
standards into specific food plans at several different cost levels.
The BLS chose for this budget their moderate cost plan, and modified it
by data from the nationwide USDA Household Food Consumption Survey.
They selected out of this food plan the items actually used in various
regions by families in the income class containing the median income. (64)
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They also devised weights for the food items on the basis of the same
consumption patterns.
The result of this process is a hybrid sort of a standard. It is
not a minimum cost or most effective way of achieving good nutrition.
If nutrition were the only value involved, the diet would probably be
50% soybeans. So meeting the scientific standards is only part of
the criterion. The modifications made for consumer preferences still
do not make the food plan realistic. Families with even the moderate
budget level income do not all eat nutritionally adequate diets - much
less the same diets prescribed by home economists. It is not even clear
that they could, if they wanted to, calculate out the requirements the
way a home economist does. The result is probably a measure of a
socially defined norm, though not one actually practiced.
The idea that food needs may be determined scientifically goes
back in great part to the efforts of W. 0. Atwater. The caloric
standards he devised for various kinds of people have not much changed
since his analyses in the last 25 years of the nineteenth century.
Wright and others used Lhem to evaluate the adequacy of diets and
budget designers like Chapin in his 1907 Budget for New York
incorporated the cost of meeting these needs routinely into budgets.
While today we know about vitamins and the need for balance in diets,
the principles for food selection are not very different. The BLS
mill-worker's budget, for example, contained adequate nutrition as
expressed by a local prison diet, and modified for non-prison customs.
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For instance, the BLS added meat for dinner to the diet because local
workmen would normally have it. Thus they used a professionally
designed diet, which they checked for the general nutritional standard
and modified for actual preferences.
The housing standard too is a similar blend of absolute, judgmental
and consumer standards. The "scientific" element is provided by "official"
standards of public groups, the American Public Health Association and
the U.S. Public Housing Administration. It called for, among other
things, an unfurnished five-room unit, in sound condition with a private
bath, hot and cold water, access to public transportation, stores, and
play-space for children, in a hazard-free residential area. The price
was determined by getting the average rent for the middle third of the
distribution of rents for actual housing fitting these requirements in
the area. In many cases this procedure may produce an unrealistic
result in the sense that "standard" housing may be such a small percent-
age of total housing that it does not represent usual or even common
practice. Since the standard represents a norm, or consumption goal,
rather than a practice, the unreality may not be an issue. The food
standard was not realistic either, in that it did not represent real
practice, but was a combination of ideal and actual, likd the housing
standard.
The process for designing the standard is very complex. Before
the 1950's, the standard was less difficult to design since it was
simply the rent for housing fitting the requirements. But after the
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War, such a large percentage of families owned their own homes that BLS
analysts felt a budget which did not account for this was too unrealistic.
in other words, they were applying consumption-based criteria at this
point. In 1959 the major obstacle to making what they would call a
complete revision of the CWFB rather than the "Interim" version they
did make, was this problem of defining home owner standards. Ultimately
the standard represented a typical, perhaps, but nonetheless somewhat
arbitrarily chosen situation. The assumption was that the family had
purchased a home seven years previously and had a 15-year mortgage,
representing 75% of the purchase price. The final housing cost given
in the budget was a weighted average of homeowner and renter costs
based on actual percentages of each in the population of budget-type
families. Once again the result was a standard at most based on a
small subgroup of the population and ultimately unlike the practice or
ideal of any one. Nor is the result an average or some familiar way
of summing up a distribution. Rather the standard combines selectivity,
averaging and arbitrariness.
Selection of Budget Quantities: Consumption-Based Approach. For
consumption categories where absolute standards are not readily '
imaginable, most budgets used some kind of criterion derived from
actual behavior of the appropriate group, as usual combined with
elements of judgment and the arbitrary. Until the original CWFB in
1946, a method was not standardized. Rather budgets used a wide
variety of ad hoc methods. However, at that time Dorothy Brady
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developed a way of routinely analyzing consumption data to determine
quantities (65) The method was used in about one-third of the items
in the 1966 CWFB, including such categories as clothing, house-
furnishings, reading, recreation and meals away from home.
The procedure involved the examination of expenditures in various
categories by families of the range of income groups. Like Engel's
laws it depended on successive comparisons of proportions of income
spent for various categories of items and on the idea that these
proportions provided indices of how well family needs were being
fulfilled. The data Ms. Brady analyzed from the 1934-36 expenditure
surveys showed that families of the budget type tended to buy larger
quantities of items in a consumption category as their income was
higher. The quantities increased first at an increasing, then at
a decreasing rate of change relative to income. She then took the
elasticity of expenditures with respect to income in this
relationship and plotted them against income. The BLS took as the
budget quantity the number of items purchased by those with incomes
corresponding to the point of maximum elasticity on this bell-shaped
income-elasticity curve.
This way of manipulating the data is largely for the convenience
of the mathematical formulation which permits a consistent way of
choosing a point. It does not fit into any larger theory or
mathematical model. In fact, it is only the flimsiest of models
itself. That is, the point of maximum elasticity does represent, at
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least in some sense, a point where the intensity of demand for a class
of consumption is declining. It represent this in the terms that
Engel posed in that this elasticity is a measure of the propensity to
spend an increasing proportion of total income on a particular
consumption group as income increases. The point chosen is where
this proportion just starts to decline.
It should be noted that the use of the method, even to produce
this limited conclusion, depends on several other assumptions. First,
the consumption categories must be meaningful groups between which
people do not make important tradeoffs. Secondly, all income groups
must be op-erating by common consumption aspirations since the data
comes from the whole income distribution. Thirdly, the popular norm
must consist in first reaching some target quantity of goods before
using additional income to upgrade the quality. Finally, it assumes a
common hierarchy of needs such that a family will satisfy one before
it begins on the next in earnest. Thus all families will satisfy
food needs first, probably shelter and fuel second, and clothing third,
and so on for other consumption categories.
The BLS has been able to check partially these assumptions and
they are not completely satisfactory. The marginal problems with
the consumption categories are not trivial, particularly for the
many items which serve double functions, such as, for example, sports
clothes, which serve as clothing and recreation. It is unclear that
division by function provides an unambiguous role in modern complex
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society, though it may well have done so in the near-subsistence
economy of the turn of the century industrial worker. The common
consumption standard idea seemed correct because there were no
important breaks in trend of consumption patterns in relation to
income, nor major differences due to other factors than locality.
However, information on the nature of goods purchased was not detailed
enough to prove there was no difference in, say, type of clothes or
books purchased. Thus the assumption about increasing quantity
before quality was not well established. As for the hierarchy of
needs, this clearly goes back to the pervasive hypotheses of Engel,
but again the data does not clearly establish such a-hierarchy.
It seems likely, however, that families would fill needs not only in
relation to some internal hierarchy but also to the array of costs
confronting them and to the way they maximize their own benefit for the
least cost.
Summary of Design Issues
This glimpse into the design process of the BLS moderate level
standard budget should help clarify the nature of the complexity and
ambiguity in the indicator. This should illustrate what it means to
say it is put together using a closely interlocked combination of
criteria and objectives. In the final indicator the ideal is blended
with the actual,relative standards with absolute, scientific criteria
with consumers' preferences, and pragmatic or arbitrary choices with
self-serving professional standards.
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The goals of the indicator are the measurement of needs for health,
social participation, nurture of children and other such broad concepts.
They have no universally understood or precise meaning, and the budget
designers present only the most meager of models relating the goals to
measurable phenomena. Therefore the theory behind the budget is
obscure and vague, if indeed it can be called a theory. The result of
the way the budget is designed is that it is difficult to interpret
and use appropriately. Certainly the conceptual problems raised by
its design have been a principle obstacle to the acceptance, wide
utilization, and even institutionalization of the standard budgets.
It is not clear whether any general income adequacy criterion could
have been widely acceptable. The topic is a controversial one on
which there are many opinions and possible criteria for index design
such as absolute need on relative status. The reason the standard
budgets have become as popular as they have may be the same as the
reasons they have never been fully successful - because they both
obscure and partially account for the controversial factors.
Values Implicit in Budgets
All the standard budgets over the years, including the CWFB,
incorporate in them values and perceptions of society in ways that are
obviouslike the choice of budget items and others that are more subtle.
Some of these ingredients have been introduced by default or the need
to make some decision, however arbitrary. These often hidden elements
can make of the indicator something unpredictable, politically charged
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and controversial and can impede its wide use. An indicator requires
a common acceptance among users if it is to facilitate rather than
impede discussion. In fact it needs acceptance in quite a few different
views for almost any public purpose. The more value judgments an
indicator contains and the less consensus on them, the less likely
it is to be used. The standard budget has a relatively large value
component which has been an obstacle to its use.
The unemployment indicator also contained value judgments, but
they were fewer, more explicit and most represent a clearer political
consensus. Both indicators suffer, however, from the fact that
certain values and models were incorporated into the original measure
which have not changed over time, but rather have become increasingly
unsuited to current views of problems. Although many aspects of both
measures changed with the times, the changes tend to lag behind
perceptions and the basic framework of the indicator tends to have a
kind of permanence, though perhaps it should not.
The value elements enter not only, as we have described,
in the selection of budget items and the design of equivalence scales,
but also in a number of other ways. Notably, all the budgets have
been influenced by the design and structure of the expenditure surveys
and the values or conceptions implicit in them. They have also been
affected by the changing society and values around them over the
years. They tend to reflect the times in which they were created.
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Expenditure Surveys Set Patterns. The questions, categories and ways
of tabulating information in expenditure surveys have shaped and
limited budget design. This is true for virtually all budgets, not
just BLS budgets like the CWFB. Even those which use little
expenditure data or designed their own special surveys were influenced
by the patterns established in the nineteenth century expenditure
surveys. The empiricist designers of these surveys made decisions
about how to categorize and present information and on what to focus
attention. These have persisted throughout the years for analysts
of family budgets. The consumption categories devised almost a
hundred years ago provide the cornerstone to budget design today,
though it is not clear they are the most appropriate ones.
The most significant element of the budget that dates from these
early days is the choice of family type. This was to be a source of
considerable controversy throughout the years in its use for wage
setting. Today the BLS has recognized the budget for the single
family group as inadequate. The budget type family until the 1960's
has predominantly been that of a blue-collar, or low-salary urban
worker with a family of approximately average size. The family was
not average, nor necessarily even the model family and it usually
represented perhaps twenty percent of the population and the group was
even smaller if you include the limitation that for most budgets the
children were under working age. In any case the budget family was
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not the elderly couple, the extended or large family, the young couple,
single woman, or female-headed family, all of whom are more likely to
have financial problems than the chosen "standard" family. Though
over the years many states designed budgets for single women to "protect
morals," budgets for the other groups in general had to await the
expansion of social programs in the 60's.
It must be remembered that the early expenditure surveys were
motivated by a desire to evaluate wages. The controversy over the
justice of tariffs in the 1880's was concerned with how well the
typical industrial workman's family could get along on the usual
wages. Therefore data on the families with children, neither too few
nor too many, and income neither too high nor too low, were singled
out for special analysis. By implication the cost of living for this
family type was the fair wage. The items and weights for the cost
of living index from its inception as a food index after the 1901
survey have always been based on the working-class family consumption
patterns. It is this group that the Congress explicitly decided to
be concerned with - and this grcup as well that interested most of the
early budget designers. In any case the habit of mind to think of
the "normal" family was established in the nineteenth century. More-
over the data available for use in budget design was largely that
based on such families.
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More was involved in the focus on the "normal" family than just
a decision on who was the high priority group. It also implied
that it was desirable that a father should be able to support a whole
family. Certainly such studies as the BLS did on mill-worker budgets
(66) explicitly indicated that it was harmful for children to work and
not be able to attend school, and for mothers to be unable to attend
to children. The early budgets did not allow for costs of employment
for other than one breadwinner. Moreover, it was clear that the goal
of most budget uses was and has been over the years to promote the
solid, so-called "average" American family. There were other families
with problems, but public policy and even private concerns until quite
recently focussed on the workingman and his family.
The nature of the budget family was to change slightly over the
years as the result of demographic changes and an altered model of the
origin of living standards. As the number of children in the average
family declined over the years so did the size of the budget family.
It went from as many as four or five children in the earliest budgets
to three children in the BLS 1919 Health and Decency Budget and two in
the Depression and subsequent budgets.
Secondly the massive expenditure surveys of the Depression, for
the first time covering the total population rather than just the
working class, shattered a basic assumption on which budgets had been
founded - that the standards of the working class were different from
those of other population groups - that they aspired to quite different
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life styles. In fact in the description of the 1909 mill-workers
budgets, the BLS indicated they would assume "fair" budgets for
workers would not be fair to executives. Moreover, the BLS devised
different budgets for different ethnic groups! Analysis of the
Depression surveys, not done until the design of the CWFB in 1946,
revealed that there were no major discontinuities in consumer
preferences related to social factors - at least not within the
broad categories on which consumption information was obtained.
The principle determinants of consumption patterns were taken to be
income, climate and region.
Budget Content: A Reflection of Social Structure and Values. The
content of prevailing budgets is the most obvious way in which values
and models of society entered into the budgets (67) The level
and content of the various budgets evolved over the years to reflect
changing societal values and changing structure of the economy and
society. The English budgets of Rowntree and others were close to
mere subsistence level, reflecting as they did a concern for social
reforms to alleviate poverty. The early American budgets in the
first 15 or 20 years of this century were considerably more generous
but still less than average in terms of contemporary standards.
Then during the First World War, as industrial conditions improved
and union became stronger, a new level "comfort" budget was more often
designed. It was this more generous budget that the BLS designed
for setting civil service salaries in 1919. The trend reflected
improved living conditions as well as the fact that policy was focussed
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on the average person rather than the underprivileged. The decline
in budget content in the WPA budgets reflected the straitened conditions
of most of the population at the time and the emergency quality of
relief measures. The higher level CWFB reflected the improved
conditions during the War and the feeling that all should share in
prosperity. Finally the diverse budgets of the 60's reflected the
new concerns for underprivileged groups.
Mingled with the influence of changes in the level of living
society considers desirable are changes in the way society is
organized. It is virtually impossible to disentangle
changes upgrading the standard from changes necessitated by conditions.
Turn-of-the-century budgets contained little or no allowance for
transportation for example. But as cities grew, public transportation
became not only available,but an essential for getting to work. In
1970, a car is essential for many even in the lowest income categories
because of changing residential and industrial location patterns as
well as changing relative prices of cars. Fresh fruit and vegetables,
a luxury in the early twentieth century are necessities in all modern
budgets as transportation improvements make them easier and relatively
cheaper. Heavy indoor clothing has become unnecessary with the
advent of central heat, but a greater variety and better quality
becomes necessary as workers move to white-collar jobs and feasible
with the advent of synthetic fibers and modern marketing techniques.
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The shortening work week suddenly makes leisure time an expense as well
as an opportunity so that recreation has taken an increasing proportion
of the budget in recent years, in short, changing technology, relative
prices, geographical patterns and dominant life and work styles, make
different consumption choices over time not only the desirable ones
but often the only rational ones.
Then too, the categories of consumption so fundamental to the design
of budgets since all analysis is done within them, represent a subtle
way in which models and values creep into the budget. The number of
categories increased as life grew more complicated, but the original
ones remain along with the principle of dividing consumption instead
of studying it as a whole, and dividing it by function. The
categories were established by empiricists who applied no model and
had little concept of their future uses. They were primarily
concerned with recording the data in a comprehensive way. Yet
these categories have persisted though a quite different set of
categories might well suit today's purposes better. For example
to group all things worn as clothing and all travel as undifferentiated
transportation may not be as meaningful as differentiating work and
leisure expenses.
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The Final Product: A Standard Budget
The indicator which results from this combination of concepts and
methods is a norm for adequate incomes which, virtually by definition,
will define a goal of public action if it were used and accepted.
The concepts and methods involved in its design, and the fact that it
is inherently normative, have proved a considerable obstacle to its
use and acceptance, as the next section will suggest.
The vaguely defined concept a budget is intended to represent
and the sketchiness of the model for its measurement leave large areas
of its design open to individual judgment and guesswork or simply
arbitrary decisions. Most budgets are supposed to measure socially
defined norms for what families should be able to have. As we can
only inquire about the norms indirectly with our sketchy model, and
as we have no other measure than the budget against which to validate
the result, it is difficult to establish general confidence in the
indicator. Moreover, there is no general consensus on the precise
specification of the making of the concept which might guide the
experts or provide confidence in the result. In fact, unlike unemploy-
ment, the idea is not in common parlance at all.
Largely because of their basic vagueness, standard budgets
contain particularly large elements of value judgment and some
important but not well founded, assumptions about behavior, public
values, and the nature of social standards. Moreover, with the large
judgmental element and ad hoc methods applied in different ways to
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each element of the budget it, not surprisingly, turns out that several
views or dimensions of income adequacy are collapsed into the measure
so they cannot be disentangled. So it is too with measurement
criteria, which are so thoroughly mixed that it is difficult to
evaluate any single budge element on the basis of the method employed.
Standard budgets, then, are hybrid measures, difficult to under-
stand, in which the objective and subjective are mingled, in which
actual standards are combined with ideal and absolute with relative
ones. They are highly specific in applicability to time, place, and
type of family and yet no budget applies to any particular family.
A budget is not an average nor a guideline to "good" consumption.
Rather,it partakes of all these elements to some imperfectly specified
degree. Because the indicator is a directly normative level rather
than a scale like unemployment, these conceptual ambiguities and
value judgments presents tremendous obstacles to its wide use.
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CHAPTER V
USES AND NONUSES: LONGEVITY WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE
From the first standard budget in 1901 down to the present, count-
less agencies and groups have used budgets in a wide variety of ways.
Nonetheless, the indicator itself has never been accepted the way the
unemployment rate has, with little doubt about its methods, assumptions
or the appropriateness of the basic concept. On the contrary, when
a person or group uses a budget as evidence in an argument or applies
it to some situation,someone else frequently objects. The latter
frequently does not understand it, trust its hidden value judgments or
accepts its assumptions as appropriate to the use.
There has been a clear, steady demand over the years for a
measure of income adequacy, and budgets have usually been the only
measure introduced to fill the gap. Sometimes the criterion they
provide has been the basis of action, but frequently other income
criteria come into play and sometimes income adequacy as a goal altogether
disappears. Sometimes the indicator itself is the focus of controversy,
as its acceptance may define the type or level of action.- Certainly
its use may decide the crucial issue of distribution and level of
benefits - who gets how much.
The specifity of the budgets, their complexity and the difficulty
of understanding them was to give them a quite different set of uses
and users than the unemployment data. National aggregate figures like
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unemployment are relatively easy to apply and understand. Moreover,
the same data can be pertinent to a nationwide audience of the general
public as well as to many specialists. The budgets, however, are
difficult to apply or interpret in particular situations, and most
have had limited applicability in any case to a few family situations
and specific localities. Accordingly, the uses and users have been
widely separ4ted, with focus on quite different budgets and little
communication between them. Only recent events have even begun to
bring the budgets into the public eyebut still only a small "expert"
group understands them. The result is that the users never were to
form themselves into pressure groups that might defend, scrutinize or
press for improvements in the indicator and its methods.
Notable by its absence in this account is the use of budgets in
analysis of economic or social issues. At most a budget may be used
as an approximate income line for identifying population groups. But as
it does not represent a clearly definable variable, it does not fit
easily into the models social scientists may design. It is difficult to
relate changes in a variable on which so many factors may operate to
changes in some other variable. This failing of the indicator, due
largely to the lack of theory that went into its design, appears to
have important consequences for its use. Since it cannot be used in
theory, it is difficult to use in policy analysis, which also requires
models of social or economic change. Moreover, the failure of the
theoreticians to support it or attempt to solve or obviate its
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methodological and conceptual problems may mean the budgets will never
meet the tests of relevance and rigor that would make them widely
acceptable.
Contexts of Use
Budgets appear in most of the arenas of social planning and action -
policy discussion, program design, administrative operation, advocacy
proceedings and academic research. They appear in some contexts,
however, more frequently than others and are better suited to some than
others. Moreover, uses in each context are associated with different
audiences, expertise, and controversies. The diversity of uses is far
greater than for unemployment rates, which are largely confined to
program and policy discussion. However, sheer number of uses does not
seem to be the key to institutionalization of the indicator. In fact
the policy and program level use may be the really important ingredient.
Policy Discussion. Though many issues of public policy involve object-
ives of income adequacy, budgets have emerged only infrequently and
sporadically in policy discussion. There are two reasons for this fact,
the first of which is the difficulty of applying budgets to a population.
The second lies in the large element of value judgment in the budget,
combined with the obscurity of the methods. Policy discussion is
centrally concerned with values and cannot gloss over them as easily as
some other types of discussion. For budgets to be useful in policy
analysis, representatives of different views must recognize and agree
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on the inherent value judgment. This is seldom possible, as they are
many and hidden.
A policy is a broad statement of intention and objective. It may
also include a strategy for achieving the goals. It differs from a
program, which also has an objective and a methodology, in that a policy
considers the whole system rather than a limited subset of it. (68)
It sets system goals like the increase of social and economic mobility
in the population, and it might also say that increasing availability
of education was a good way to accomplish this. A program sets more
limited goals and more specific methods, tactics rather than strategy.
Its design may ignore systemwide consequences which can be contrary to
the program's immediate objectives. A program is the result of a
policy, or it should be. One program that might grow out of the
mobility policy could be a college scholarship program. The goal
would be a number of college graduates of a certain type. This
achievement might or might not further the goal of mobility, depending
on whether the graduates would have attended college anyway. Only
policy criteria permit analysis of the latter type of issue.
At the policy level, the use of budgets as income adequacy guides
present some complications. First, policy discussion, particularly
that pertinent to income adequacy, is generally carried on at the state
or national level. If an analyst wishes to use the budget criterion
to count or identify people or groups in the population whose incomes
are low, a great deal of data is required - more than has been available
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on a large scale until quite recently. In particular,data is
required on family incomes by 'family size because budgets are so
specific in nature. Moreover, until equivalence scales were issued
with the 1946 CWFB, it was impossible to classify the vast majority of
households at all with the budget criterion. It simply did not apply
to other than a four or five-person family.
Secondly, policy discussion involves the setting of priorities and
the definition of goals. As suchbasic values come into play, indeed
into conflict. Moreover, the discussants of policy are very largely
laymen - not experts in statistics, consumption analysis, or budgets -
Congressmen, high-level administrators, journalists, the general public,
large business and labor groups. This combination means that budgets
are frequently not accepted as bases for decisions. The hidden and
explicit values and the mysteries of their design make them suspect to
almost all, particularly those who do not like the result - the income
level they define, or the people they identify as likely beneficiaries
of policies. As a result, though budgets are frequently offered in
policy discussion, they are seldom decision criteria. Instead the
goal of income adequacy often recedes.
An indicator which is used and accepted in important national
policy can develop a wide, strong backing from the powerful groups that
depend on its value, just as did the unemployment indicators. Its
permanent existence may be written into law at this level and its
continued scrutiny guaranteed the way the Employment Act guaranteed it
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for unemployment data. We have never established a general policy
of income adequacy with accompanying mechanisms to carry it out as we
did for employment. However, recent efforts to reform welfare are
tending in the direction of such a policy. If it is established, the
indicator which makes the programs go may quite possibly be a standard
budget - though perhaps with many changes and considerably more wide-
spread understanding of the concept and methods.
Program Design. Budget use at the program design level does not have
very different meanings or implications than its policy use. Indeed both
are part of a single continuum in which policy goals are supposedly
expressed in more detail at the program level, though of course elements
may get lost and others intrude in the translation. A program does
depend on a model. That is, the translation of a policy to promote
equal opportunity via education with a program which provides specific
benefits in a particular format depends on one's model of how education
actually does affect opportunity, one's definition of opportunity, and
onels model of society and how it is now working. For example, one
can promote social, economic, or racial integration at various education-
al levels, or provide assistance to groups for education at one or
another level, one can try to change the nature of education.
Budgets enter in at the program design level in several ways.
The criteria may help to count the numbers who will use the program;
they may also define eligibility limits for benefits or identify the
groups so that specific measures directed at them may be designed.
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Often the same people design programs and policies,but the general public
may be less aware of these more detailed considerations. They may be
a level or so removed from.the public figures who argue policy issues.
The detail of program design may be of less interest to the public and
be less understood than broad policy questions. Many of the important
value decisions have been made once the policy is set and people turn
their attention elsewhere before programs are designed to carry it out.
Unemployment rates have some role in program design in triggering
benefits in areas of substantial unemployment (though the rate is
figured slightly differently from the national one). But the
unemployment indicator is an aggregate figure and not particularly
pertinent to program design.
Administrative Uses. A common but less interesting use of budgets is
in the administration of social programs. Again we should note that
we are drawing an arbitrary line in a continuum of social decision-
making, here between program design and administration, or the actual
carrying out of the program. Administrative actions may amount to
further specification of the details of a program. However, they are
less public than the program design we have been discussing so far.
Administrative decisions usually are taken without any effort to
achieve public consensus or even to inform the public. They may or
may not carry out program designers' intentions; they may fill in
fuzzy areas where intentions were not obvious. Thus administrative
procedures are a separate form of program definition - they occur in
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a different way and according to different criteria, and with different
authors than the ones we have been discussing so far,
The administrators using budgets may be the personnel of public or
private social agencies or programs, or managers of businesses. The
decisions they make about benefits, payments, fees, and wages have
tremendous impact on the lives and pocket books of many individuals.
The administrators may use the criterion of a budget to establish
general guidelines or to distinguish among individuals. The develop-
ment of the equivalence scale greatly expanded this use. Administrative
uses are extensive but, at this level of decision, little is documented
or discussed. Usually only the individual affected is aware of what is
happening - and even he does not know what the reasoning is behind the
decisions.
Administrators may be in a position to understand and use the
budgets more appropriately than others busy with -discussion of broad
issues and requiring a handy index. They may analyze the budgets,
perhaps alter them to suit their requirements. The budgets are very
specific,and administrators have narrower populations to deal with than
policy-makers and can potentially apply budgets to the correct groups.
They are inclined to use a standard budget because it gives their
decisions an air of impartiality to be based on a standardized measure-
ment. However, when administrators use them as a specific standard to
apply to individuals, as they often do, they are misusing the indicator.
The standard never was designed to be realistic,and it represents only
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a very approximate norm, at best, so its precise level cannot justifiably
be applied rigorously to an individual.
Advocacy Uses. The budgets have also been used as evidence or leverage
in arguing cases. Unions have been the principal such users in wage
disputes. The budgets are in some respects not unsuited to this purpose
because their value judgments and specific applicability may coincide
with those of the advocate. As partisan tools, however, they are
regarded with suspicion by the opposition, and therefore the users try
to make the budgets appear to be nonpolitical, objective measures.
Unfortunately for the specific purpose of wage discussion budgets have
a basic flaw which hampers their suitability - which will be discussed
later (p. 304). Other groups besides unions, such as the National
Welfare Rights Organization, have occasionally used budgets as well
to argue their cases.
Research Use. This use has been very infrequent, and principally
confined to setting broad and other arbitrary income criteria for
dividing up or analyzing a population. (69) As we have noted, budgets
do not represent a clear, single variable which would fit into an
analytic model of social change. Nor have people much studied the
budgets themselves and changes in them for similar reasons. They are
affected by so many influences and chance elements that the effort seems
fruitless.
The impact of this relatively small research component in the use
of budgets was that few academics were interested in them. Accordingly,
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few understood them, supported their publication and use, explained
them to laymen or did research to improve them. Since they were not
part of models, there was no self-generating demand for the data from
the research community. Moreover, this meant there was less chance of
devising policies which would use budget data. Many policies for
unemployment, for example, were derived from the theories that were
currently in vogue employing the concept. Unemployment rates, then,
were to have a singular advantage over budgets in that their simplicity
made them much more attractive to researchers.
Types of Use
Within these contexts budgets are used in several ways. First,
and most simply, they provide an income criterion which one can apply
to actual incomes to count the number below the standard. This
requires an equivalence scale to translate the income into that needed
for different family sizes and data on incomes by family size. Without
such data the budgets are sometimes used as a very approximate criterion
for judging the magnitude of a problem. A sequel to this is the use of
budgets to identify and characterize target groups. The data on family
size and income is essential here because glossing over the differences
would defeat the purpose. Information on other social or economic
characteristics of families correlated with size-and income would be
necessary to characterize the groups. So this use demands greater
accuracy and more information than the first.
294
The budget may be the criterion to identify individuals who are
eligible for some benefit or to determine the level of benefit they
should receive. While it is unclear what standard might be a better one
to apply, the budget standard is not conceptually suited to this. As
we have noted, the budget is an artifact, not representing any actual
behavior, and many elements are formed by weighted averages of tro
disparate consumption patterns. Of course, one can look at the
detail in the budgets' design and make changes so that it does approximate
a standard applicable to the group in question. However, the lack of
precision in the design process, the guesswork and the approximate nature
of equivalence scales to make the use of budgets to set absolute income
cutoffs on which to make decisions about individuals is a dubious
proposition.
The budgets may also determine adequate income levels for benefits,
or to calculate program costs. They are also used for two kinds of
comparisons. One is between living levels among families of different
sizes, as we discussed in connection with equivalence scales. Of
course, the indicator and scales only give us cutoff incomes of
equivalent welfare families of different sizes. We cannot make
comparisons at other points, particularly since the utility for an
increment of money changes in relation to the amount one has.
Secondly, the budget is used to compare living costs in different
cities. One cannot apply a cost-of-living index to the problem
since its value in one city at one time can only be compared with its
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value at some other time, not with some other city. It is a measure
of change not an absolute level. Moreover, an intercity index,
measuring relative costs on the same principle has so far not been
feasible because it would require a common market basket. Quite
different market baskets make sense in different cities and important
items in one city may even be unavailable in another. In any case,
a principal factor in differential living costs between cities lies,
not in the different costs of the same items,. but in the different
choices one must make because of such things as climate or availability
of transportation. While the budgets are designed according to some
judgmental methods and thus may vary according to some irrelevant
factors, they still provide the best comparative measure for living
costs in various cities because they take into account local require-
-ments.
Purposes of Budget Use
Budgets have been applied almost entirely in connection with one
of two fundamental kinds of concerns - wages and welfare. The wage
questions include labor-management disputes, as well as unilateral
management decisions and situations where government action affects wages.
"Welfare" is here defined broadly to include public and private activities,
of which the primary purpose is to provide payments or services to needy
individuals,
In these two areas budgets have been applied in a variety of
ways and at all levels, from broad policy analysis to the most routine
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administrative decision. But clearly the budgets have a rather differ-
ent role to play in each area, as the values involved are different.
Welfare questions involve principally adequacy of benefit and tend to
focus on the deprived groups. Wage issues involve not only adequacy
but also fair payment for work done, and focus on the average family.
Budgets turn out to be appropriate and inappropriate in different ways
for welfare and wage issues. Sometimes the budget indicator has been
the decisive criterion, particularly at the administrative level, and
frequently it has been at least one important input to decisions.
However, it has often failed to be accepted at important moments as
a criterion.
Equity Issues: Budgets and Comparative Welfare
Within wage and, particularly, welfare questions as well as a few
others, a principal issue has to do with equity. The term "equity"
implies the distribution of benefits or burdens according to a fair
criterion. Budgets have entered into the analysis when the goal is
for families to have equivalent living levels. In many contexts the
view is that some families should not sacrifice or gain more than others
in terms of potential living level as a result of the decisions.
A simple income criterion is thus unsatisfactory as it does not bear
any necessary relation to how well one can live. There are many
kinds of factors affecting the welfare level achievable for a given
family from a given income. Family size and local living costs and
styles are important factors for which the budget indicator does account
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in conjunction with equivalence scales.
Therefore, budget criteria were frequently applied to questions of
equity, particularly in program design and administrative decisions.
Some criticisms have been voiced of this budget use,, but the users
seldom appeared to recognize and question the assumptions behind the
equivalence scale. Nor have they introduced what seems the most
obvious objection - that individual welfare levels are ultimately too
complex and subjective to be truly comparable. Users either do not
recognize or simply accept that the only adjustments to be made in
accounting for the welfare potential of an income to a particular
family is its size and location. This approach excludes a good many
other factors which surely affect the satisfaction from income such
as health, occupation or ethnic background and customs. Of course
the budget criterion provides only presumably equivalent cutoff levels
for different familes. It does not attempt to compare welfare at
other points on a scale.
Planning A. Tax Program. The one important exception to the budget's
principal use in the analysis of wage and welfare problems is its role
in the planning of equitable taxation programs. Congress authorized
the original City Worker Family Budget to provide a way of evaluating
post-war tax reform proposals. In fact, it was used by the Treasury
Department in testimony (70) and the report it prepared for Congress
(71) as Congress had intended. The report used budgets to evaluate
proposals for levels of income tax exemptions and deductions. It used
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the CWFB, and higher level Heller Committee budgets for single persons
and families as well as Heller maintenance level budgets. The
Department's analysis also added "breakeven" levels derived from the
1944 Consumer Expenditure Survey. To adjust for family size they used
BLS Equivalence Scales. The purpose was to establish criteria for
determining at what point income should begin to be- taxable and what
size deductions for dependents should be. It required choosing a
particular welfare level in quantitative terms as the exemption level
and defining income levels providing equivalent welfare for families
of various sizes to estimate equitable deductions for dependents.
The idea is not new that a measure of living needs is
pertinent to tax policy. It dates back at least to the Civil War,
when an income tax law was passed with a $600 personal exemption.
The Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue said, "It was,
of course, the purpose of the law to exempt so much of one's income as
was demanded by his actual necessities." (72) In 1920, a British Tax
Commission declared there were three income levels where taxable
capacity might be held to begin: the minimum income necessary for
bare subsistence; the level necessary for health and efficiency;
and an income sufficient to provide conventional comforts and
luxuries of working people. (73) During the Second World War the
Senate Finance Committee and the Administration disagreed on the best
way of raising war revenues. Treasury Secretary Morganthal proposed
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additional income taxes, and the Committee was more inclined toward a
sales tax. The latter used the budget concept to estimate how much
of a $5,000 a year income would go to necessities and thus how much
there would be left for a tax. (74)
In any case, the 1947 Treasury Report used the budgets in some
detail. Applying the Heller Committee dependency budgets, the report
concluded that existing exemptions for 1- and 2-person families were
too low. The report used the CWFB and equivalency scales to compare
exemption levels at various family sizes with budget levels. It
concluded that the largest differences between budget and exemption
level was for families of 2- to 4-persons. It also gave, on the basis
of budgets, an approximate scale of income needs for equivalent living
standards for families of various sizes.
Treasury analysts were not well satisfied with the data. In
the House hearings they cited its inadequacy for low income groups.
They said the data on higher income families was inadequate to justify
choice among alternative proposals because it pertained only to
California. They clearly did not feel the data provided the decisive
criteria, using it perhaps only because Congress had directed them to
do so. Certainly the vast majority of their report and virtually all
of the hearings were concerned with other matters. Interestingly
enough, the tax analysts seemed critical of the budgets largely because
there were not enough of them to apply to the range of population.
They made no comment about the appropriateness of concepts or methods.
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In fact, pressure for indicators to use in tax analyses was one of the
reasons for the development of the higher level budgets in 1967.
Administrative Decisions and Equity. Most of the budget uses to
determine equity questions were more at an administrative than program
design level. These were less often questioned,though, in their own
way, no less influential. Administrators tend to want a convenient
criterion which will permit them to proceed with their primary job of
carrying out a program with a minimum of argument and criticism.
A budget is relatively easy to apply to an individual family with the
aid of an equivalence scale. The administrator can claim it is
objective because it is a criterion devised by someone other than him-
self. In one sense these budget uses were the most careful and thought-
ful of any in that administrators usually understood and used the budgets
in full detail and were aware of their characteristics, like specificity
to family type. In another sense, administrative decisions are made
and the limited role of administrators discouraged discussion of basic
values or assumptions. If administrators are aware of the possible
problems of budget use, there is little documentation of it.
In business and in government, budgets have been used to set wage
differentials between cities or regions where the goal was to provide
equivalent living levels.to workers. The WPA designed and priced
their budgets in 59 cities to set not only levels, but also intercity
differentials in the wages it paid its employees.
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The objective of WPA work was to provide some emergency level of support
through work for as many families as possible. The purpose would be
defeated if families could not maintain themselves on the wages, but
if the wages were too high, then fewer could be supported. Thus the
WPA objective was an index to regional differences.
Business too used budgets for measuring interarea living costs
for wage and salary setting. Until recently they were dissatisfied
with only the CWFB or WPA figures for various areas and sometimes
designed their own, higher level budgets. Their principle purpose
with budgets was to make decisions on plant relocation and salary
differentials for executives who move. It is in their interest to
see that their personnel are willing to make the moves. This use
of budgets as an intercity living cost index has apparently been
important to business management, as it has supported the budget
statistics primarily for this purpose of making this kind of comparison.
They also encouraged BLS development of a higher level budget in 1967.
Their support has been lukewarm, however, and erratic in view of some
other budget uses they did not favor, in wage negotiation.
Administrators use budgets extensively to establish sliding fee
and benefit scales, according to family income and size. Voluntary
agencies provide many services to families who might not otherwise
afford them, but are not impoverished. In the interest of equitable
distribution of limited funds, they normally charge a fee for services
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whose size is determined by. the family's ability to pay. Budgets,
particularly the moderate level ones like the CWFB, have been the
agencies' traditional tool for determining ability to pay. Moreover,
the agencies sometimes use budgets to guide in counseling families
about spending.
Voluntary agencies have found the budgets so essential to their
work that many have designed their own (based on BLS budgets) to account
for local requirements and spending patterns, (75) Personnel of these
agencies are among the strongest supporters of the budget indicator.
At the administrative level, too, benefits are often dispensed
according to a formula based on budget data, as at least one of several
criteria. Differentials in welfare payments to families of various
sizes are usually the product of budgetary analyses. In fact, many
state welfare agencies have designed their own maintenance level
standard budgets for this very purpose. They use them not only to
determine what payment levels to make, but also what the specific needs
of individual families are in terms of consumption goods. College
scholarships are another important category of benefits dispensed
according to scales derived from budgets and dependent on family size
and income.
We should note here, however, that budgets are not a universally
accepted criterion for designing sliding income scales, though they are
the most common. They are not used in a good many important situations,
such as eligibility for public housing. The criterion often applied
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is that the family must have an income equal to a multiple, somewhere
between three and four times the rent for the apartment. The idea is
related to the budgets and to Engel's laws, but nonetheless, it does not
involve a budget directly.
Policy Discussion of Equity. The use of budgets to determine equity
issues at the policy level of discussion is increasingly likely as the
- government expands its social responsibilities into ever-widening areas.
There is growing discussion of new kinds of programs. They would neither
focus solely on the needy, like welfare, nor be free to all, like educa-
tion. Rather they would be dispensed in graduated fashion or paid for to
varying degrees by recipients, according to some formula.
The discussion of sliding scales and, possibly, budgets emerges into
the policy arena as we try to determine whether certain kinds of programs
are feasible and what broad principles we should set for distribution of
benefits. Social scientists have increasingly noted that free or low-
tuition universities benefit the well-to-do who could afford other
universities. They use up places, while private universities fail for
lack of students. A basic policy decision that may have wide impact in
the coming years is whether to raise tuitions generally to pay increas-
ing costs or to change to a sliding tuition scale based on income, as
Governor Sargent recently suggested for Massachusetts.
Day care is another type of government service on which the
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principles of distribution are still being discussed at high levels.
Since it is too expensive for a large percentage of families, in fairly
large income ranges, it seems likely that sliding fee scales will be
part of day care services. The decision, which will amost certainly
involve budgets, will determine much of the nature and philosophy of
any new program.
Budgets in the Determination of Wage Adequacy
The earliest budgets were designed to assess wage adequacy -
indeed, the first expenditure surveys a half century earlier were
motivated by the same concern. Budgets continue to be used for this
purpose right down to the present, though this use has been controversial.
The problem is that budgets relate adequacy to family size, whereas
wages are paid according-to type and quantity of work. The use of
a budget to define wage levels also requires the assumptions that only
one family member works and that the budget family size is typical, at
least of the worker whose wages are in dispute. More than that, it
presumes the judgments that wages should be adequate to support a family
of certain size or at a certain stage in the life cycle and that there
should not have to be more than one breadwinner. Disagreements over
these assumptions have continued to crop up throughout the years. (76)
In spite of these defects, budgets have continued to play a role in
the settlement of wage disputes. Their role, however, is not notable
in direct labor-management negotiation, though sometimes unions offer
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budgets to support their arguments. These disputes are predominantly
determined by a test of power. However, when an arbitration board
or an official government agency must make wage decisions, it cannot
usually respond directly to political pressure, They prefer to refer
to some social values in making their decisions. A measure of income
adequacy,~like a budget, can be a useful way of making or publicly
justifying a decision. Although such groups have seldom been well
satisfied with the budgets, the budget at least gives the appearance of
objectivity and has the advantage that it is designed by some uninvolved
group. Such a government board or agency may use the budgets to give
an air of impartiality to their decisions.
Government gets involved in wage decisions usually in one of two
ways. Most obviously government must pay its own employees, and it
has used budgets to determine the wage levels.On a variety of other
occasions government actions have affected the labor market, during war
time, for example, or during the present inflation-unemployment crisis.
Either for justice to workers or reasons of national defense, and the
assurance of uninterrupted production, the Federal government has
considered the issues of adequacy of wages. Finally, more with the
motivation of general welfare and protection of unions, state and
Federal governments have taken an interest in minimum wage levels.
It is in connectionrwith these topics that the principal policy uses of
budgets in connection with wages have occurred, or, in some cases,
failed to occur.
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Budgets in wage determination then are used in a full range of
contexts from advocacy to policy analysis. Many of these are the most
visible and emotionally charged of all uses, and as such develop for
budgets proponents and opponents and arouse and educate the interest
groups, Congress and the public.
Arbitration Boards Use Budgets. The concept of using a budget, though
only a primitive version, to argue a wage dispute made one of its
earliest appearances in 1902 in connection with the Anthracite Coal
Strike. A Presidential Commission was appointed to ajudicate the
dispute and the miners offered the argument that they could not maintain
a "fair standard of life" or the "American standard of living" due to
the recent increases in the cost of living. (77) For proof, they
offered their own data on increases in costs of the "necessities of
life" and pointed out that their children were prematurely forced to
work. The mining companies did not deny the miner's right to the
"American standard of living." Some asserted it was impossible to
measure as so many would assert in later years, and others countered
with their own measurements, like the number of pianos in workers'
homes and the quality of their clothing and housing, which the
companies said was adequate because it was comparable to that of
similar workers.
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Oddly enough, the Commissioners did not attempt to deal with the
argument about living standards. It was odd because the BLS was at
that time tabulating results from its nationwide cost of living survey,
which contained considerable data that would have cast light on the
usual American living patterns. Moreover, BLS Commissioner, Carroll
Wright, was on the Coal Strike Commission. The Commission did use a
measure of increased food costs from the survey to assess increased
total living costs. Why it went no further than that is not clear,
though it seems probable that Wright was reluctant to set up a normative
budget, and perhaps jeopardize his Bureau's reputation for "scientific"
impartiality.
The period from 1902 to the end of World War I was one of intense
pressure on wages. Union activity was increasing, along with bitter
labor-management battles over wages and unionization. The economy
was growing and labor wanted to establish its right to a share in that
growth. The war precipitated inflation, which caused much pressure
for higher wages. The need to keep the economy running smoothly and
producing the necessary defense needs meant there was considerable
incentive to settle labor disputes. Arbitration boards were a
common solution.
The arbitration boards for two street railway disputes were among
the earliest users of budgets for wage criteria. In San Francisci- in
1917, Jessica Peixotto, originator of the Heller Budget series in the
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twenties, prepared and submitted an estimate to the Board of the cost
of a "minimum standard of wholesome living" for a workman's family of
five. The wage dispute between conductors and the company was settled
by the board on the basis of this budget. Similarly, an arbitration
board used budgets designed by employees, the company and finally by
Professor William Ogburn to settle a Seattle street railway wage
dispute. (78) Budgets were used in street railway cases in 1920 and
1921, by the Railroad Labor Board and arbitration commissions for
bituminous coal miners and anthracite coal miners. In most of the
cases the employees produced detailed exhibits on the cost of subsis-
tence and minimum comfort budgets that had recently been designed. (79)
Other considerations prevailed, however, and the budgets were not
decisive. The Railroad Labor Board actually announced a reduction in
wages because it considered, as its enabling act intended, such matters
as decreases in wage scales in other industries and prevailing unemploy-
ment levels. Now that a full cost of living index was available, the
budgets were not the only living cost criteria available,and they played
a lesser role.
Unfortunately, although both employers and workers agreed on the
concept that a living wage should be paid, they could not agree on a
measure and this hampered budget use by arbitration boards. Employees
felt the minimum subsistence budgets offered by employers were too low,
providing only an"animal existence" and employers objected to the
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higher level "comfort" budgets that had begun to appear in 1917 and
1918. They called these "theoretical" budgets based on someone's
view of what a group ought to have rather than what they actuall did
have. (80) The difference in the number of value judgments between
the budgets was not great. The higher budgets were more liberal
largely because of expert judgments about needs. In a way typical
of all moderate level budgets down to the present, they provided a
standard somewhat higher than that actually enjoyed by most workers.
All the budgets became suspect, and a source of considerable controversy
in arbitration boards. They were less and less used as decision
criteria. Only where wages fell below minimum subsistence budgets,
did these apparently provide some floor for wage awards.
Another important objection to the use of budgets in this context,
raised by employers, was that as designed they were not specifically
applicable to the situation. The National Industrial Conference Board
(NICB) an employers' association, pointed out that budgets were
inappropriate for their use in street railway disputes. The families
might well not be of five persons, and the clothing requirements were
different from those in actual budgets used, as was available housing
in the railway conductors' communities. The NICB also raised the
objection, often to be reiterated later, that the single-wage-earner
family was not typical or necessary. (81) A basic value conflict was
involved here, with workers feeling that one worker should be able to
support a family and employers that it was perfectly appropriate for a
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family to have more than one worker.
Wage Controls and "Substandard" Wages. During three major wars and
again in 1971 the Federal government set up boards to control wage
increases and ajudicate wage disputes. The same basic issue has
arisen each time, and each time budgets have played a substantial role
in resolving it. The boards limited wage increases normally to some
percentage, related to the cost of living index.
This rule imposed an unequal hardship on the lowest paid, whose
absolute increases would have to be very low. If their earnings did
not provide a decent living before controls,they could never improve
them after controls. Moreover, the disparity between higher and lower
paid workers would widen rapidly. Therefore advocates before the
boards, the boards themselves or Congress sought objective criticism
to define "substandard" wages which would be free from controls.
Standard budgets seemed to provide the only such possibility.
Accordingly, they figured in discussions, though they were controversial.
The National War Labor Board, established in 1913, stated as its policy:
"1. The right of all workers, including common laborers, to a
living wage is hereby declared.
2. In fixing wages, minimum rates of pay shall be established
which will insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health
and reasonable comfort." (82)
They clearly had the concept of a budget in mind, but no recent
figures existed for their use in 1918 when the first important wage
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case came before them. The board then ordered that a study of the
existing budgets be submitted to them. (83) After examining them,
the Board's labor joint chairman introduced a resolution declaring that
the living wage was $1,760.50. This was the cost of a budget made up
by Professor Ogburn, then examiner for the War Labor Board, to
determine the cost of a level of living "above minimum subsistence" for
a New York shipyard worker's family of five. The proposal produced
protracted debate between labor and employer groups, with the latter
opposing designation of any fixed sum. The Board finally decided
against a firm decision rule and in favor of deciding cases on an
individual basis. An examination of the decisions suggests, however,
that many were based on a subsistence level budget prepared by Ogburn
at the same time as the other. Clearly the concept of a budget was a
criterion somehow underlying the Board's analyses, although it was too
controversial for it to use the budget freely.
The National War Labor Board (NWLB) established in World War II,
settled the historic Little Steel Case in mid-1942 by awarding workers
the 15% increase which corresponded to the rise in the BLS cost of
living index. (84) Not long thereafter they adopted the principle
as a general wage control yardstick. Shortly afterward, President
Roosevelt issued an executive order (85) authorizing the board to
approve wage increases where necessary "to eliminate substandards of
living."
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Accordingly, the Board chose a criterion.for substandard wages
below which an increase would be automatically approved.. They chose
somewhat arbitrarily a wage of under $.40 an hour as the definition of
substandard. Not many organized laborers received so low a wage in
wartime, but finally in 1944 a case involving the Textile Workers came
before the board. The union had priced the WPA 1935 Emergency Level
Budget in five communities where workers lived and presented the figures
as its principal exhibit. (86) They showed that $.40 an hour would
not cover the cost of the budget, which, in any case, represented a
very low level of living, perhaps hazardous to health over an extended
per.od, according to the WPA. The board, as a result, raised its
definition of substandard to $.55 an hour.
The employers did not contend that the budget represented too high
a level of living, but took issue with the implications of using this
particular budget and with some of the textile workers manipulation of
the "official" index. An NICB study (87) pointed out that the budget
was not nationally representative nor was the 4-person family it
represented the appropriate family size. The union had added $109 to
the food component, which was originally based on a Bureau of Agriculture
Economics' low-cost food plan, to account for inability of workers to
purchase as efficiently as the nutritionists who planned the diet.
They also included $175 to account for Social Security withholding and
war bonds. The NICB objected on both counts. Savings were not
normally to be considered part of a minimum budget, particularly one to
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be applied in wartime, when the goal was to cut back consumption.
If wages were set on the basis of this minimum, they argued, the
workers would not be providing their share of the sacrifice. However,
since Social Security and war bonds were required and the budget was,
after all, a subsistence level, there was not much fat left for
sacrifice. The War Labor Board essentially accepted the TWUA argument.
The board and its postwar successor, the Wage Stabilization Board,
continued to provide substandard wage criteria until a number of years
after the War.
A set of volumes which documents the decision-making process of
the NWLB in tremendous detail provides an unusual insight into the role
of the budget indicator in the Board's decisions. Most agencies do
not terminate definitively, and if they do it is seldom with a complete
official history of this sort. For students of the process of the
creation of government policy this history is a remarkably good source.
(88) The study details the development of the substandard wage policy
and makes clear that budgetary studies were a factor in NWLB decisions.
However, it felt it could not raise its definition of substandard wage
rates as high as the budgets would indicate because doing so might
create a loss of employment. Here as in many other situations, criteria
other than income adequacy would prevail.
Regional boards did have discretion to increase wage rates up to a
level set by the National Board, and an appendix documents the role of
budget studies, or lack thereof in these decisions. The two boards
314
which did use budget studies considered them only as one of several
criteria. They relied on WPA Emergency and Maintenance level budgets
as well as some subsistence budgets prepared by welfare agencies.
The boards considered the higher Maintenance budget to be more appropriate
than the others to meet wartime needs for efficiency and morale, though
they sometimes used the Emergency level budget on the assumption that
the average family was less than the four provided for in the budgets.
Members of the Denver Board attempted to arrive at the minimum
standard by the nineteenth century "breakeven" criterion. They tried
to use the assumption that the income levels where net deficits occur
on the average are substandard. However, they concluded that income
levels so derived were not necessarily adequate by any other standards.
They eventually recommended minimum standards well above any that would
be dictated by such an approach. Clearly they felt an absolute standard
to define needs was essential.
To use the budgets the board had to make various assumptions.
For example some assumed one wage earner per family. This was, of
course, a value judgment about what type of living wages should make
possible. In fact, the average number of wage earners per family was
somewhere between 1.2 and 1.5,and the Philadelphia Board used this
assumption. The problem is that no family has 1.5 wage earners;
some have one and some have two, so the wages based on this criterion
are appropriate for neither group. The groups also had to make
assumptions for setting hourly wage criteria about the length of a
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"normal" or average work week, which was not obvious in wartime since
it was as much as forty-eight hours in some industries, and lower in
others. They often had to make rough estimates also to adjust for
local differences in budget costs since budgets were not priced in all
areas. Clearly, the use of the budgets was a complicated and
approximate procedure, although the boards seemed to be quite
sophisticated in their understanding of how to adjust and use the
budgets in deliberations.
The most recent recurrence of this controversy over substandards
was in 1971 and 1972. In the face of rapid inflation, combined with
persistent high unemployment, Congress passed the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970 to give the Executive power to control the economy.
President Nixon involved these controls in mid-1971. Accordingly,
Congress reexamined the Economic Stabilization Act in late 1971 once
they saw how the economic controls were being carried out. Testimony
from David Livingston of the Distributive Workers of America and Congress-
man William Ryan (89) indicated that the Administration was giving
no special consideration to poorly paid workers. Accordingly, Congress
amended the Act to read that substandard wages should be exempt from
controls. The House Committee Report (90) specified that they had in
mind the BLS Lower Level Budget (used by Livingston and Ryan in
testimony) as the criterion. The budget was priced at $6,960 fk.,r a family
of four. To use it directly to determine the substandard wage would
have meant an exemption from control for all wages under $3.50 an hour,
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of close to fifty percent of the work force.
The Cost of Living Council went back to the familiar objection
about the representativeness of the size of the budget family and
the number of workers. They proposed to exempt wages up to $1.90 an
hour on the basis of the fact that the average number of workers per
family is 1.7 rather than one. It was this decision that led to bitter
controversy between Labor, Congress and the Administration and it was
one of the factors that led to the four Labor members' decision to
quit the Pay Board in March of 1972. Finally, in July a Federal
court.declared the Council's decision to be contrary to the intent of
Congress, and the Council responded by raising its cutoff for "sub-
standard" wages to $2.75. It is noteworthy that although the budget
criterion worked to pull the level up, it was not decisive or the wage
would have been $3.50. Other factors, principally the fear of
inflation,dictated a compromise. Either the goal of permitting workers
a decent living was of low priority or the budget criterion was not
fully accepted. The two factors are closely intertwined.
It is probable that without a BLS lower budget much of the dispute
might have taken a different form. Much righteous indignation and
sympathetic press coverage for Labor's case resulted from the
Administration's refusal to use its own "official" budget statistics.
It seems quite probable that this dispute was one of the major reasons
that the Administration decided the statistic was a political liability
and is now making an effort to dispense with it. The problem caused
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by the very existence of the statistic promises to continue in the
near future and arise whenever wage and price controls are invoked.
Governmental Wage Setting. The government as an employer is not
supposed to exert its power over its employees, but rather to abide by
certain public values and set fair wages. It is only recently that
public employees' unions have even been permitted. The adversary
proceeding was thought to be a hindrance to governmental operation.
Accordingly governments have had to justify publicly the fairness of
their wage and salary scales. They used various simple quantitative
criteria, like parity with similar workers, but often turned to budgets
as the decisive criteria. The decisiveness of the budgets in some
cases may have been due to the relative lack -of discussion of the
criterion in this basically administrative decision. Certainly one
can find little reference to the usual criticisms of the suitability
of budgets as wage criteria.
The first uses of budgets in government wage determination came in
1915. Budgets had been designed for wage evaluation prior to that
time, but it is unclear that any were actually used. The city of New
York was revising the salary-scale for street cleaners at the same time
the Board of Estimate was working on a family budget to represent the
needs of unskilled laborers. (91) The budget was submitted as a
measure of necessary wages and, accordingly, wages were raised so that
the maximum wage approached the minimum cost of living described by the
budget. (92) In 1917 the Mayor of Dallas appointed a citizen's
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committee to study the cost of living to recommend appropriate wage
increases for city employees. They found the cost of a "safe
normal" standard for a family of five and used it for their
recommendations. (93)
In at least two important instances the Federal government
designed budgets specifically to set wage levels. In 1919 the
Congressional Joint Committee on the Reclassification of Salaries
ordered the BLS to design a budget that would apply to the lower
echelon Civil Service worker in Washington and his family. The
Committee wanted to use the data in planning new salary scales in
accord with postwar prices and living standards. Then, during the
Depression the WPA designed budgets to establish wage levels for its
workers.
Congress Seeks a Floor on Wages. Congress has only on rare occasions
concerned itself with wages,but these have usually been in connection
with wages that seemed unduly low. Budgets did crop up in these
discussionsand Congressmen were eager for a convenient adequacy
measure but the budget was not fully accepted. In discussions on
minimum wage levels, budgets were conspicuously absent.
A major Congressional discussion on wages, the so-called "White
Collar Hearings" (94) concerned substandard levels,as did the. recent
hearings on the Economic Stabilization Act. The wartime limitations on
wage increases, coupled with rapidly rising living costs had put white
collar workers in a severe bind. Unions were able to organize cases
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and win increases before the War Labor Board, but most white collar
workers were not unionized and, accordingly, were on essentially fixed
incomes. The Senate passed a resolution resulting in extensive
hearings, one of the main purposes of which was to ascertain the quality
of life for those on fixed incomes. It was a policy-making hearing.
No specific legislation prompted it; rather it was an effort to define
the problem and search for causes.
In the hearings, the Committee pursued the question of whether
white collar earnings were substandard. They heard a good deal about
budgets and questioned BLS Acting Commissioner Hinrichs about the
recently designed Steelworker's Budget. (95) The Bureau had been
unable to get funds from Congress to do a new budget during the war,
but instead had aided the Steelworkers' union in surveying their own
members to develop a budget. The budget cost was $2,600. Senators
compared this figure and prices of WPA budgets with average wages for
teachers and others and with the War Labor Board's substandard and wage
criterion of $.40 an hour. By whatever budget standard, wages were
inadequate, often below Depression subsistence levels. The Senators
pointed this out to Chairman William Davis of the War Labor Board and
demanded to know why he did not favor incomes' rising to subsistence
level. Davis replied the country could not afford it, and that, in
any case, he could not define subsistence. Senator Pepper indignantly
asserted that the subsistence level was not a matter of opinion but one
of fact andas evidence, pointed to budget studies done by the BLS and
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various social groups.
The Committee's report concluded that millions of white collar
workers had substandard incomes: that although $50 a week provided
only a narrow margin of living, the average white collar salary was
$28.69. It criticized the BLS cost of living index as a measure of
actual living cost changes. Finally, the Committee recommended
stronger price controls, an end to the War Labor Board's use of the
Little-Steel, 15%-formula, a new substandard wage exemption level
over twice as high as the $.40 level, higher wages for state
employees, and higher Social Security and Public Assistance. (96)
Most of this did not happen. The war was beginning to wind down.
There is no question, however, that these well-publicized hearings
served to call public and Congressional attention to a need for a
measure of a standard of living for public policy purposes. Committee
Chairman Pepper, among others, clearly felt that such an indicator was
not only needed, but also that the concept was an acceptable and
measurable one. It was clear that a well-established indicator would
have provided a powerful weapon in the argument with Chairman Davis.
In connection with another issue, minimum wages, Congressmen and
other proponents of legislation have seldom ever referred to budgets,
though the central issue was stated to be the adequacy of wages.
Budgets were certainly not applied in the original legislation or
the later amendments. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 declared
that labor conditions exist which are "detrimental to the maintenance
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of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and
the general well-being of workers." (Emphasis supplied) It declared
a national policy to "correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate the conditions...without substantially curtailing employment
or earning power." The legislation established a minimum wage of
$.25 an hour, which at 40 hours a week, would have provided an annual
income of about one-third the cost of the WPA Emergency Level Budget
for a family of four. Every minimum wage increase ever since has been
similarly far below the lowest budgets. The $.75 minimum in 1949
was inadequate to purchase the Emergency Budget and the $1.60 minimum
in 1971 would not bring a family of four up to the official poverty line.
Once again other criteria were actually more important than "the
maintenance of a minimum standard of living" - for example, the relation
of the minimum wage to prevailing wages in various industries, changes
in the cost of living since the last wage level was set, and the
probability that some workers would lose their jobs. Comparatively
little of the discussion surrounding the legislation or the later amend-
ments related to the goal of bringingwages up to a standard which
would support even one person. (No indicator existed for the latter in
any case). The issue was not seen as particularly relevant, since many
individuals in low-wage industries would have other members of their
family working. Once again, the budget criterion assuming one bread-
winner, was inappropriate to the specific situation.
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Policy for Poverty: Challenge and Opportunity for the Standard Budget
The Budget and Poverty Levels: A Summary. Until recently in the
U.S., a standard budget seldom served as a measure of adequate income
for programs of income support or other direct assistance. When it did,
it was principally as an administrative criterion rather than a tool
for policy analysis or program design. The superficial reason is that
until 1969, there was no nationwide poverty budget. In fact, there was
no official effort to design any general poverty criterion until 1964.
The principal reason for this fact was that the little welfare policy
we did have as a nation before 1964 was not primarily focussed on the
goal of income adequacy. Insofar as there was a concern for adequate
living standards, there was little consensus on the concept, and even
less on a budget as its measure.
Once we developed a national interest in a policy with a focus on
poverty itself rather than some more limited welfare questions, a
poverty measure became essential. An administration eager to explain
and justify its proposals groped around hastily for a convenient
"poverty line." It is indicative of how poorly accepted the standard
budget was as an income adequacy measure that they did not turn to
this concept - particularly since the very first "poverty line" was
based on a budget (p. 232). As policies were implemented and the
official poverty line put to use in measurement and evaluation, a
chorus of criticisms arose. It was increasingly obvious that this
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"poverty line" did not represent either expert or popular values and
models of the nature of poverty. Despite official efforts, the line
was far from universally accepted or used.
The effort to decide an important policy-related indicator by
fiat, a somewhat arbitrary fiat at that, was doomed to failure. After
all, it took ten years of discussion and experiment before analysts
could settle on a practical concept of unemployment which would fit
into prevailing models of the economy and individual behavior and
motivation. By the same token, an indicator of minimal income
adequacy may require much discussion and examination in the context of
feasible policies before there will be the general agreement on its
appropriateness which is essential to its effective use.
In 1969 a lower level national budget finally appeared and entered
the competition for acceptance as the poverty measure. It has already
figured prominently in the high-level debate over guaranteed income
plans as well as the one we have already discussed over substandard
wages. As a result, the budget has been thrust into general public
view, and is gaining strong adherents as well as opponents. As the
debaters become more informed about the nature of the indicator and
relate it to the policy questions, its values and methods seem bound
to come under intense scrutiny. The standard budget's entire future
may well hang on the outcome of this discussion. If it is accepted as
a definitive income adequacy measure, in conjunction with new national
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commitment to guarantee incomes, it may become a permanent, well-
protected fixture like the unemployment rate. If its concepts and
methods do not inspire sufficient confidence, it is likely to be seen
as quite dangerous now that policies could revolve around its level.
In that case, it could be abolished once and, perhaps, for all.
Welfare Policy: The Low Priority of Adequate Incomes. Until the
"discovery" of poverty in the early sixties, U.S. public welfare policies
and programs focussed on specific problems of the poor, through social
work or housing, for example. Though direct public assistance exists
at the state or town level at the beginning of the century, it seldom
met standards established even by state-designed minimal maintenance
budgets. The income maintenance programs designed in the thirties
were not largely based on a criterion of adequacy.
It is not simply chance that the first poverty line was designed
in England. The atmosphere was clearly ripe for it as the British
began very early to build the Welfare State with its substantial
social insurance programs. British focus on poverty as an issue in
itself dates back to Elizabethan poor laws. Rowntree's measure of the
numbers in poverty in 1900 helped to trigger industrial reforms, (97)
and he responded to continued interest in the measures by repeating
his study several times in the next half-century. In this country,
however, budgets have focussed on the middle income groups, the working-
class family, just as have many national policies and programs. In
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fact our national focus has been very much on the enterprising person
trying to help himself rather than the destitute.
An instance of this policy bias, as well as one more example of
the general mistrust of budgets, is in the discussions over Roosevelt's
Economic Security program during the Depression. It was out of this
program that grew Social Security and unemployment insurance, as
well as the first Federal aid for direct public assistance.
The President appointed a Committee on Economic Security, made
up of Cabinet Members, an advisory group of the public as well as a
technical group. He recognized that the measures had to be the product
of some broad consensus, informed by the technicians. Their state-
ments surely reflected this input, as did the indicators they used.
The remarkable aspect is the way that the indicators they used belied
the statements they made. The report declared:
"The one almost all-embracing measure of security is an assured
income. A program of economic security, as we vision it, must have
as its primary aim the assurance of adequate income to each human
being in childhood, youth, middle age or old age..." (98)
The policy statment seems to demand the use of budgets as the
only available way of assessing income adequacy for different types of
families and estimating welfare levels for individuals in varying
size families. However, the Committee goes on to cite figures about
the percentage of employed with annual earnings of less than $1,000
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and less than $1,500. The figures appear to have been rather
arbitrarily chosen, round numbers with not much bearing on actual
welfare levels. It is unclear how many or what size families are
involved.
Congressional debate reveals a similar pattern of ignoring
adequacy standards. It is true that budget data for families of all
sizes was not available at that time on a national scale. The WPA
budgets were still being designed, and the BLS "Health and Decency"
budget was not very relevant fifteen years after its creation under
conditions of depression instead of poverty. More recent, special
purpose, or local budget studies were available however. Senator
Wagner, author of much of the proposed legislation, appeared to have
used some of these in making his recommendation to the Senate
Committee of benefits of $40 a month per person or $2,000 a year to a
family of four. Senator James Couzens of Michigan questioned him
closely on the source of his figures and how precisely to measure a
decent living standard. Wagner could not define or explain his
estimates. He could not claim they were "official" figures nor could
he explain their methodology. Another Senator was concerned with how
objectively any such standard could be measured, and, in any case,
felt that states could not necessarily by expected to pay for the
full standard. (99)
The Administration bill in January 1935 said that any old age
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pension shall provide an amount sufficient (with other income) for "a
reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health." The
language, taken from Massachusetts and New York laws, is reminiscent
of the BLS Health and Decency Standard. Its purpose was to permit
benefits to vary with circumstances, rather than be fixed by law or
regulation. States could be denied Federal funds if they did not
provide adequate benefits. Several Senators, like conservative
Harry Byrd of Virgina, were dubious about the principle, questioning
Administration Spokesman Witte about how these standards would be set.
Th6ir particular concern was that, without any objectively determined
standards, the Administrator of the program would have considerable
arbitrary power. The flexible decency and health concept was not to
become part of the program.
The discussion revealed that there was some interest in the idea
of measuring a standard of living in some objective way. It seems
quite likely that if a widely accepted, institutionalized measure had
existed it would have been used in the discussion. It might well
have meant that variable standards for states according to local
conditions would be acceptable to the Congressmen, so long as they felt
the data was above political manipulation. It would almost certainly
have been used at least as a goal for program benefits.
However, there was no such accepted measure, and the legislators
seemed inclined, in any case, to give more priority to other criteria.
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Certainly the bulk of the hearings was devoted to such questions as
the cost of the program, and criteria for benefits that had nothing to
do with adequate incomes. Two major programs, Social Security and
Unemployment Compensation, were both insurance programs. As such the
focus was on the limitations imposed by ability to pay into the fund
and fairness of benefits in relation to previous wages. Both
programs were intended to apply only to short portions of the working
person's life, and as such, one might well expect individuals to draw
on other resources than the insurance. In any case, the final levels
of payment bore little relation to a realistic adequacy standard, and
have continued to lag behind even the most minimal estimates of need
through the years.
The direct assistance program enacted through the legislation for
the elderly, the blind, and dependent children, contained no require-
ment for an adequate payment standard. The payment level was left up
to the states which, in practice, were to provide benefits lower
than their own locally developed budgets indicated.
This important case of the nonuse of budgets, in a situation where
they would have seemed the logical criterion, is testimony to the low
priority of adequate incomes as a public goal and the failure of the
budget to mesh with policy-makers' views. But budgets were not completely
ignored in welfare related-programs before the sixties. As we have
mentioned, public and priate service agencies set up scales for pay-
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ment and benefits. Naturally the budgets also served in this
administrative process to set upper limits on income eligibility
as an implicit income adequacy measure - though not one publically
discussed or thoroughly examined.
The one area where budgets were openly used for welfare levels
in the years before the commitment to poverty alleviation was in
conjunction with the needs of the elderly. The Social Security
Administration designed a special budget for a retired couple in 1947
with the aid of the BLS, which was preparing the City Worker's Family
Budget. (100) The latter budget could not just be scaled down.
An older couple would not have work expenses and would often own a home
and all household equipment. On the other hand, they would have
medical expenses. Congressional Committees have held hearings and
Presidential Committees studied the problems of the aged, and both
have frequently used this budget and its later versions (101) to
evaluate the living standards and benefits for the elderly. (102)
Perhaps the budgets were used most often in connection with the
elderly because we have less ambiguous values about income adequacy
for them than for other groups and because it is more obvious how
budgets apply in their case. No one contends that the elderly should
work, and not all of them have children, so even the solution of
children's support cannot be offered as a panacea. Most discussions
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of the needs of the elderly appears to accept the idea that they
deserve society's support at some decent level. 'Although this level
of support has not really been provided for a number of reasons, the
consensus seems to exist, and the budget approach seems satisfactory
to defining income needs for this group. The issues of varying family
size and number of breadwinners are not a problem in applying the
budget so it is quite simple to use in estimating income adequacy for
the elderly as a group. In any case, the various studies have had a
number of results, not the least of which has been the raising of
Social Security benefits over the years.
The Poverty Line: An Indicator Created by Fiat
In the early 1960's President Kennedy and the nation "discovered"
poverty in the U.S. Sociologists, economists, and Congressmen had
been talking about it for some time, (103) but suddenly the public
began to think about the fact that millions of people in this country
lived in some form of deprivation. President Johnson proposed a
massive attack on poverty and, suddenly, the Council of Economic
Advisors, the Federal agencies and the Congress found themselves
called upon to define and measure poverty so they could discuss the
proposals in more concrete, specific terms.
At first, the Council (CEA) looked for a handy figure for their
1964 report. The data on annual family income was only available
at that time by gradations of $1,000. They chose $3,000 a year for
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families greater than one because it was equal to approximately half
the median income. Ironically they ended up with an absolute line
Though they chose it as a relative one. The level was in line with
the $2,500 figure Robert Lampman used in a Joint Economic Committee
Study on economic conditions in 1959. (104) They applied the flat
figure to the population to show the number and composition of the
poor for the President's 1964 Economic Report, and its justification
of the need for a poverty program.
This line was attacked from many quarters. Its basic failing
by most standards was that it completely obscured actual living
levels of individuals in families of various sizes. Mollie
Orshansky, designer of the retired couple's budget for the Social
Security Administration, sought a better index for her research on
poverty - an alternative to the Council's measure. (105) The
measure she proposed and used was a multiple of the cost of the USDA's
economy level diet. (The measure is described on p. 256).
The Council in its next, 1965 Report, (106) adopted her index
as an official poverty line with startling results. The percentage of
the poor who were children was much higher and the percentage of
elderly declined since the line was flexible with family size. (107)
The income level was not much higher on the average than the CEA's
original choice. It was flexible in some respects, but still
represented a fixed life style and living level. The Consumer Price
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Index was applied to update it from year to yearbut this does not
take into account general rises in prevailing living levels. By 1970,
its value was to be far less than half the median income, and it was
clear the Index represented a fixed standard.
Both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations have tried to make
this the "official" poverty level. The Census Bureau has used it
since 1969 as the criterion to distinguish the poverty population, and
it published special analyses of this population based on this poverty
criterion. (108) The Administration increasingly cites it to assess
programs and progress in defeating poverty. These actions do give
this poverty. line a considerable advantage over others that might be
put forward. Official data comes conveniently tabulated according to
this criterion and others are far more difficult to apply. Moreover,
this line, and the numbers and character of the poor it identifies,
get considerable publicity and acceptance from an uninquiring public.
Certainly it is the path of least resistance to accept this line.
However, the "official"poverty index was increasingly unpopular.
It did not correspond to concepts or models of income adequacy held
by many policy-makers, analysts and even the general public. For one
thing, many analysts objected to the fact that it represented a fixed
level of living, on philosophical grounds. Poverty, they felt, was
a concept relative to prevailing standards. Over time the piew seemed
vindicated, as the line became lower than popular views of what it
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with the poverty line as a criterion for their analyses and planning.
(112)
Participants in the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition
and Health (113) feared use of the poverty line in impending welfare
legislation as they felt it too low. They recommended the USDA
discontinue designing its economy food plan, which they claimed was
unrealistically low and, most importantly, built a downward bias into
the poverty criterion. Certainly the use of this food plan was one
of the weakest points in the poverty index. It represented, at most,
a temporarily adequate diet, and in any case, few, apart from trained
nutritionists, could purchase the equivalent nutrients so cheaply
and efficiently. So even if one accepted the basic assumption of the
official poverty line that food was an index of welfare, the concept
was still assailable.
Meanwhile in 1966 under Johnson, the BLS saw its opportunity to
develop an important new statistic. The Bureau went to the
Appropriations Committee with the request for funds to design a "lower
level" budget. It was not, they said, to be a poverty index; it
seems unlikely the Bureau would have received permission to make all
the value judgments and fundamental policy decisions that would imply.
But clearly, judging from the 1963 report of the Technical Advisory
Committee, (114) with which the Bureau armed itself for its testimony,
it was the definition of some socially defined minimum income line that
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should be, as evidenced, for example, by responses to the Gallup poll
on what families needed to get along on.(109) Moreover, the method of
designing the line provided no assurance that families would have
enough to cover some minimal needs. Even if the assumption behind
the basic line was correct, that families with adequate diets could
have adequate levels of other things, the data for the indicator was
based on 1955 consumption patterns. The multiplier could well have
changed, particularly since the cost of food relative to other items
was declining.
Discontent with the index was at many levels. The various
Federal agencies felt quite free to use whatever poverty line suited
their particular problem when they wanted to make head counts or set
criteria. For example, the formula to designate poverty areas for
special funds under Title II of the 1964 Elementary and Secondary,
Education Act used a flat figure of $2,000 of family income rather
than the poverty index chosen to spread the amount of available money
appropriately throughout the desired districts. (110) Academics
proposed new indices for poverty and debated their merits at length.
The Special Senate "Hunger Committee" chaired by George McGovern,
which held several sessions on "Hunger and the Income Gap" heard
criticism of the poverty line from witnesses. (111) The President's
Commission on Income Maintenance Programs,established to plan for
welfare reform,and consultants they engaged expressed dissatisfaction
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the Bureau had in mind. Certainly this was the way the measure would
be understood when it finally appeared. The Committee, concerned
about the possibilities for evaluating results of the rapidly growing
spending on poverty programs, approved the new budget standard.
The Standard Budget and Income Policy. The lower level budget was
finally published in 1969, (115) five years after the inception of the
poverty programs. Its concept was described in only the vaguest terms,
more by implication than directly, and its level for a family of four
turned out to be close to half the median income. It was considerably
higher than the official poverty line,and, though the BLS did not
offer it as an alternative, it increasingly was used as such.
The issuance of the budget coincided closely with President
Nixon's August 1969 announcement of his plan for welfare reform.
The Family Assistance Plan would provide guaranteed income maintenance
to families, according to a formula whereby they would receive basic
grants in some amount and have a gradually increasing tax on
additional income. The graduated tax was to be designed principally
to maintain incentives to work. Nixon described the purposes of this
plan as to raise benefit levels in the states where they were lowest,
provide assistance to the working poor, to avoid family dissolution
caused by current welfare systems. Notably, income adequacy was not
on the list, though it was implicit in other goals.
Nonetheless, the ensuing discussions in Congress of the President's
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plan were to thrust the BLS lower level budget into the limelight
and make far more people aware of the existence of the budgets than
ever before. The Administration used the official poverty line (equal
to $3,721 in 1969) in their testimony. (116) Though they did not
directly assert the line meant an adequate lifestyle, they counted
potential benefits in terms of the number who would be pushed over
the line; as if indeed it did represent a meaningful division.
The subject matter of the legislation, guaranteed income, and
the rising public concern for underprivileged groups, was bound to
evoke some comment about the adequacy of income. And when the
Administration focussed so much argument on pushing people over the
poverty threshold, it was to be expected that the poverty line itself
would become an issue. Any line would have to be as much a product
of public understanding and consensus as the whole program.
The hearings in 1970 and again in 1971 began to produce a rising
chorus of complaints about the poverty line. Although many witnesses
accepted the $3,721 level grudgingly as a goal, like Mayor Lindsay did,
(117) they clearly felt it was unsatisfactory but the only
politically feasible one. Whitney Young, for example, said it was
an acceptable immediate goal though it was arbitrary, and then went
on to cite the BLS lower level budget as a more appropriate measure.
Witness after witness testified to their preference for the BLS figure,
and few, if any, claimed that the official poverty figure represented
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adequacy. Senator Ribicoff, former HEW secretary, called for a
national goal for all citizens by 1976 to be "assured of an income
adequate to sustain a decent standard of life," and proposed that HEW
produce a plan for this within 18 months. The Administration had
unwittingly focussed attention on the inadequacies of its own index.
The hearings on welfare reform were not the only policy arenas
where the BLS lower level budget was emerging. Witnesses critical of
the poverty line before McGovern's Hunger Committee proposed the sub-
stitution of the BLS Budget level. (118) One panel of the White House
Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health demonstrated their contention
that the poverty line was too low by comparing it with the BLS lower
and intermediate level budgets. Although they did not believe in the
possibility of devising scientific standards for consumption items in
view of differences in age, physical condition, and preferences and the
enormous role of value judgments in setting standards, the panel went
on to declare in its report that it was "convinced that a family of four
cannot be fed adequately on an income of less than $5,500 and still meet
other necessities." (119) It seems most probable that they did use
the budget to arrive at the figure, which was approximately the cost
of the lower budget minus work-related expenses.
The budget is beginning to appear in an increasing number of
highly public policy discussions. For example, the National Welfare
Rights Organization and the National Tenants Association, among the
most organized and vocal representatives of the poor, advocate a
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$6,500 a year guaranteed minimum income, almost exactly the level of
the BLS budget. They attempted to have it adopted as a plank in
the Democratic Party platform at the 1972 Convention. Increasingly,
too, the budget appears in the editorial pages of newspapers, usually
in criticism of existing levels of welfare.
The BLS budget is popular particularly with Administration critics
largely because it is higher than the poverty line. Moreover, the
budget draws on a long tradition and is the product of the highly
respected, nonpolitical agency, the BLS, the agency that brought us
unemployment data. Users of the budget always hasten to point out
that it is from the BLS feeling this information imparts a certain
respectability to the figure.
The Budget Threatens Administration Plans. In the course of these
discussions, the budgets are gradually picking up adherents and gain-
ing a public. Many of these do not as yet understand how the budgets
are constructed, nor what their implications and weaknesses are.
These will undoubtedly become clearer as opponents of budget use for
poverty criteria try to pick them apart. Whether the budgets will
survive this intense scrutiny is unclear.
Meanwhile, they are beginning to gain a strength and life of
their own. The Administration producing them cannot keep rein on
their use and impact. People certainly use the lower level budget to
criticize or alter Administration programs. Congress was undoubtedly
somewhat swayed by the evidence of the budgets to raise the income
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floor in the welfare legislation above levels the Administration
considers practical. A House conmittee's interest in the lower level
budget led finally to the exemption of 10 million more workers from
wage controls under a new definition of substandard wages. The
longer the budget stays around, the more people will become aware of
its existence and the less credibility they will give to the
Administration's poverty line.
It is not surprising that the Administration decided to try to
rid itself of their unwelcome statistic conceived of by an earlier,
more social-reform-minded administration. Though it was supposed to
be revised and updated from year to year as part of the BLS' regular
program, it was only two years old in 1971. The Labor Statistics
Commissioner thought he would eliminate it without too much trouble.
He probably did not count on the fact that it had already begun to be
an institution. He could not simply quietly discontinue it as he did
with some data series not authorized directly by Congress, and not
so much in the public eye.
The top echelon of the BLS made a plan to eliminate the budgets.
They would provide for some of their uses with other indicators. They
would devise an interim cost index for making geographical comparisons,
inspite of the conceptual difficulties. Then the Bureau would publish
expenditure breakdowns in three income groups, to give information on
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actual spending but it would discontinue the publication of a
normative budget standard.
They prepared releases detailing their objections to the concepts
and methods. (120) Though real motivation for the effort to abolish
the indicator was surely its unwelcome political role, the Commissioner
was able to make a relatively convincing technical argument that
ultimately the standard budget was an ambiguous measure. The release
pointed out that it was unrealistic to derive budget components
separately and sum them; it led to an upward bias. The release
also pointed out the element of circularity involved in the areas
where budget-designers had to choose levels directly, as they did
with the fiat. Finally it concluded that the budget used was a
norm, that the BLS should not be in the business of setting norms and
lastly that it was impossible to set norms objectively.
The release and the whole discussion that ensued reveals how
differently people regarded the indicator and its purpose, its actual
and appropriate. For example even the BLS Commissioner apparently
was not sure if the index was supposed to be a goal or an average
since the release criticized it for being unrealistically high,
while calling it a norm. The BLS had been disavowing that budgets
were norms since it began publishing them, though their own descriptions
belie this. Finally some of the users were to defend it as a norm.
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The Commissioner presented the idea to the official BLS Labor
Research Advisory Council Committee on Consumer and Wholesale Pirces,
and found the group indignant. (121) They accused the Bureau of being
more interested in market research than evaluating welfare. They felt
it was important to have a normative indicator. The Committee pointed
out the areas of judgment that the BLS would be involved in it if they
made the interarea index they proposed as they would have to make
climate and taste adjustments. The Commissioner raised the objection
that the components were chosen according to a variety of criteria,
somewhat inconsistent with one another, and that the index involved
adding apples and oranges. The Committee members pointed out that
this was continually done in statistical research, even by the Bureau,
which, after all, is responsible for the Consumer Price Index.
Commissioner Moore retreated to his point - that the budget has
been equated with a "minimum" level, despite the Bureau's insistance
that it has no way of defining that level. Lazare Teper, the
Committee Chairman, and Research Director from the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union was well-versed in the uses of Bureau statistics
and responded with insight. (He was responsible for the 1944 Textile
Workers Budget demonstrating substandard wages to the War Labor Board.)
Though other Committee members were sophisticated and aware of the
issues, he was probably the most effective spokesman., He replied that
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the misuse of data or the fact that it is not perfect should not be
cause for its abandonment. Other statistics were also at times
misused, even by Labor Department spokesmen, he said who, for
example, equated the category "employed" with "at work" although in
fact the two concepts are quite different. Teper generously said
he did not feel this was cause to cancel the unemployment survey.
Mr. Teper then added the most telling argument from the
Administration standpoint. A short time earlier it had abandoned
its regular collection of data on the very high unemployment in
poverty areas on the pretext that the sample was based on old 1960
population data, while at the same time continuing other sampling
programs based on such data. Labor in particular, but also
business, had been critical of these moves, and Teper pointed out
that to abandon the standard budget at that point would be regarded
as politically motivated. Since the Bureau Chief was already in
considerable political trouble over the handling of unemployment
releases and was being accused of muzzling the professional staff,
he had to be sensitive to the comment.
The interchange reveals considerable knowledge and sophistication
about the budgets and the- nature of the whole data production process.
The labor representatives recognized and accepted the political nature
of the data. It also reveals that budgets have defenders who may
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make it politically very difficult to abolish them, and who certainly
intend to make an issue of unwanted changes in data. Moreover, it
shows that just as in the case of unemployment, the interest groups
have come to trust the technical bureaucrats of the BLS, their
honesty, competence, and impartiality. They are allying themselves
with the bureaucrats against the political administration. It may
well be that the interest groups will forego what they might ideally
want in concepts and methods of an income adequacy indicator for
the advantages of the BLS steady,dependable calculations.
Prospects for the Standard Budget
It is not at all clear what will happen to the budgets now.
If they have become enough of an institution, the Administration may
be unable to abolish them. In the course of the discussion of
welfare reforms, which is bound to continue for some time, new
national goals may evolve, into which the budgets may or may not fit,
or which the budgets themselves may help to shape. The discussion
of basic values, and intense scrutiny of the indicator may lead to
improvements being made in it or perhaps to its complete rejection
when a wider group of would-be users recognizes its basic ambiguity.
It seems most likely, however, that if policies and programs
involving the distribution of large quantities of public funds are
to depend on the indicator's level, its ambiguities and wide areas
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of design open to judgment will disqualify it from use.
Indeed it could become a dangerous tool for deception open to
manipulation by each new Administration, and therefore public consensus
may ultimately be to eliminate it. So long as we have a commitment
to alleviate poverty it is doubtful that consensus will permit the
lower BLS budgets to be eliminated without their replacement by
some other income adequacy measure that corresponds more closely to
public conceptions and analytic needs than the poverty line.
At the moment the BLS budgets are clearly filling a significant
need in policy analysis as well as many other areas.
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PART IV
CONCLUSION: PERSPECTIVE ON THE INDICATORS
CHAPTER I
A COMPARISON OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND BUDGETS AS INDICATORS
Common Patterns
The two case studies of quite different indicators reveal
important similarities in the institutions and processes through which
both indicators were created and evolved, though the uses of the two
followed divergent patterns. Some of the similarities derive from
the reasons the indicators were chosen, their long history and wide
use, but many of them reflect patterns that are likely to occur when-
ever indicators are successful - that is, accepted and used. The
similarities have to do with the ways they become accepted, the nature
of the institutions for their collection, design and use, and ways
they have been regarded and used by the public and the experts.
The history of both indicators is long, as we have noted, but
more significantly, in both cases a good deal of time, effort, and
experimentation went into the creation of the indicator. The unemploy-
ment rate required ten years of intensive work on concepts and methods
from 1930 to 1940, and at least as long a period before that for the
foundations of public interest to grow. The standard budget was a
concept that emerged from fifty years of research by students of family
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consumption patterns in the nineteenth century. Moreover, although
the first budget was designed in about 1900, we did not devise a
completely standardized method for it until 1946. It seems likely
that indicators generally will require time for their development-
time because the designers and users want to think through the
alternatives and their implications, because new methods may have to be
developed, and because data collection and experimentation take time.
The institutions designing and producing the two.indicators have
had much in common. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of course, has
been the key institution in the production of both indicators, and
the record in both cases clearly demonstrates that the Bureau's reputa-
tion for nonpartisan professionalism has greatly enhanced public
confidence in the indicators. In the case of unemployment figures,
Congressmen gave greater credence to Bureau statisticians than
Administration appointees,and with the standard budget the "BLS" tag
has clearly conferred an authority on the indicator. Part of both
indicators' prestige and acceptability derived from the characteristics
of the producing institution.
Other data producing institutions involved have had similar
characteristics. The Census Bureau has been the data collecting
agency for the unemployment series since 1940, and it enjoys the same
kind of reputation and has the same sort of expertise as the BLS.
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The WPA Division of Research was responsible for a sizable portion
of work on both indicators, though its role was more critical to the
unemployment survey than to budget design because the basic principles
of the latter had already been established before the Depression.
A few other Federal institutions were involved in producing budgets,
like the Agriculture Department and the Social Security Administrations,
but these agencies shared many characteristics with the BLS in that
they had strong research groups with professional status and separation
from the operating branches of their departments.
The Federal agencies were not the only .nes in either case to
produce the indicator. From time to time private and other public
groups produced both budgets and unemployment estimates. As the
Federal figures became more reliable or accepted, the proliferation
of competing indicators subsided. In both cases, interest groups,
in particular the research departments of business and labor
organizations, produced their own versions of the indicator.
They were predictably biased in one direction or another. Union
budgets were higher than management's and employers' unemployment
estimates were lower than unions'. Predictably too, such figures
were not generally persuasive, and their use simply created another
incentive to get definitive indicators, or, at least, ones unsullied
by partisan designers.
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The origin and course of development of both indicators has
been critically determined at many junctures by outside events.
Wars and depressions in particular have impelled developments in the
indicators, while lesser problems have not. Both these indicators
have required tremendous social upheavals as well as specific issues
focusing attention sharply on the particular topic before a real
public commitment would be made to develop and use them.
Perhaps in an era when a public is pore disposed toward the idea of
using social statistics, less incentive might be required to develop
new indicators. But greater knowledge and competence will not
eliminate a fear of indicators and the way they may define and demand
problem solution. Therefore, strong outside motivation may always
be required for the development of new national indicators.
For both indicators described here, it was the legislative branch
of government that provided the important impetus for developments.
Although a permanent arm of the Executive has been essential to
dependable production of both indicators, it seems likely that neither
would have started at all, and that neither would have been as care-
fully designed in concept and method, if it were not for Congress.
Although some individuals, like Labor Statistics Commissioner Carroll
Wright or Ewan Clague in the sixties, have played a catalytic role or
had some personal vision which promoted the indicator, the executive
branch of government was not the instigator of the statistical series.
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In the case of budgets, in 1888 it was Congress that requested
the expenditure studies to settle the questions surrounding the tariff
issue. Carroll Wright may have planted the idea, but it was not the
Administration that put the political force behind it. It was Congress
that consistently demanded each of the Federal budgets until 1966,with
-the exception of the WPA effort. It is Congress that in 1972 is
injecting BLS budgets into policy discussions of wages and guaranteed
incomes.
For unemployment in 1928 then 1930, it was a Congressional
Committee that wanted the inclusion of the questions in the Census.
Congressmen repeatedly complained of the inadequate data on unemploy-
ment in the Depression, keeping up the pressure on a reluctant
Administration, which finally resulted in the 1937 Unemployment Census
and ultimately the monthly survey. Finally, the Congress, the Senate
in particular, was responsible for the idea and the passage of the
Employment Act, which assured the continued production and use of
unemployment rates.
This pattern of legislative-based drive for indicators is not
surprising if one considers the role that indicators would play. They
were weapons for legislators to fight Administration proposals, or
more importantly, to criticize current policy. The indicators are
public, obvious measures which may or may not reflect
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Administration activities, but certainly they can attract attention
and create difficulty for an incumbent administration. Moreover,
Congress must discuss things at a broad level in general terms under-
standable to its many members and much of the public. The simple
"facts" represented by an indicator were constantly in demand to
settle questions and permit rational argument. Within the Executive
decisions may be made with less direct reference to broad public values
that the indicator may represent and in accord with more elaborate
and complex data.
In view of Congress' interest in the data, it was predictable
that elaborate arrangemenLs would be made to assure that it appeared
to be first, nonpartisan and protected from immediate political
considerations, and secondly, accurate and reliable. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics, in the tradition established by Wright, shied away
from all political involvement. Its officials refrained from
expressing policy judgments, and they preferred to avoid controversial
data. In 1942 and 1943 when the cost of living index was under
attack, the BLS Acting Commissioner resisted any sort of public discus-
sion of its design, fearing the intrusion of politics. But the more
effective approach to this depoliticizing of the indicator was to use
outside or interagency committees of technical personnel to evaluate
the indicators or suggest changes. The BLS called in a technical
group to design the original City Worker Family Budget and again to
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assess the uses and needs for change in the budget in 1962. The Bureau
officials constantly retreated behind these Comnittee's recommendations,
offering few opinions of their own to Congress. They justified their
requests with this weapon of "impartial," expert opinion.
Professional advisory or investigatory committees showed up at
several critical points in the story of unemployment data as well -
in 1930 in the design of the Census, in 1954 in connection with the
sampling discrepancy, and in 1961 the Presidential Committee to respond
to the Reader's Digest article. In the case of unemployment, Congress
also acted as watch dog. In both cases, the executive data-producing
agency was closely scrutinized from the outside, usually at its own
instigation. The scrutiny served three functions. It helped
produce internal change, protected the agency from criticism as
partisan or unprofessional and provided backing for requests for
expansion. In each case the committees evaluated the technical
problems, made comments, and ultimately suggested new or expanded
activities. The members of these groups have become very involved
and eventually operated as lobbyists for the indicator.
Both indicators have gone through some equivalent stages in the
development of concepts, except that the budget has not left the early
stages. There was a period when the unemployment concept was
ambiguous, not fully spelled out, where each analyst could produce
different figures because of fuzziness of the concept.
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Neither indicator was created and applied by fiat. The effort
to construct the unemployment rate by fiat failed in 1930 when the
Administration simply decided which of many marginal groups were the
unemployed. It was met with many protests and complaints. The
concept was not useful in analysis and it did not match common
conceptions of unemployment. No measure would be instituted until
one was found that somehow met these two criteria. By the same
token, the peremptory declaration of a poverty line did not work in
1964. It soon became too low to fit popular conceptions. The way
it was constructed, with an economy food plan, was not accepted,
and many objected because it did not increase relative to life styles
and incomes. The lower budget seems no more likely to be arbitrarily
and effectively declared a poverty line. If it becomes the accepted
poverty line, it seems likely that it will require the same gradual
process of testing, exploring,and eventually acceptance that the
unemployment indicator required.
The concepts and methods of the two indicators have changed over
the years in response to values and methodological developments.
The unemployment concept was changed in 1957 and 1967 to reflect new
work patterns and new concerns. The seasonal adjustment was introduced
to meet demands for finer tuning of the economy. The development of
subsidiary unemployment data to back up the overall figure in the
sixties reflected new analytical approaches and an increasing concern
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with specific population.groups. Official budget levels and content
reflected contemporary life styles, changing every few years or so.
The methods of design became more routinized in 1945 and the standard
was altered to apply to the whole income range. In both indicators
there was a lag between changes in values and changes in the indicator.
It took time to recognize and agree on a need for change and implement
it.
One concern of indicator designers has been that changes in
indicators would spoil their continuity, while lack of change would
soon make them irrelevant. The issue has resolved itself for both
these indicators in a surprisingly satisfactory way. It has proved
more important to have the indicator represent current conceptions
than to be perfectly continuous. The budget turns out to be more
comparable as a measure of income norms with the concept changed than
it would without them. Although long-term changes in unemployment
are hard to interpret in view of its methodological and conceptual
alterations, it has been the short-term that has been important.
Moreover, it is unclear, in any case, that if we had insisted on
the same unemployment concept continuously, it would have measured the
same thing over the long-term. As the unemployment story indicates,
the questions we ask get different answers in different times and
places. A quite different identification procedure and even definition
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may be necessary to get at unemployment in Depressions than in wars,
for example.
Once a government agency produced each of these indicators, they
became public property. Despite the BLS and Census Bureau educational
efforts on the indicator purposes, data quality, and methods of
design, both indicators were often used without regard for these
caveats. Both have been used descriptively, analytically and
normatively though they are not equally suitable for these purposes -
and were certainly not intended for all these purposes. It seems
clear that the indicator designer cannot control data uses, but can
at best encourage those he wants. He will have to be alert to the
ways data are likely to be used, as well as those he intends in
considering the impact of various design choices.
The two indicators have appeared, though to differing degrees,
in policy analyses - the broad, high level consideration of societal
goals, setting up priorities, and choosing of strategies to meet them.
It is in this arena that both indicators have come to gather most
potency. It is here that they become most visible, have the greatest
potential impact on public actions, and where they have gained most
of the interest and support that would protect them and assure their
continuity. At this policy level, Congress, the Cabinet, or the
President may use the indicator in making arguments and analyses.
In this process interest groups have been awakened to the importance
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and implications of the indicator's existence and characteristics.
Those who would be benefited by the indicator's use, or who simply
found the indicator facilitated discussion and action, as many did
with unemployment, rose to defend and protect the indicator.
It is at the level of policy use that the process of institution-
alization of both indicators seemed to begin. Of course, the policy
use of budgets has been far more sporadic, shorter-lived than for
unemployment figures so it is difficult to know if the budgets will
also become firmly established. An examination of the differences
between the histories of the two indicators will hopefully suggest
why they are not now both equally well established and what the
prospects are that the budgets will become the same kind of permanent
fixture as unemployment figures in our decision-making apparatus.
Differences: Indicator Design and Use Interact
In 1972 the unemployment rate, with its forty years of history,
is a firmly established indicator, whose important role in public
I"problem-finding" and solving is secure. The much older standard
budget, however, produced by the same agency as the former figure
and serving thousands of uses, is on the verge of elimination. The
unemployment rate has become an institution in the sense that it has
a life of its own beyond its inmmediate uses. It can define problems
'where none were seen without it. Important groups in the power
structure see it to be in their interest to maintain the indicator
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and keep it free of short--term political pressures. They keep it
under close scrutiny and defend it when it is attacked. The standard
budget, on the other hand, is used, but it is not widely accepted as
the correct indicator of income adequacy. It has little role, there-
fore, at the policy level and, unlike unemployment, there is no
statutory requirement of public responsibility for income adequacy.
There are few inside or outside government who would put much effort
into protecting it, and few who even understand how it is constructed,
or what it implies.
The type of institutionalization that the unemployment indicator
has had does create some problems. Because it is so firmly esta-
blished and relatively fixed in form, it can draw attention to problems
formulated in ways that may not mesh with current values and problem
analysis. Thus its exclusion of the discouraged workers made it
difficult to focus public attention on the problem. It is possible,
however, for concepts to change, and the process has begun. While
institutionalization presents a danger of "hardening of the
categories," the problem is not insurmountable.
The precarious condition of the standard budget appears to be a
much greater problem that the opposite condition of institutionali-
zation. To begin with, if it is possible to eliminate indicators
whenever they convey information unsatisfactory to the data collectors,
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many policy-makers will not be able to depend on them and will not
bother to pay attention to them when they are around. Secondly, if
policy-makers and analysts do not fairly generally accept the
indicator as a dependable and accurate permanent representation of
some variable, it cannot serve much purpose in facilitating discussion
or making possible agreement on goals. On the contrary, the
discussion may simply turn into an argument about the indicator.
It is important for those interested in planning indicators to try to
understand how the difference in acceptance and institutionalization of
the two indicators came about.
The basic reasons come from two sources. One has to do with the
fact that as a nation, the U.S. never focussed so sharply on solving
the problem of income inadequacy as it did on unemployment. We have
considered it from time to time, but never set up permanent, legal
responsibility for adequate incomes. Such legislation might have
required the use of the budget on a regular basis, just as the
Employment Act demanded unemployment figures. The other reasons for
the differences derive from the basic nature of the two indicators,
one, relatively simple and direct, the other complex, ambiguous and
highly normative.
The reasons policy never focussed squarely on income adequacy go
back, in part, to the characteristics of the budget. Of course,
some of the reasons have to do with the Puritan ethic and resistance
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to the welfare state. We have not decided that government support
may be-necessarily a way of life for some, but have preferred to
think of it as a temporary measure. Accordingly, adequate income has
given way to other considerations. However, if we had had a generally
acceptable and accepted income adequacy measure during the Depression,
it might have become a part of the goals and policies established then.
Certainly legislators were interested in the idea, if unsatisfied with
the actual indicator. The question remains open at this point as to
whether any measure of income adequacy would capture some common
concept - if indeed such a concept exists or could be created. Here
we shall examine why the concept of the budget and the methods of
measuring it were so much less satisfactory than concepts and methods
of unemployment data.
First of all, the concept the budget represented, a social norm
of adequate consumption, was not in common parlance, like unemploy-
ment. The assumption was that it was an implicit concept, that many
of us might subconsciously apply, but those who understood the concept
disagreed on its practical definition. The norm is not measurable by
common, objective standards. While many of the users of unemployment
data might not fully understand or even agree with the classification
of marginal cases, most would have a similar basic idea about what
unemployment was. The concept is objective in that we can observe
unemployment fairly directly. The social norm of adequate income is
more of a "theoretical concept" in Kaplan's terminology. We require
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a fairly elaborate theory just to observe and measure it. Moreover,
we can only assume it exists in the first place on the basis of
theory which says that people operate according to some such norm.
To accept unemployment data we must assume that those we inter-
viewed understood the questions about their work patterns in the way
we intended, that they did not lie, that enumerators recorded honestly
and accurately the information, and that our sampling models will
reproduce actual population patterns from a subgroup. For the
standard budget, however, we must accept all these assumptions plus
several others. These others are, for example, that public health
professionals produce standards which represent the social standard,
that consumer choices reflect a common social standard, that people
choose to satisfy by consumption needs within certain categories in
a particular order, and so on. With each additional model we take
a further step from credibility, as well as from understanding and
increase the potential for error.
The standard budget has a far higher component of subjectivity
than the unemployment rate. Although a few marginal situations have
been included among the unemployed, on a value-basis, the unemployed
can be counted by the objective criterion of current activity.
If one is not at work, but looking for a job, he is unemployed.
While the current BLS budget design does not depend on an individual's
subjective decision, many ingredients depend on the basically subjective
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decision of a standard-setting group.
Ultimately the models and multiple methods of the budget make
what it measures ambiguous. Even the well-informed user of budgets
is hard put to know what the measure implies. Its meaning cannot be
communicated well and, in any case, it is unclear that consistent
criteria were applied in the selection of budget components. These
factors add up to confusion and distrust of the indicator.
The fact that the budget is a norm has also con'tributed to the
difficulties it has had in being accepted. For the budget the
technicians not only select the ingredients and decide how to combine
them, but they also determine the amount of these ingredients.
This quantity inevitably became a norm despite BLS disclaimers. it
was used in many situations as either the target income or the
definition of the income level below which a problem begins. With
unemployment, technicians designed only the scale; the rate itself
moved around on the scale. Whether the normative level is 3, 4 or 5%
has been a subject of heated political discussion and economic analysis.
Since the budget itself was the norm, it would be the highly political
issue. Moreover, since the budget was so complex, ambiguous and
allowed so much room for error, it became doubly controversial. To
accept the budget would involve not just the acceptance of a statistical
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"fact" which one might use in various ways, but the precise definition
of a problem and a goal. A reluctance to make these steps is clearly
behind current Administration efforts to eliminate the indicator. Its
use is forcing the issue of adequate income into plans for welfare
reform and forcing a particular definition of that income.
The fact that the unemployment rate was a national aggregate
figure, while the budget was a representative indicator, highly
specific as to place and family type, has also made a difference in
the uses. An overall national percentage is simpler and more usual
than this very specific yet unrealistic measure. The level of its
components is somewhere between actual and ideal,and the choices are
weighted combinations of divergent preferences. Not only is such a
measure difficult to understand, it is also difficult for the user
to know in what situation it is appropriate to apply it.
The unemployment measure is obviously a suitable gauge of national
unemployment, but the budget is not obviously suitable in any
situation. In fact, the critics have severe complaints about almost
every use. The family type and the need criteria make the budget
inappropriate for wage discussions. It is too approximate for setting
specific assistance levels for families. Moreover, the criteria for
selection of components do not necessarily mesh with those of various
programs for which budgets define eligibility standards. As
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approximate income lines for separating out broad population groups
with equivalent incomes, the budgets do serve fairly well. But, if
one is going to study these groups further and analyze their charac-
teristics, one would have to understand clearly the implications of
the selection criterion. The budgets' complexity precludes any such
essential clarification and make it a poor research tool. Few
researchers have used it, preferring to stick with more straightforward
income criteria.
These differences in the nature of the two indicators have been
a considerable factor in the differences in their uses and users.
The qualities of the uses and users seem to have been the critical
ones in the institutionalization of unemployment figures. Potential
users were less able to understand the standard budgets and less
willing to trust them, than they were the simpler, less normative
unemployment figures. The greater difficulty of applying budgets
than unemployment rates to broad population groups was a major
obstacle to their use in the important, visible, policy-level
discussion. The lack of trust and understanding of the budgets pre-
vented their incorporation in policies of income support in the
thirties; whereas faith in the unemployment figures made them an
essential ingredient in policy apparatus set up by the Employment Act.
The specificity of budgets has meant that there has been a
tremendous number of budgets, designed independently each with its
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own methods and content. There has been until recently no authorita-
tive budget for large groups to focus on. At most there were eight
or ten unemployment estimates, but for many years there has been only
one unemployment figure. Accordingly, the users of the budgets have
been highly dispersed geographically and administratively. Budgets
have been most applicable to limited administrative situations.
Many more budget-users than unemployment data users have been middle-
level bureaucrats than public figures. Budget use.rs have been
scattered throughout many kinds of public and private agencies at
city, state and Federal levels,and they have not formed a national
interest group. Unemployment figures, on the other hand, because of
the Employment Act, affect economic policy across the board and,
accordingly, are of interest to national power groups, such as
business and labor. Although some labor unions have used budgets,
they have been few and this use has been sporadic - not enough to
assure their permanent commitment to the understanding and protecting
of the standard budget series.
The unemployment measure is not designed with much more
theory than the budget, but its greater simplicity makes it possible,
nonetheless, to be a more useful research toool. If the budget is
to be used in research, it needs more theory because it is so highly
indirect a measure of so theoretical a construct. The budget's
style, methods and content did not develop along with economic or
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social theory and it simply is not pertinent to the issues in these
areas. Judging from the important role economists have played in
analyzing and defending the unemployment data when it was attacked
and the importance the indicator gained when it was part of models of
the economy, the standard budget's possibilities for institutionali-




SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR THE FUTURE
The similarities and differences in the two case studies and
the logic of their patterns is suggestive for those who wish to plan
indicators for the future. While the future need not exactly
resemble the past, and indeed we study the past in the hope of
improving upon it, many of the past patterns seem likely to recur
because of the nature of indicators and the nature of social decision-
making.
We can use the studies to help us prepare plans for future
indicators which take into account those features which are unavoidable,
which emphasize those which are most likely to make them successful
and avoid the pitfalls of the past. On the basis of the studies,
I propose some general guidelines for the planners of future indicators.
Some may seem obvious at the present juncture, but most have not had
explicit statement in the literature or planning for indicators.
Many of the guidelines stem from two basic principles. The
first is that an indicator has significant political potential. If
an indicator has policy relevance, its use will have an impact and it
will become controversial. In focussing attention on problems and
suggesting goals, it may please some, but is bound to displease others.
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In fact the more impact an indicator may have on policy, the more
likely it is to have opposition. The recognition of this potential
is essential to any strategy for getting new indicators implemented
and used.
The second principle is that the design of an indicator which
is importantly used, is necessarily a process in which actual and
potential uses influence and are influenced by the indicator's
characteristics. Efforts simply to declare an indicator by official
fiat have not been notably successful. It seems far more likely
that many different viewpoints and hopes for new policies, much
discussion, and experimentation will be required before a satisfactory
concept is found. The concept may require the development of new
measurement methods or the revision of old ones. The methods may
require changes in the concept which then needs further consideration.
The process when successful is likely to be time-consuming, iterative,
and involve many people and groups. Moreover, an indicator which
maintains its vitality and relevance over a long period is likely to
be redesigned or "improved" from time to time, particularly after
experience with its use builds up. If this did not happen, it would
soon be out of tune with changing values, social theories and political
realities.
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Several recommendations for the designers of indicators flow from
these basic considerations and more generally from the lessons of the
two case studies. They are as follows:
Look to the legilsative process to supply the initiative and
political force to institute new indicators. Some proponents of
indicators have already recognized the potential of Congress in this
process and are focussing attention on the Full Opportunity Act.
Congress was the principal instigator of new budge-ts over the years
and consistently, until 1940, demanded adequate unemployment data.
It was Congress too that began to use both indicators in the broad
policy discussion which was to assure their political impact.
Congress was the source of the Employment Act with its requirement
for data. Given the potential of indicators as a weapon for
"outsiders" to criticise an Administration, and the fact that once
an indicator series is established, a national Administration can
often do nothing to stop or influence it, it is to be expected
that the legislative rather than executive branch will be most
interested in indicators.
To get an indicator series started, take advantage of
compelling current issues. To overcome inertia in the system and
outright resistance to new and perhaps politically dangerous indicators,
one cancapitalize on current problems and focus attention on the need
for specific indicators. Carroll Wright did this in 1888 when he used
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the controversial tariff issue to focus attention on a need for family
expenditure data. Without this spur, it is unlikely the surveys
would ever have been done. Data gathering costs money and the Congress
who must appropriate it has its attention riveted on the solution of
immediate issues rather than analysis of long-range problems.
Developments in both the indicators studied here, especially at the
beginning, were closely tied to urgent problems.
This experience strongly suggests that any effort to institute
a total system of social indicators in one step is likely to fail.
It would require far too much political capital. It would probably
mean giving some semi-independent institution the power to select,
design and perhaps apply official indicators to current problems.
Neither a Congress nor an Administration is likely to be willing to
relinquish so much power over future problem definitions. In any
case it is not clear whether indicators designed in such a way would
have any impact. If the patties who would use the indicators had
little input into their design, they might well ignore them, for all
their official status. It seems far more likely that indicators will
continue to be created, one at a time in response to pressures, with
much public discussion before they are established.
Integrate the indicator into policy commitments. If an indicator
has a specific role in the implementation of programs or policy to
which we have a permanent commitment, it can become very strong.
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Interest groups come to oversee and protect it, and an Administration
is forced to continue its collection no matter how unpleasant the
information it conveys.
Ensure that the institution which produces the indicators
operates according to nonpartisan professional standards. In view
of the political nature of indicators, they can easily become suspect.
An indicator is confusing rather than helpful to discussion and
planning if some participants accept it and others do not. An
important insurance against this is keep the data-producing institutions
out of day-to-day politics and staffed with people whose principal
is to their professional standards. Occasional checks by outside
groups on their activities can be an additional reassurance and a
reminder to the agency.
Establish open processes for the design of indicators. That is,
do not rely on a singal bureaucratic group to create in a short period
indicators that will be implemented and used. Rather, develop a plan
which will provide both incentive and opportunity for economic and
social theorists, statisticians and potential public and private users
to participate in indicator design. Allow time for individuals and
groups to understand the proposals, test their implications against
their own needs, and visualize new opportunities. Make an aggressive
effort to communicate to a relatively wide group the nature of the
issues and decisions so that feedback may come before substantial
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investment in an indicator. This kind of effort has been shown for
both budgets and unemployment to provide the necessary inputs to the
indicators which can make them relevant and used. It also provides
public confidence in the product and often an important group of
supporters.
Establish ways to allow for orderly changes in methods and
concepts and permit public scrutiny of the data generally and
irregularities in particular. Outside groups of well-known experts
have served effectively on many occasions with both indicators to
reassure the public about the methods of the data-producing agencies,
to make recommendations about changes in concepts or method, and to
follow up on their implementation. They provide a channel to the
agencies for the expertise and views of the academic community.
Organized groups of less expert users perform some parallel
functions. They complain when an indicator does not serve their
needs or they do not understand it. In this way, they provide
impetus for changes. Their questions and comments help to make clear
to the agency where it has failed to explain the data properly.
Finally, they too serve as powerful support groups.
Plan indicators that mesh as much as possible with theory.
Think through and define clearly the concept to be measured, and choose,
where possible, the clearest and simplest concept. Attempts to lay out
clearly the relationship between the concept and its measure. If the
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indicator is unrelated to economic or social theory, like the standard
budget was, and if its concept and measurement are complicated and
ambiguous, it is likely not to have the valuable interest and support
of the research community. Moreover, it is far more likely to be
suspect among the public and many potential users than a simpler,
clearer measure. It is also far more likely than a simpler measure
to be inappropriately used, cause distortions in policy and perhaps
its own downfall.
Avoid indicators whose methods, or concepts are largely subjective.
An indicator is unlikely to be trusted and used by many people of
different persuasions if it contains a large subjective element, and
it is not very useful for research. The greater subjective aspect
of the budget than of unemployment data clearly gave the former a
large handicap.
Avoid designing indicators which incorporate norms. The decisions
about target levels of an indicator are highly charged politically.
They involve value judgments and models of the social or economic
system. The preferred choice may depend on the level of other
variables in the system. An indicator which incorporates a norm may
be rejected for that reason. The issues of norm selection are so
complex and so relative to a time and place that it is preferable to
allow the policy-makers to set them in particular situations after
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discussion and analysis rather than to fix them per-manently in an
indicator.
